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Abstract 
Designers of intrusion detection systems are often faced with the problem that their design fails 
to meet the specification because the actual implementation is not able to detect anac/cs as 
required. This work aims at addressing such shoncomings at an ear(v stage of the design 
process. The proposed method provides guidance to intrusion detection systems designers by 
predicting whether or not a given design will be able to detect cenain classes of anacks. Our 
method achieves this by introdUCing a classification of anacks and a description framework for 
intrusion detection systems. The anack classification and the description framework are defined 
at a common level of abstraction. and thereby form the basis for our ana(vsis method. which 
determines the anack classes that a given intrusion detection system design can detect. Intrusion 
detection system designers can use these results to determine where the design meets the 
specification and where it does not. These insights facilitate a more systematic and effective 
design process because they can be gained at an early stage of the design process without the 
need of actually implementing the design. Final/y. we show how our approach to intrusion 
detection system design analysis can be validated and how the analysis results can be used for 
further applications such as guiding the design of intrusion detection architectures that combine 
diverse intrusion detection systems. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
In recent years, an increasing number of intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have become available 
[Sobire98]. This has been driven by numerous developments, including the growing e-business paradigm. 
the increasing interconnection of critical infrastructure elements, and the growing number of computer 
security incidents [CIN0799, Gross97, Howard97, Kumar95, LSMTTF98, Neuman98b, NeuPar89]. 
These incidents highlight the increasing need for organizations to protect their networks against 
adversaries [Sundar96]. The subject of protecting networks and making them secure and reliable has been 
addressed in many publications that have analyzed the problems and made pertinent recommendations 
[BeGIRa98, Neuman98]. Intrusion detection (ID) is widely regarded as being part of the solution for 
protecting today's networks. 
IDSs are used to improve system security by detecting attacks and intrusions. However, although they 
have been under development for many years, installing and configuring them to provide the intended 
service still is a major undertaking and may involve an unacceptable effort. There are numerous reasons 
for these difficulties. The facts that 
1. IDSs tend to generate excessive numbers (99% and more) of false alarms [JuliscOO, JuliscOl] 
and that 
2. they often fail to meet their specification by not detecting attacks they should detect 
[LFGHKMOO, LHFKDOO] 
are two of the most frequent and important weaknesses of IDSs. These weaknesses are in part caused by a 
problem inherent to intrusion detection: the difficulty of determining whether the intent of activities that 
IDSs observe is malicious or benign, i.e., whether or not an alarm should be generated. There exists no 
generally applicable technique to make such distinctions, not least because many attacks make legitimate 
use of features provided by the target system. Instead highly specific and, at times, ad-hoc techniques are 
required for rating activities as being either malicious or benign. As a consequence special care has to be 
exercised during the design process of IDSs, in particular when ad-hoc techniques are used. Such IDSs 
often suffer from the weaknesses described above. 
1.1 Motivation 
The design of an IDS is a challenging task because besides requirements such as the coverage of certain 
types of attacks, other limiting factors have also to be taken into account, such as the following: 
• Feature extraction: The output of an IDS can only be as accurate as its input [MWSKHH90]. For 
detecting a given type of attack the IDS needs to be capable of making the appropriate 
observations, i.e., it needs access to data that is relevant for detecting the attack. Thus, the IDS 
designer needs to identify the data required and, most importantly, a data source that provides 
this data in an appropriate fonnat. This is a non-trivial task because often the IDS designer is not 
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able to influence the properties of the data source and because different detection approaches 
may rely on different data sets for their operation. Moreover commonly available data sources 
may require significant pre-processing of the data they provide or do not provide all the data 
needed. 
• Trade-off between costs and functionality: The use of a gIven data source and detection 
approach comes with a certain cost. Their use may, for instance, cause an unacceptable 
performance degradation, or require impractical modifications of the surveyed system. In order 
to limit such side-effects, IDSs often use entirely different or simplified solutions that may result 
in reduced performance of the IDS. In fact in many cases such alternative solutions yield IDSs 
that are not able to detect certain types of obfuscated, i.e., slightly modified. attacks [PtaNew98] 
or that generate numerous false alarms. 
• Test data: Whenever an IDS is tested realistic input data is required [Maxion98, McHughOO. 
McHughOOb]. This is an issue because no two environments for which an IDS is to be designed 
are identical and because IDSs may make use of environment-dependent optimizations and ad-
hoc solutions. Thus, there is no single general-purpose data set that can be used for testing. 
The following example illustrates most of the issues described from the view of an IDS that monitors 
network traffic, i.e., a network-based IDS. 
Example: IP PDU/ may be fragmented by a router if they exceed the size that the link connecting the 
router to the destination network is able to transmit. Thus, the fragmentation of IP PDUs is a legitimate 
and necessary functionality provided by the IP protocol. However, this functionality can be used by 
adversaries to obfuscate attacks such as http-related attacks that operate at a higher level of the protocol 
stack. An IDS observing an IP PDU that has been fragmented has to reassemble its fragments before the 
content can be analyzed properly (feature extraction issue). Particularly in heavily loaded networks this 
may impose a significant load on the IDS, not least because fragments may be sent out of order. Because 
of this difficulty some IDS designers choose to not provide the functionality of reassembling IP fragments 
or at least give the user the option of disabling this functionality (cost-functionality trade-ofJ). Moreover 
some IDSs generate alarms whenever a fragmented IP PDU is observed. However, because fragmented 
IP PDUs may occur in entirely legitimate traffic, such attack signatures generally result in excessive 
numbers of false alarms. As documented by Marty [Marty02, p. 66] some IDS designers address this 
issue by having their IDSs only generate alarms whenever the size of alP PDU fragment is smaller than 
a chosen value. Such ad-hoc solutions may reduce the number false alarms, but do not eliminate them. 
Thus any such alarm has to be interpreted with care and, assuming it is not a false alarm, conveys only 
very little information about the actual attack (test data issue). 
1 PDU: Protocol data unit; a packet 
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1.2 Goal 
Recent evaluations [LFGHKMOO, LHF'KDOO, Maxion98, WalderOla] of actual IDS implementations 
have clearly revealed that currently available IDSs suffer from various weaknesses such as the ones 
described thus far. This insight motivated this work. which aims to support the designers of IDSs in their 
task. The requirement is to provide a method and tool that predicts the potential of a given IDS design 
proposal to detect given types, i.e., classes, of attacks without the need to actually implement the 
proposed IDS design. Such an approach limits the effort required to a practical level because it saves us 
from having to conduct an impractical number of experiments. We therefore set the following goal for 
this work: 
Goal: 
1.3 Approach 
Provide guidance to IDS designers by predicting the detection 
capabilities of intrusion detection systems. 
In order to achieve the above goal we propose an approach in which we claim it can be predicted whether 
or not an IDS design is able to detect a given class of attacks. As these predictions have to be made at the 
level of attack classes, we propose an approach that performs a combined analysis of descriptions of 
attack classes and IDS designs, i.e., without the need to evaluate IDS implementations. In the beginning 
the two tracks of analysis, i.e., the description of attack classes the description of IDS designs, are split to 
ensure their originality. 
For the first track we introduce an attack classification that classifies attacks according to their externally 
observable characteristics, i.e., according to the attack characteristics that are observable by IDSs, humans 
etc. We determine attack characteristics using a generic system model that enables the identification of 
system components and the interaction among these components when the system is under attack. So, any 
two attacks belong to the same attack class if they share the same set of externally observable 
characteristics. Attack classes are therefore defined by a set of externally observable characteristics that is 
shared by all attacks belonging to a given class. 
The identified attack classes are then described in terms of IDS characteristics an IDS must have in order 
to be capable of analyzing a given class of attacks, i.e., analyzing attacks belonging to any such class. 
Note also that these descriptions must reflect all conceivable approaches an IDS could take to analyze 
such attacks. The fact that attack classes are described using IDS characteristics as they are defmed by the 
IDS description framework significantly simplifies the actual IDS analysis and ensures consistency across 
the entire work. 
The second track describes IDSs using the IDS characteristics just mentioned. These characteristics are 
derived from IDS classifications and are used to describe the manner in which IDSs gather and analyze 
infonnation for signs of attacks. 
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At the core of our approach we use a method that determines the manner in which an ID analyze a 
given class of attacks. As input to this analysis we use descriptions of IDSs and descriptions of attack 
classes. In a second step further analysis is perfonned and the actual output generated. The analy i 
results for each attack class may be different and consist of a set of generalized alamlS that the analyzed 
IDS has the potential of generating. Generalized alanns are defined by the analysis techniques and the 
data an IDS uses to detect attacks that belong to the considered attack class, i.e., they reflect the semantics 
of the alarms that the actual implementation of the analyzed IDS design potentially generates. In order to 
broaden the scope of these results, the analysis step also includes the automated identification of clas e 
of attack variants, i.e., attacks that have been obfuscated in some way, and the analysis of IDSs for the e 
additional attack classes. Figure 1 provides an overview of the IDS analysis process. As part of thi work, 
we have created a prototype implementation of this process that we narned RIDAX (Rule-ba ed Intrusion 
Detection system Analyzer and eXaminer). 
Description of 
lOSs 
Classification & 
Description of 
Attacks 
Analysis of lOSs 1---" 
Figure l--Overview of the IDS analysis process 
The IDS analysis results are meant to feed into an iterative design process that aims at identifying an IDS 
design proposal that meets the IDS specification with regard to the classes of attacks the IDS has to be 
able to detect. However, it has to be emphasized that our approach uses descriptions of IDSs and classes 
of attacks, i.e. , that it operates at a conceptual level. The use of such class-level resul ts is advantageous 
for designers of IDSs, because they are not required to keep track of the numerous individual attacks that 
are newly discovered on a daily basis. Instead, the designers can focus on developing and optimizing the 
generic detection capabilities of IDSs, i.e., on their detection capabilities with regard to entire classes of 
attacks. However, the actual implementation of an IDS will only generate the results predicted by our 
approach if the IDS is configured accordingly, if all the attack signatures required are available. Also the 
IDS must not suffer from implementation flaws or use ad-hoc techniques that are not reflected by its 
description. In practice these limitations are merely of limited significance because it is in the interest of 
IDS implementers and users to make best use of the capabilities offered by IDSs. This means, for 
instance, that IDS users usually update attack signatures regularly-similar to the manner signatures of 
anti-virus systems are kept up-to-date. 
The fact that under certain circumstances an IDS may behave differently than predicted also has 
implications on the validation of this work. We will discuss these difficulties and show that for practical 
reasons only limited validation can be provided. A limited validation can be achieved by providing 
evidence that for a representative number of attacks the analysis results produced by our approach reflect 
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the results that actual IDS implementations produce. We will outline such a validation approach by 
comparing a small number of results produced by our approach with the results ID implementations 
produce. 
1.4 Novelty of our approach 
Numerous surveys and classifications of IDSs and attacks have been proposed. IDS surveys uch a the 
one by Jackson [Jacks099) and those by many others [Amor099 Axelss99b. EsSaPi95. Lunt 
MWSKHH90) generally focus on the detection capabilities of IDSs and less so on the ID characteri ti 
that are necessary to achieve these capabilities. IDS classi fications such as the ones by one Debar er a l . 
[DeDaWeOO, DeDaWe99) or the one by Axelsson [AxelssOO) focus on the internal characteri tic of 
IDSs. However, because they do not aim at the automated analysis of IDS detection capabilitie . they 
operate at a level of abstraction that for our purposes is too coarse. 
Approaches to IDS benchmarking evaluate IDS implementations fo r their behavior with regard to 
predefmed sets of attacks. Most of the experiments are generally conducted in artificially created 
environments that simulate background acti vity. The best known work in this area is the o-called Lincoln 
Lab experiment conducted by Lippmann et at. [LFGHKMOO, LHFKDOO). However, Maxion and Tan 
[Maxion98, MaxTanOO) as well as many others [DCWMS99, GafUlvO I, WalderO l a, WalderO lb) have 
also made important contributions to the evaluation of IDSs. It has to be mentioned that in particular the 
Lincoln Lab experiment has been criticized [McHughOO, McHughOOb) as having numerous shortcomings 
that in part also apply to the other approaches. From our perspective, the results provided by ID 
evaluations are too low-level because the benchmarks are carri ed out using a selection of specific attacks 
rather than at the level of attack classes. 
Note that IDS evaluations could be used to determine class-level results if one conducted a substantia l 
number of tests to determine the IDS behavior for each equivalence class of attacks. However, such an 
approach requires a large number of tests that would exceed the number of tests involved in the Lincoln 
Lab experiments by far. Moreover benchmarks obviously require the IDSs to be implemented, which is a 
second requirement that we attempt to circumvent with our approach. Figure 2 provides a comparison of 
our approach (above the dashed line) to IDS benchmarking (below the dashed line). 
Analysis of lOSs 
Abstract Level 
Implementation Level 
,..------.~=======----1 Benchl~~ng of r-- -.-( IDS Alarms I 
Figure 2--Comparison of our approach with IDS benchmarking 
In the area of attack classifications there exists a substantial amount of prior work. Important 
contributions have been made by Neuman and Parker [Neuman95, euPar89], Kumar [Kumar95) and 
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many others [Cohen95, Howard97, LinJon97]. In many cases classifications of attacks are tightly coupled 
with the classification of vulnerabilities [Howard97, Krsul98]. When studying these classifications. one 
fmds many of them to be quite different from each other because each of them pursues a different goal. 
Regarding the goal pursued by our approach, the attack characteristics that might potentially be 
observable by an IDS are the most important aspects to be taken into account. 
Seeking a suitable classification, we found that most existing attack classifications were aimed at different 
goals or did not capture the attacks in appropriate detail and were therefore not well-suited for our 
purposes. Hence, we found it necessary to develop our own classification and description schemes for 
IDSs and attacks. However, in the following we also use, for instance, concepts developed by Debar et al. 
[DeDaWeOO, DeDaWe99] as a basis for a part of our IDS description framework. 
Finally note that it has been argued [McHughOO, McHughOOb] that one of the major weaknesses of IDS 
benchmarking approaches is the manner in which the attacks used for testing purposes are selected. For 
our approach this issue is only of limited importance as the analysis of IDSs is conducted at the level of 
attack classes rather than at the level of specific attacks. However, when it comes to providing relevant 
examples and a set of predefmed attack class descriptions, we are in the advantageous situation of being 
able to make use of existing work to select attack classes that are known to be relevant. While conducting 
the work presented here, we have built and maintained IBM's security database (VulDa) [DacAle99], 
which we were able to use for categorizing attacks with regard to the observable aspects of attacks. We 
used the statistical results obtained from this categorization to select a number of relevant classes of 
attacks that we then used in the larger context of this work. The availability of such statistical data that 
reveals the most popular attack categories may also help IDS designers when specifying the list of attack 
classes that their IDSs should be able to detect. 
1.5 Contributions 
The method and tool presented in this work supports designers of IDSs by providing them with the 
capability of verifying whether their design meets the requirements before the actual system is 
implemented. Moreover the results provided by our approach may serve as the foundation for other ID-
related research such as the assessment of IDSs and combinations thereof. In detail we make the 
following contributions: 
1. A novel and systematic scheme to describe IDSs concisely: So far IDSs have been characterized 
and described based only on benchmarks [LFGHKMOO, LHFKDOO] and product descriptions 
[Jacks099]. Our scheme also goes further than existing taxonomies of IDSs [AxelssOO, 
DeDaWeOO, DeDaWe99] by describing IDSs in a much fmer granularity. 
2. A generic classification and description scheme for attacks: We created an attack classification 
and description scheme that is based on criteria that are directly relevant to the ways IDSs 
analyze their observations for signs of security threats. The attack and IDS description schemes 
make use of a common basis that ensures consistency and simplifies the analysis of IDS designs. 
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3. A novel approach to IDS analysis: Making use of the fIrst two items. our approach [AlessaOO] 
systematically predicts the attack classes that a given IDS design is able to detect and how these 
classes would be reported. The results obtained provide guidance to IDS designers by identifying 
strengths and weaknesses of IDS designs and, most importantly, by identifying where the design 
meets the specifIcation and where it does not. Moreover we have outlined and successfully 
illustrated the manner in which our approach to IDS analysis can be validated-thereby 
implicitly also validating the above two points. 
In addition we categorized attacks based on criteria that are relevant for their detection using IBM's 
security database VulDa [DacAle99]. The statistical results obtained served to identify representative 
attacks and attack classes for which we created descriptions in the course of this work. The statistics 
obtained support IDS designers in the specillcation of the attack classes that the IDS to be created needs 
to be able to detect. The categorization has become an integral part of VulDa, which is used on a daily 
basis by IBM's security professionals. 
Finally note that the IDS analysis results obtained in the last item form the foundation for further ID 
research, such as for developing novel approaches to the assessment of IDSs and combinations thereof. 
1.6 Outline 
In the following chapters we fIrst develop the necessary foundations for this work, and then explain and 
develop the approach introduced in Section 1.3 in detail. The foundations include a discussion of related 
work, and also introduce fundamental concepts and terminology, which is done in Chapter 2. 
Then, in Chapter 3, we provide a more detailed overview of the entire approach that has been developed 
in this thesis. 
In Chapter 4, we describe the attack categorization scheme that we apply to attacks taken from VulDa. 
VulDa is IBM's security database, which was developed by the author in parallel with the work described 
here (see Appendix A). The scheme provides a categorization of attacks that enables us to identify the 
most relevant attacks, which we then use to identify the attack classes used during the IDS analysis 
process. Furthermore we develop the generic concept of IDS scopes. These simplify the combination of 
our work items and support us in ensuring consistency. 
In Chapter 5 we develop the IDS description framework. It makes use of the IDS scope concept 
developed in Chapter 4, which is why it is placed after the attack categorization chapter. 
Chapter 6 defines the manner in which attack classes are to be described by means of IDS characteristics, 
and thereby combines the results obtained in Chapters 4 and 5. 
The results of these chapters are then brought together in Chapter 7, where we develop the IDS analysis 
process, which resulted in the implementation of RIDAX. The latter is also described in this context. 
Finally, we outline and discuss an approach for validating IDS analysis results as, for instance, generated 
by RIDAX and provide a set of illustrative examples. 
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In Chapter 8 we provide an extensive example for a further application of the IDS analysis results as they 
are produced by RIDAX. The example explores a possibility of assessing individual IDSs and 
combinations thereof. In order to achieve this we first define suitable assessment metrics. Then we 
discuss results obtained by using an extended version of RIDAX to calculate these metrics. These results 
are based on the analysis of five configurations of three fundamentally different IDSs, and assess every 
possible combination of them. The results clearly show that not every combination of IDSs is beneficial 
and results in improved completeness and utility of the ID architecture design considered. 
Chapter 9 concludes this work and provides a critical discussion as well as an outlook to future work that 
we envisage to pursue. 
Figure 3 provides an overview of the chapters herein and indicates their main dependencies. The square 
boxes represent processes or tasks performed, while the rounded boxes represent concepts and results 
produced. 
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Chapter 2 Related Work 
The main focus of this work is the investigation of how IDSs analyze attacks. Accordingly it is closely 
related to approaches to IDS evaluation, but also to ID in general. This specifically includes 
classifications of attacks and IDSs. Last but not least, parts of this work relate in a significant way to the 
MAFTIA project, which makes use of concepts and terminology originating from the dependability field. 
In fact we have made important contributions to the MAFTIA project in the context of this work 
[D2Maffil, D3MafOl]. One aspect to which we contributed is the MAFTIA terminology, of which we use 
a subset in this work. In the following we provide an overview of these items and also explain how they 
relate to the work to be presented here. 
MAFTIA aims at unifying concepts developed in the ID community and concepts originating from the 
dependability community. The two research fields, although overlapping in significant areas, have 
different roots. ID has its roots in the early seventies [Anders72] and gained impetus with the occurrence 
of the Internet worm [Spaff088] and the seminal work by Denning [Dennin87]. The basic concepts, 
however, were discussed in the early eighties by Anderson [Anders80]. The concept of dependable 
computing dates back even further. As explained by Avizienis et al. [AvLaRaOO], the concept of 
dependable computing first appeared in the 1830's. Because of their rather unreliable components, the 
first generation of electronic computers led to the development of new dependability techniques, starting 
in the late 1940's. 
In this work we make use of the dependability concept known as fault assumptions [LaA vK092]. The 
goal of fault assumptions is to identify all possible faults that might be activated within a system. 
Knowing all possible potential faults is a prerequisite for a systematic analysis to determine, for instance, 
the expected mean time to failure (MTTF) of a given system. This concept inspired us to identify the 
input to the IDS analysis based on a categorization of attacks, the goal being a systematic identification of 
input data. 
2.1 MAFTIA terminology and concepts 
As mentioned, this work uses the terminology as defined in the framework of the MAFTIA project. A 
first version of this terminology was introduced in the MAFTIA deliverable Dl [DIMaffiO], and then 
significantly improved in the intermediate deliverable D2 [D2MafOl]. The deliverable D21 [D21Maffi3] 
provides the fmal version of the MAFTIA terminology and concepts. Besides defming the terminology, 
MAFTIA applies concepts from the dependability field to ID. We have chosen to adopt these concepts 
and the terminology because they represent a suitable framework. Other approaches, such as the glossary 
initiated by NSA (National Security Agency) [NSA98], are not based on concepts as rigorous as those 
developed by MAFTIA, but merely try to consolidate the common use of terms. A glossary of terms 
defined in the context ofMAFTIA that are relevant to this work can be found in Appendix E. 
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In the dependability field [LaAvK092] the concepts of fault, error and failure pia a central role . A fault 
constitutes the adjudged or hypothesized cause of an error. Applied to ill. attacks can be \; ewed as 
malicious interaction faults (see also Appendix E and D21 [D2l MaID 3 D. An error repre ents the 
manifestation of a fault and is viewed as the part of the system-state liable to lead to failure . FinalJy. 
failure describes the event when the service delivered by a system deviates from fulfilling the tern 
function . Accordingly a security faiJure represents the violation of the intended security polic . i.e ., the 
system function in terms of confidentiality, integrity, availability or any other security-related 
requirement is not guaranteed anymore . Figure 4 illustrates the basic fault model. For a detailed 
discussion how this model can be applied to security and to ill in particular we refer to Section 3.3.2 of 
the MAFTIA deliverable D21 [D2IMaf03]. 
Fault Fault 
Error Failure 
Figure 4-Basic fault model 
In the remainder of this section we describe those concepts developed within MAFTlA that are relevant 
to this work, including the definition of intrusion detection that was made in tenns of we ll -defined 
concepts originating from the dependability field . In the following severa l concepts taken from the 
MAFTIA deliverables D2 [D2MafO 1], D3 [D3MafO 1] and D21 [D21 Maf03] are therefo re repeated or 
summarized. Note, however, that this is onJy done for items to which the author made ignificant 
contributions. 
2.1.1 Intrusion Detection 
Considering the term intrusion detection from a linguistic viewpoint, it seems obvious that the goal is to 
detect intrusions. Unfortunately this turns out not to be quite correct once one takes a closer look at its 
current (rather unfocused) usage-the term intrusion detection is used as a name for a set of security-
relevant practices and mechanisms. 
In this work we use the terms intrusion detection and intrusion detection system as they are defined in the 
MAFTIA deliverable D2 [D2MafOl] . These definitions use the well-established dependability 
terminology: 
• intrusion detection: the set of practices and mechanisms used towards detecting errors that may 
lead to security failure , and/or diagnosing attacks. 
• intrusion detection system: an implementation of the practices and mechanisms of intrusion 
detection . 
The error-detection portion of ill is the observation and analysis of the system aimed at detecting states 
that are error states as defined by the security policy. In practice this is often implemented by detecting 
symptoms or evidence of such error states and includes the detection of suspicious activities, vulnerabdi 
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scanning, and configuration checking. Additionally IDSs may perform a certain degree of fault diagnosis 
in which intrusions, vulnerabilities and/or attacks are analyzed and assessed further. However. most 
currently available IDSs do not include any fault-diagnosis mechanisms that go beyond what is required 
for detecting errors. When monitoring a system for suspicious activities the IDS has to analyze any 
activity observed to some degree. If the analyzed activity is found to be suspicious, additional analysis 
may be conducted. In this case we view the total of the two analysis steps as "fault diagnosis," because 
the diagnostic results provided along with the error report, i.e., the alarm. may contain information 
already determined in the first analysis phase. 
2.1.2 CIDF intrusion detection model as viewed by MAFTIA 
In Chapter 5 we shall develop our own IDS model. In fact this model is to be viewed as a simplified 
version of the CIDF ID model as it has been adopted and refined by the MAFTIA project [D2Maro I]. 
The following discussion summarizes the CIDF model, including the refmements done by MAFTIA. 
MAFTIA presents a model of IDSs according to function, derived as a refinement of the Common 
Intrusion Detection Framework (CIDF) [CIDF98]. Wherever possible, the language of the CIDF is used, 
although some refmement has been necessary. MAFTIA also addresses issues of channels between 
components, which, however, are not a concern in the context of this work. 
The CIDF classifies components of an IDS into four categories. 
• An e-box, or event generator, is a component that gathers event information. 
• An a-box, or analysis box, analyses event information toward detecting errors and diagnosing 
faults. The output of an analysis box may provide information to other analysis boxes. 
• A d-box, or database, provides persistence for the IDSs. This facility will take on different forms 
depending upon use. It may be a complex relational database or a simple text file. 
• An r-box, or response box, is the portion of the system that acts upon the results of analysis. 
According to [CIDF98], automated responses may include killing processes, resetting 
connections, or activating degraded service modes. In line with the discussion in Section 2.1.1, 
we do not consider the r-box to be part of ID per se. MAFTIA instead considers the r-boxes as 
part of the set of facilities providing error recovery, fault isolation, and system reconfiguration in 
a general intrusion-tolerance framework. 
Figure 5 presents a refinement of the CIDF model that explicitly identifies sub-components of the e-box, 
and the fact that there may be multiple e-, a- and d-boxes. 
Note that the decomposition may not correspond to particular physical boundaries. Vulnerabilities, and 
hence targets, exist at several different abstraction and implementation layers so that the model is to be 
applicable at several layers. The boundaries between components are determined by the level of 
abstraction with which we view the system: people, LANs, machines, processes, memory pages. etc. 
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Figure 5--IDS components of the eIDF model 
2.2 Classifications 
Classifications and description schemes are an essential part of this work, as we sha ll develop a eries of 
them in the context of trus work. The following subsections ajm at providing an overview of exj ring 
work, of wruch we shall adopt significant portions. 
2.2.1 Classification requirements 
An important characteristic of our approach to IDS analysis is the fact that it operates based on classes of 
attacks rather than on specific implementations of attacks. In order to ensure consi tency and va lidity of 
the IDS analysis results, it is therefore vital that the classification scheme used for classifying attacks is 
sound and well-swted for its purpose. Hence, the requirements the attack classification scheme needs to 
fulfil have to be defined clearly. 
Computer Science and most particularly ID has adopted the concept and mechanisms of classifications 
from other sciences such as Biology or Sociology. Based on a review of generically valid classification 
requirements [Bailey94, Marrad90] and requirements more specific to Computer Science [VeRaGlO I, 
Ze1Wal97] and ID [Howard97, Krsul98 , LinJon97], we have identified the following set of requirements 
that a classification scheme needs meet in order to be considered sound: 
• Orthogonality: Any item can be put into only one class. 
• Procedure: The classification procedure must be available, I.e. , the classification must be 
reproducible. 
• Observability: The classification procedure has to be based on observable, measurable features 
of the event. 
• llierarchy: Classes are ruerarcrucal , subilivided into more specific classes. 
• Consistency: Members of a given class must share common properties. 
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The attack classification scheme that we develop in this work will have to meet above requirements. 
Accordingly we shall review whether our attack classification meets these requirements (see Section 
7.3.2). 
2.2.2 Equivalence class testing 
Equivalence class testing is an approach to system analysis that aims at systematically testing every 
conceivable mode of operation of a given system. 
The term eqUivalence class stems from the field of discrete mathematics (see Sections 7.2 and 7.3 in 
[Biggs02]). Equivalence classes are non-empty and pair-wise disjoint. Their union covers the complete 
set of elements considered. Moreover all members of a given equivalence class are related. This means 
that if a is member of the equivalence class A and b is related to a, b is a member of A as well. It also 
means that neither a or b are members of the equivalence class B. 
Equivalence class testing addresses the difficulty that in many cases it is not practical to test a system for 
every possible set of input parameters. Using this approach, one classifies all possible input parameters 
into equivalence classes-the goal being the identification of all conceivable modes of operation. The 
parameters assigned to a given class affect a given, previously identified mode of operation of the tested 
system. During the actual test runs one selects representative input parameters from each equivalence 
class. The number of parameters selected per class may vary. It is important that borders of equivalence 
classes are included in the tests if such borders can be identified. For instance, if a class is defined by the 
fact that a given numerical input parameter lies in a given range, the test should include values within the 
range but also at the limits of the range. 
2.2.3 IDS classifications 
The first proposals for IDS classifications date back to the late 1980s and were realized in the form of 
surveys such as the work by Lunt [Lunt88], Jackson [Jacks099], and others [Amor099, Axelss99b, 
EsSaPi95, MWSKHH90]. 
Sound classifications and taxonomies of IDSs and ID-related technologies are a rather recent 
development, dating back only to 1999. The taxonomy proposed by Debar et al. [DeDaWe99] is probably 
one of the first real IDS taxonomies. Other taxonomies have since been published, such as the one 
proposed by Axelsson [AxelssOO] and, more recently, the one proposed by Halme and Bauer [HalBauOO]. 
Figure 6 shows the taxonomy proposed by Debar et al. [DeDaWe99]. This taxonomy was later extended 
and refined by Axelsson [AxelssOO] and by Debar et al. themselves [DeDaWeOO]. 
In the context of this work the most important elements of the taxonomy by Debar et al. are the audit 
source location and, especially, the detection method. The detection method is used to divide IDSs into 
so-called behavior-based and knowledge-based systems. 
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Figure 6-1999 IDS taxonomy by Debar et aL 
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Behavior-based systems, also called anomaly-detection systems [Mounji97], have no knowledge of 
specific attacks. However, they have been provided with knowledge of the behavior of the system being 
monitored during normal operation. Such knowledge has been acquired either by extensive training of the 
system [DeBeSi92, JLADGJ93] or by other more systematic approaches such as those implemented in the 
DaemonWatcher by Wespi et al. [WeDaDeOO, WesDeb99]. Behavior-based systems have the important 
advantage that they require no database of attack signatures that needs to be kept up-to-date. The main 
drawback of behavior-based systems is that the alarms they generate are meaningless because generally 
they cannot provide any diagnostic information (fault diagnosis) such as the type of attack that was 
encountered. In other words, they can only signal that something unusual happened. A second drawback 
is the requirement that a database that describes the normal behavior of a system has to be built. 
Depending on the implementation of the IDS this may mean that for every single version of a product a 
separate signature set needs to be generated [WeDaDeOO, WesDeb99] or that the IDS needs to be trained 
using data from the real operational environment [DeBeSi92, JLADGJ93]. When real operational data is 
used, one always runs the risk of including real attacks in the training data. As a consequence of this the 
IDS would not report attacks contained in the training data as being suspicious. 
Knowledge-based systems, also called misuse detection systems [Mounji97], operate based on a database 
of known attack signatures. Whenever they encounter an activity matching a signature stored in the 
database, the corresponding alarm is generated. The advantage of such systems is that their alarms are 
meaningful, i.e., they contain diagnostic information about the cause of the alarm On the other hand, 
their main drawback lies in the system component that enables the generation of meaningful alarms. i.e., 
the database. The database of attack signatures needs to be kept up-to-date, which is a tedious task 
because new vulnerabilities and attacks are discovered on a daily basis. However, most commercial 
systems available today, for instance NetRanger from Cisco [CiscoNR99] and RealSecure from ISS 
[ISSNet99], are knowledge-based systems. 
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Note that the revised IDS taxonomy by Debar et al. [DeDaWeOO] as shown in Figure 7 takes into account 
the detection paradigm implemented by the IDS. If the detection paradigm of an IDS is state-based. the 
IDS tries to identify a given system state as being an error state or as being a failure state. Transition-
based IDSs monitor a system for any state transition that represents an attack or an intrusion. 
Moreover, Debar et al. redefme the audit source location by adding the categories application log files 
and IDS sensor alerts. This modification takes into account the differences in granularity of log data 
generated on a hos~. Furthermore, the addition of IDS sensor alerts reflects the trend to hierarchical ID 
architectures, in which several IDSs send their alerts to a higher-level instance where the alerts are 
analyzed and possibly aggregated. The resulting alerts may then be sent to the next-higher instance or 
presented to the security officer. 
10<-----,.1 NONPERTURBING 
EVALUATION 
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i'<-----"i EVALUATION 1..=:..==--_---' 
Figure 7-Revised IDS taxonomy by Debar et aI. 
Based on the work by Debar et al., Axelsson [AxelssOO] refined, using different terms, the detection 
method. Moreover he regrouped and extended the remaining categories into what he calls "a taxonomy of 
system characteristics." 
2 In Section 5.2.1.1 we classify information sources as well, but do so using a more generic approach. 
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As in Debar et al., Axelsson classified a number ofIDSs according to his taxonomy. Some of the systems 
appear in more than one category-raising the question whether his taxonomy is ambiguous. Axelsson 
gives a plausible explanation for this by stating [AxelssOO, p. 7]: 
... this is not because the classification is ambiguous but because the systems employ several 
different principles of detection. 
However, the presented schemes for classifying and describing IDSs represent merely informal schemes 
that are not suitable for the automated analysis of IDSs as envisaged in this work. They pursue different 
goals and, most importantly, do not enable IDS descriptions at the level of detail required for our 
approach. In Chapter 5 we develop a description scheme for IDSs that is partially based on above 
concepts and that enables the description of IDSs at sufficient level of detail. 
2.2.4 Attack classifications 
Attack taxonomies and the resulting classifications are of interest to us because we envisage using a 
classification of attacks to identify the input to the evaluation of IDSs. Computer security attacks and 
vulnerabilities have been classified in many ways; however, so far no commonly accepted reference 
classification exists. 
As described in detail by Howard [Howard97] many attack classifications are based on empirical lists or 
simple lists of terms. The weakness of these classifications is that often the terms used to classify are not 
mutually exclusive and/or properties of vulnerabilities, and that properties of attacks are not clearly 
separated. An example of such a classification is the one proposed by Cohen [Cohen95]. 
One of the earliest works is the one by Neumann and Parker [NeuPar89]. There the authors classified data 
from about 3000 incidents, which they had collected over 20 years, according to nine different computer 
misuse techniques they had defined. These categories are, as the authors state themselves, not mutually 
exclusive. Based on [NeuPar89], Neumann proposed an extended scheme [Neurnan95] where he also 
incorporates the vulnerability exploited and the impact of an attack. 
Other approaches, such as the one proposed by Howard [Howard97], classify attacks according to several 
sets of categories concurrently. Lindqvist and Jonsson [LinJon97] proposed a similar approach by 
classifying attacks according to the two sets of categories "intrusion technique" and "intrusion result." In 
his Ph.D. thesis [Kumar95] Kumar introduces a classification based on attack signatures used within the 
IDS IDIOT [CDEKS96]. This classification is based on the type of observation required to be able to 
detect a given attack. As we shall discuss in Chapter 4, this work is related to our activity classification, 
which is based on activity properties observable by an IDS. 
While considering these different approaches to the classification of attacks, we were able to identify the 
following classification categories: 
• List of terms: a wide range of highly diverse terms. Examples: [Cohen95, IcSeV095] 
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Tools: type of tool used to execute an attack e.g., script, distributed tool etc. Example: 
[Howard97] 
Prerequisites: the prerequisites to be met before an attack can be staged successfully, e.g., access 
required, resources required, skills required etc. Examples: [CheBeI94, JiSilrOO, Longst97. 
NeuPar89] 
Technique: the technique used to run a given attack, e.g., spoofing. Examples: [LinJon97, 
NeuPar89, Stalli95] 
Detection technique: the technique or type of signature required to detect a given attack. 
Examples: [Kurnar95, KumSpa95] 
Impact: the immediate damage caused by a successful attack, i.e., an intrusion. Examples: 
[CheBeI94, Howard97, JiSiIrOO, LinJon97, NeuPar89, SinSigOl] 
Bear in mind that many attack classifications also include information on the vulnerabilities exploited. 
characteristics of the attacker, and hislher objectives etc. These inclusions let them become general 
classifications of security issues rather than attack classifications. 
As mentioned in our approach to IDS evaluation, we use the statistical results of an attack classification to 
identify the classes of attacks that are actually of relevance. Clearly, for us to be able to derive a 
representative set of activities from such a classification, the classification needs to be centered on the 
attack aspects observable by IDSs. Also, we require the classification to be sound, i.e., to meet the 
requirements defined in Section 2.2.1. 
Unfortunately most attack classifications do not meet these criteria (the same is true for many 
vulnerability classifications). This has been observed and extensively criticized earlier by several authors 
[Howard97, Krsul98, LinJon97]: 
• Namely the categories used in attack classification are often not mutually exclusive. This is often 
due to a bad choice in the set of categories that form a category set. 
• An attack may qualify for several-mutually exclusive--categories concurrently. In many cases 
this is not caused by a bad choice of the categories, but rather by the fact that attacks involving a 
sequence of steps are not atomic operations. 
• An IDS can observe a given attack in many different ways, depending on the information source 
and detection techniques used. 
The fact that we were not able to identify an attack classification that meets above requirements led us to 
develop a categorization scheme for attacks, described in Chapter 4. 
2.2.5 Vulnerability classifications 
Vulnerabilities are tightly linked to attacks. In fact, to successfully launch an attack, the corresponding 
exploitable vulnerability must be present in the system. This close relationship may cause confusion when 
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defining a classification. One example is the classification proposed by Howard in [Howard97]. where he 
proposes a "computer and network attack taxonomy" that contains categories describing the vulnerability 
exploited. This is not to say that combining attack and vulnerability characteristics is not viable, but they 
should be clearly distinguished to avoid confusion. 
Similar to attack classifications, the classes used for a vulnerability classification are determined by the 
goal pursued. For example, if the genesis of a vulnerability is of interest, classes describing the genesis of 
the fault will be introduced, as done in the classification proposed by Landwehr et aJ. [LBMW94]. Their 
work is based on hierarchical categories, i.e., a decision tree. However, as explained by Howard 
[Howard97], this classification is ambiguous because vulnerabilities may qualify for several categories 
concurrently, i.e., violate the orthogonality requirement. 
In his Ph.D. thesis [KrsuI98] Krsul discusses 17 different vulnerability classifications. We are not 
reproducing the entire discussion here, but instead provide an overview of the various classes chosen for 
these classifications: 
• Genesis: The way the fault was introduced. Examples: [AsKrSp96, Aslam95, LBMW94, 
Longst97]. 
• Time: The point in time at which a fault was introduced, e.g., design phase, coding phase, 
maintenance etc. Examples: [Howard97, LBMW94]. 
• Cause: The cause for the introduction of a fault, e.g., wrong algorithm or parameter used etc. 
Examples: [Knuth89, Longst97]. 
• Removal: The steps to be taken to remove a given fault. Example: [DeMMat95]. 
• Type: The type of operation that is faulty, e.g., decision making, data handling etc. Examples: 
[BasPer84, KrSpTr98, OstWey84]. 
• Location: The location of the fault, e.g., the faulty object, protocol, device etc. Examples: 
[DLAR9I, KrSpTr98, LBMW94, Tanenb87]. 
• Threat: The potential threat represented by a vulnerability. Examples: [KrSpTr98, Power96]. 
The threat category is closely related to the impact category introduced in Section 2.2.4, as are attacks and 
vulnerabilities in general. A given attack does not necessarily exploit a given vulnerability in the worst 
possible way, i.e., the threat represented by a given vulnerability is not necessarily fully exploited by an 
attack attempting to exploit that vulnerability. 
Example: A fully exploitable buffer overflow [Aleph96} vulnerability may be used to take over control of 
the system or merely to crash the system. 
2.2.5.1 Enumeration of vulnerabilities 
A non-classificatory approach to deal with vulnerabilities is to enumerate them. Recent efforts to 
enumerate vulnerabilities are driven by the common need for unique identifiers for vulnerabilities when 
handling security incidents, reporting the finding of vulnerability on a given system, and also when 
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reporting the observation of an attack, i.e., when an IDS generates an alarm [DeHuDoOO. W ooErlO I]. The 
latter, however, is less obvious as attacks may not always be mapped onto specific vulnerabilities and 
vice-versa. 
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [ManChr99] is a security-industry-.... ide effort 
coordinated by the MITRE Corporation [CVE99]. CVE is a dictionary that aims at facilitating the sharing 
of data across separate vulnerability databases and security tools. While CVE may make it easier to 
search for information in other databases, it should not be considered as a vulnerability database on its 
own merit. 
Another well-known effort is the Bugtraq ID. Bugtraq IDs are assigned based on vulnerabilities as 
published on the security mailing list bugtraq, operated by the SecurityFocus [SecFoc] web site. CVE 
entries and Bugtraq ID database records both refer to their corresponding counterparts in the other 
database. However, neither CVE entries nor Bugtraq IDs--or any other identifiers-are assigned based 
on the same principles. 
Example: A design flaw recently discovered in the Microsoft IIS Webserver software enables a remote 
user to execute arbitrary commands on the machine running the webserver software. In this particular 
example CERT [CERT] released the advisory CA-2001.12 [CAl201]. The same vulnerability has been 
assigned the Bugtraq ID 2708 [SF2708j by SecurityFocus and the CVE candidate name CAN-2001-0333 
[CVE033301j by the CVE editorial board. Once the review process of the CVE candidate entry is 
finalized. the name of the entry will be changed to CVE-2001-0333 provided that the entry is not rejected. 
which seems very unlikely given the severity of this case. 
2.3 Evaluation of intrusion detection systems 
IDSs can be evaluated or simply compared in many ways-all pursuing different goals. So far we have 
been able to identify three different approaches: 
1. Description-based comparison 
2. Enumerative evaluation 
3. Benchmarking 
In the following, we discuss the three approaches listed above. Because the so-called Lincoln Lab 
experiment by Lippmann et al. [LFGHKMOO, LHFKDOO] had the most significant impact in the field 
with respect to IDS evaluation we shall dedicate Section 2.3.3.1 to their work and explain it in greater 
detail. Lastly we would like to mention the recent survey on ID by McHugh [McHughOI] in which he 
dedicates an entire chapter (Chapter 5) to the various approaches to IDS evaluation, including the initial 
version of the approach presented here [AlessaOO]. 
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2.3.1 Description-based comparison of intrusion detection systems 
Summaries such as the one maintained by Sobirey [Sobire98] provide an over,iew of existing IDSs. 
However, they do not allow the comparison of IDSs based on a pre-defIned set of criteria. In an extensive 
work Jackson [Jacks099] did exactly this. She described numerous IDSs by means of a predefIned set of 
criteria that then allows their comparison. It is clear that this work does not take into account the quality 
of IDSs in any form as it is based on the description of IDSs only. Also, it provides limited information 
about the classes of attacks detected by the IDS only. Nevertheless this work provides a useful over-iew 
of the IDSs available and the technology used to perform ID. 
As we use an IDS description framework, it is probably fair to consider our approach as a description-
based analysis of IDSs. 
2.3.2 Quantitative evaluation of intrusion detection systems 
Another, more practical approach is to test IDSs for a predefmed list of attacks: Here one systematically 
launches every attack on the list and records the alarms the IDSs being tested generate. Such enumerative 
testing can be based on pragmatically composed lists of attacks or on enumerations such as CVE or 
Bugtraq IDs. The test environment is generally kept simple and does not include additional elements to 
generate background activity artifIcially. 
One example is the diploma thesis of Gigandet, the results of which were published in a research report 
[GigandOO]. In this report he describes the results he obtained by examining Symantec's host-based IDS 
product Intruder Alert3 [InAlertO 1] for a large list of attacks. 
2.3.3 Benchmarking of intrusion detection systems 
Benchmarking of rDSs has become the most popular approach to IDS evaluation. In part this is certainly 
the effect of CERT's recommendation [ACFMPS99] to develop adequate ways to test IDSs. 
Benchmarking generally imposes a relatively complex testbed that permits the testing of IDSs under 
conditions closely matching those found in real environments. This means that, in contrast to the previous 
approach, a significant effort has to be made to generate background activity that is as realistic as 
possible. The background activity influences IDSs in two ways. Firstly, attack-similar background 
activity may cause IDSs to generate false alarms. Secondly, a high volume of background activity may 
reduce the detection rate ofIDSs because they are overwhelmed by the amount of information to analyze. 
In mentioning these aspects, we have already identifIed one of the big issues with this type of approach: 
Because no two environments are identical, the evaluation results are of limited value only as soon as one 
starts considering IDSs in differing environments. 
3 Originally this product was developed by Axent. Axent was acquired by Syrnantec in 2000. 
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As mentioned, the most highly regarded work in this field is certainly the "1998 and 1999 DARPA off-
line intrusion detection evaluation" [LFGHKMOO, LHFKDOO] performed at the Lincoln Lab by 
Lippmann et af. They used a complex testbed where IDSs were systematically exposed to malicious and 
benign activities. This work represents an important contribution to the field. It thereby builds the 
foundation for further work such as the work by Maxion and Tan [Maxion98, MaxTanOO], the work by 
Durst et al. [DCWMS99], the work by Gaffney and Ulvila [GafUlvOl] and last but not least the LARIAT 
(Lincoln Adaptable Real-time Information Assurance Testbed) project [HRLC01, RCFRLH01], which is 
the continuation of the Lincoln Lab evaluation. 
It is worth mentioning that McHugh has criticized the Lincoln Lab evaluation repeatedly [McHughOO, 
McHughOOb]. His critique represents an important contribution as it not only identifies many issues that 
apply specifically to the Lincoln Lab work, but also-and even more importantly-issues that generally 
apply to IDS benchmarking approaches. It is therefore no surprise that many of the issues identified by 
McHugh also apply to most recent work such as that pursued by the NSS Group [WalderOla, 
WalderOlb]. 
2.3.3.1 The Lincoln Lab evaluation 
In their evaluations Lippmann et al. [LFGHKMOO, LHFKDOO] made a considerable effort to create a 
testbed that closely resembles a real environment-the fictional Eyreie Air Force base. Besides systems 
used for attacking other systems and systems serving as attack targets, the testbed also included a router 
to simulate an internal and an external network. In addition, hundreds of PCs and workstations were 
simulated on the internal network, and thousands of them on the external network. 
This setting was then used to simulate five weeks of real operation of the site. During this period, all 
network traffic and host audit data (Solaris BS~ and Windows NT audit event logs) on the internal as 
well as on the external network was recorded. In addition, nightly filesystem dumps of the security-
relevant files were made from the attack target machines. This setup resulted in a huge amount of 
information-mainly consisting of background activity. For instance, on average, every day 411 Mb of 
networking data was recorded. 
During the five-week period, real attacks were run on the testbed-overlapping with the simulated 
background activity. The attacks were marked in the recorded data in order to enable the comparison of 
the alarms generated by the IDS tested and the attacks actually run. 
Unfortunately Lippmann et al. provide no information about the criteria that were used to compose the set 
of attacks employed. In their 1999 evaluation, they used 56 different attacks that they classified according 
to the classification by Weber [Weber98]. This classification distinguishes five classes of attacks: 
1. Probing attacks, 
4 BSM stands for Sun's Basic Security Module, which is used to generate level C2 audit logs on Solaris 
systems. 
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2. Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, 
3. Remote to Local (R2L) attacks, 
4. User to Root (U2R) attacks, and 
5. Data attacks. 
Once all this information was recorded, they split the data into two subsets. The first portion, covering 
three weeks, was made available to test and tune IDSs and included the markers to find attacks in the test 
data. The second portion, covering the final two weeks, did not include any markers where to find attacks 
in the test data. This second portion was then used to evaluate various IDSs. 
The results then obtained illustrate the general weaknesses of current IDSs. As mainly knowledge-based 
IDSs were evaluated, it is clear that many attacks were missed because either the corresponding attack 
signature was not available or the attack was executed in a stealthy, i.e., obfuscated. fashion that 
prevented its detection. 
Finally, they acknowledge the deficiency of their testbed with respect to false positives. They clearly state 
that the false-alarm rates need to be interpreted in the context of the testbed, and that the false-alarm rates 
may vary significantly depending on the environment in which the IDS is used. 
As mentioned, McHugh published a critique [McHughOO, McHughOOb] of the Lincoln Lab evaluation. 
There he identifies a series of issues the evaluation suffers from. He points out that simulated background 
traffic seems to be too low. This has a negative impact on the false-alarm rates measured, which therefore 
also seem to be too low. Moreover, he criticizes the manner in which the attacks were selected and how 
the selected attacks were distributed over the test data-the different classes of attacks were not 
distributed in a realistic manner. In addition, he identifies a long list of further issues the approach suffers 
from. Last but not least, he criticizes the attack classification [Weber98] used because it is not useful in 
describing what an IDS might see. 
McHugh identified the major deficiencies in a precise and well-founded manner. It is his critique that has 
significantly influenced the more recent work pursued at the Lincoln Lab. With LARIAT [HRLCOl, 
RCFRLHOl], the Lincoln Lab is developing a new benchmarking system that emphasizes the interactive 
generation of realistic attack sequences more strongly. Furthermore, they address many of the issues 
identified by McHugh. 
However, one has to acknowledge the Lincoln Lab evaluation as an impressive and important work, 
especially because it has influenced a series of further undertakings. 
One of them is the work of Maxion and Tan [Maxion98, MaxTanOO] on the benchmarking of anornaly-
based detection systems, i.e., behavior-based IDSs. In contrast to the Lincoln Lab evaluation, they also 
performed tests in a real-world environment, which yielded far more representative results with respect to 
false alarms generated by the system being evaluated. 
Another recent undertaking is the work of Wan and Yang [WanYanOl], who developed a software 
platform for the testing of network-based IDSs in real-world environments. Their approach uses the 
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traffic of real-world environments as background traffic, which is overlaid with the attacks used for 
evaluating IDSs. 
Last but not least the work by Marty [Marty02] needs to be mentioned The goal of this effort is not the 
benchmarking of IDSs but the in-depth analysis of how diverse IDSs react to attack obfuscation 
techniques and, most importantly, how the various IDSs report these obfuscated attacks. This work. 
which in part is motivated by the concepts developed in this thesis, is being conducted at the liM Zurich 
Research Laboratory. 
2.3.3.2 Benchmarking work pre-dating the Lincoln Lab evaluation 
Prior to the work by Lippmann et aI., relatively little work was done in this field. The first notable work is 
that by Puketza et al. [PZCM096]. In their work they made a considerable effort to evaluate the network-
based IDS NSM [HDLMWW90] under stress conditions. By doing so, they were able to demonstrate the 
relation between the number of omitted PDUs (protocol data units) and the increasing load on the system 
hosting the IDS. In the continuation [PCOM97] of their work, they were able to demonstrate how attack 
obfuscation techniques can be used to prevent IDSs from detecting attacks or at least to reduce the risk of 
detection for adversaries. 
Also prior to the Lincoln Lab effort, the liM Zurich Research Laboratory developed an IDS testbed 
[DDWL98] that was used to evaluate IDSs for liM internal purposes. 
2.4 Discussion 
When describing IDS benchmarking, especially as done at the Lincoln Lab, numerous issues have already 
been identified. Many of these issues are not specific to the Lincoln Lab work, but are valid for any form 
of IDS benchmarking, especially if performed in a testbed. However, this does not mean that these 
evaluation results are not useful. Clearly, any IDS benchmarking approach needs to be considered in the 
context of the goals pursued. The goal of the IDS benchmarking initiatives is, in most cases, to compare 
IDSs and to provide a foundation for deciding which IDS to choose to protect a given environment. 
2.4.1 Issues in IDS benchmarking 
Although a remarkable effort has been made to meet these goals, the results achieved so far are still 
imperfect. This is for several reasons-most of which have been described by McHugh [McHughOO, 
McHughOOb, McHughOl]. The most important issues are the following: 
• The potential threats defme the protection required. In order to judge the utility of an IDS the 
threats one wishes to address need to be defined such that one can clearly define the 
requirements one expects the IDS to meet. 
In current benchmarking efforts the set of attacks used for benchmarking is selected in a 
relatively ad-hoc fashion. However, the choice of the test data is crucial to every form of 
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system testing. Many approaches to IDS evaluation lack a clear strategy in the selection of 
their test set or use a strategy that is flawed, e.g., [LFGHKMOO, LHFKDOO). Our approach 
suffers far less from such insufficiencies because it is based on classes of attacks. The 
strategy used in this work to determine attack classes meets the equivalence class testing 
requirements presented in Section 2.2.2. It uses a categorization scheme that pennits attacks 
and benign activities to be classified according to aspects that are observable by IDSs (see 
Chapter 4). 
Another aspect that requires increased attention are attack-obfuscation techniques or, in 
other words, activity variations. Although, for instance, Lippmann et al. acknowledge the 
importance of addressing this issue in their 1999 evaluation [LHFKDOO) and have made a 
considerable effort to implement such variants [DasOO, KendalI99), the issue generally is not 
addressed in a generic fashion. As we shall see in detail in Chapter 6, our approach 
addresses activity variants in a highly generic fashion that pennits the concurrent application 
of multiple variations to one activity. 
Furthermore it seems advisable to weight the severity of threats, i.e., to weight the 
importance of the benchmarking results for any given attack. For instance, in an almost 
purely Windows-based environment, it seems obvious that one would give priority to the 
detection of Windows-related attacks. This does not mean that one would not also check for 
Unix-related attacks as they may provide additional indications about malicious activities in 
progress. However, one would certainly assign a lower weight to the benchmarking results 
for Unix-related threats than to those for Windows-related threats. 
• The testbed environment biases the benchmarks. Whenever an IDS is connected to a real 
operational network or installed on a host, the IDS is exposed to a distribution of activities and 
activity variants that is specific to the environment considered. As a consequence benchmarks 
are mostly performed in an environment that is not representative of the target environment for 
which an IDS has to be selected. 
False positives: The rate of false positives determined during a benchmark may not be 
representative of the rate of false positives one observes in the target environment. For 
instance, if a class of benign activities for which the evaluated IDS has the potential of 
generating false alarms is very frequent, the IDS is likely to generate many false positives. 
If, however, such activities are very infrequent or do not even occur in the evaluation 
environment the benchmarking results produced will not reflect this weakness of the IDS. 
True positives: The frequency and type of attacks used in the evaluation environment 
directly influence the rate at which true positives are generated. The type of attacks used 
may non-uniformly emphasize strengths and weaknesses of IDSs. 
Background activity: The amount and type of (benign) background activity may impose a 
significant load on IDSs, which may cause them to omit data, e.g., drop PDUs. The type of 
background activity used in the evaluation environment may impact IDSs in a non-uniform 
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fashion because they differ in the amount of resources spent on analyzing different types of 
activities. As a consequence evaluation results may emphasize non-relevant or suppress 
relevant strengths and weaknesses of IDSs because the artificial creation of background 
activity as observable in real-world environments is difficult. Moreover in real-world 
environments, background activity can change significantly over time-a fact nicely 
illustrated by the data-mining experiments described by Julisch [JuliscOO, JuliscOI). 
Topology: The modeling of environments is more complex than merely determining the 
frequency of activities and their variants, although already this may be a challenge. 
Especially when considering a highly distributed ID architecture, one has to take into 
account the topology of the system (i.e., the network) when modeling the environment. 
simply because not every IDS is exposed to same distribution of activities. This issue 
significantly increases the complexity of processing the alarms generated by multiple lOSs 
installed at different topological locations. 
• The utility of the information provided by IDS alarms is not assessed. Current benchmarks do 
not really evaluate the expressiveness of IDS alarms. They only distinguish between true and 
false positives. The contribution that a given alarm may make to the interpretation of what the 
IDS has observed is not evaluated. Also, the method employed to decide whether a given alann 
actually describes the detected attack correctly is not clearly defmed. For instance, an http attack 
that is obfuscated by fragmented PDUs may be reported by an alarm that indicates the presence 
of fragmented PDUs. Such an alann qualifies as a true positive because the fragmentation was 
reported correctly. However, the actual attack was not correctly identified, i.e .. diagnosed5. 
Accordingly the results provided by IDS benchmarks that do not judge whether the semantics of 
alarms is sufficient to allow reasonable conclusions about the cause of the alarms have to be 
considered with care. An example for such an approach is the NSS work [WalderOla). Also, 
current approaches do not clearly distinguish whether alarms contain diagnostic information 
about the impact of the attack, e.g., whether the attack was successful or not. This becomes 
especially relevant whenever one compares IDSs of different types, for instance, behavior- and 
knowledge-based systems. 
• The potential for detecting unknown and non-tested attacks cannot be determined. The results of 
current benchmarks are not suitable to forecast an IDS's potential to detect attacks other than the 
ones it has been tested for. This obviously also includes attacks that are not yet known. This 
situation could certainly be improved by classifying attacks according to a classification that is 
centered around the observable aspects of attacks instead, for instance, around the impact of 
attacks. Nevertheless, the test result, i.e., a judgement as to whether an IDS has the potential for 
detecting a certain class of attacks, is always going to be biased by numerous external factors. 
For instance, it will depend on how the IDS has been configured or, even more importantly, on 
whether the signature for the attack considered has been defined for the IDS tested. It may well 
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be that the tested IDS has the potential for detecting a certain class of attacks. However, if the 
IDS does not provide a signature for the attack that is used to verify whether it is capable of 
detecting said class, the test result will be misleading. 
2.4.2 Limitations of our approach 
As explained in Chapter 1, the goals of current benchmarking approaches are different from those of our 
far more conceptual approach. The fact that our approach operates based on entire classes of attacks 
enables predictions of high generality about the behavior of IDSs. These predictions cover a significant 
number of actual attacks requiring a only comparatively limited analysis effort. Most importantly, these 
predictions can be made based on the design of an IDS, i.e., even before the IDS is actually implemented. 
However, this does not mean that our approach does not have its own drawbacks. One might, for instance, 
argue that it should take into account the environment for which the analyzed IDS is envisaged. However, 
in view of the goal that we pursue with our approach, taking into account the environment is merely a 
desirable extension rather than a requirement. It should, however, be noted that an IDS design that our 
approach has determined to have the potential for detecting attacks of a certain class may turn out not to 
be able to do so in practice. This can happen if the IDS implementation 
• uses highly IDS-implementation-specific heuristics, 
• suffers from implementation flaws, 
• is configured badly, or 
• does not provide a sufficient set of signatures (assuming a knowledge-based IDS). 
In other terms, our approach determines whether an IDS offers the potential to detect a given attack class. 
It does so also for different configurations of a given IDS. However, here one has to distinguish between 
configuration changes that impact the manner an IDS performs its analysis and changes that merely affect 
a given set of attacks. For instance, if one enables the reassembly of TCP streams for one installation of 
Snort [Roesch99] but not for a second installation that operates in parallel, significant differences can be 
expected. On the other hand, the fundamental properties of the IDS remain unchanged if one enables, 
disables or modifies the signature for detecting a given attack. 
Moreover IDSs often use heuristics in order to rate observed activities or suffer from subtle 
implementation flaws that may increase the effort required for their evaluation significantly. Marty 
[Marty02] describes an IDS that was found to raise alarms whenever it observes IP fragments that are 
between 28 and 42 bytes in size (see also the example provided in the introduction of Chapter 1). Our 
approach operates at too high a level in order to reflect such highly implementation-specific aspects. 
However, benchmarking-based approaches do not analyze such subtleties either because the number of 
individual tests required would be impractically high. 
5 In fact, this is an example for the concurrent occurrence of a true positive and a false negative. 
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2.4.3 Summary 
In this work we introduce a new description scheme for IDSs and a new classification scheme for attacks. 
These schemes are defmed such that they enable predictions as to whether an IDS is capable of detecting 
a given class of attacks and to determine the manner in which any such finding will be reported. The 
existing schemes for IDS classification and attack classification either pursue an entirely different goal. 
are not of sufficient detail or both. Moreover our attack classification scheme is descriptive, whereas 
existing attack classifications merely associate attacks to predefmed categories. 
Our approach to IDS analysis is quite different from existing IDS benchmarking approaches. In Table 1 
we have sununarized the main differences between the Lincoln Lab evaluation, which is probably the 
most important work in this field so far, and our own approach. 
Table l---Comparison of the Lincoln Lab evaluation to our approach 
Comparison of Lincoln Lab evaluation Our enumerative and description-based 
paradigms approach 
(rule-based evaluation) 
Goal Provide measurements to judge quality of, to Provide guidance to IDS designers by predicting 
compare and to support the selection of lOSs the detection capabilities of lOSs 
Realization Evaluation testbed; replay of recorded traffic Rule-based Description of the characteristics of I lOSs and attack classes using Prolog rules 
What is analyzed? IDS implementation and configuration Potential of IDS designs 
Environment A chosen testbed Independent of environment 
Input Real attacks and background activity (e.g .. Description of classes of attack classes; the 
traffic) attack classes considered are determined by 
means of an extensive attack categorization 
Input variation Known variants of given attacks selected Variants of attack classes are generated 
systematically 
Results List of specific attacks the IDS can detect; The set of attack classes an IDS design has the 
Number and percentage of detected attacks potential of detecting and the generalized alarms 
and false positives (ROC curves). by which the attack classes are reported. 
Limitations Significant bias by test environment; Prediction made for IDS design may differ from 
enormous effort involved; only limited behavior of the actual IDS implementation. 
coverage of conceivable attacks. 
It seems inappropriate and impossible to establish a ranking of the existing approaches, including ours, in 
terms of one being superior to the others, because all approaches aim at different goals-in particular 
ours. Also, it is clear that our approach, being very conceptual, will only be able to provide results at a 
relatively high and conceptual level. However, this is perfectly in line with our goal of providing 
guidance to designers ofIDSs by predicting the detection capabilities of their designs. For such guidance 
class-level results are required because the typical IDS design goal is to cover entire classes of attacks 
rather than specific attacks only. 
In the preceding discussion on IDS evaluation, it has been observed that ID alarms are not of binary 
nature, i.e., they are not simply correct or incorrect, and that, as a consequence, it may not always be 
sensible to simply rate them as true or false positives. Naturally, this also applies to our approach, which 
is the reason why we introduced the concept of generalized alarms. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have introduced important concepts originating from the ID and dependability fields. In 
part this was done by summarizing concepts developed in the context of MAFfIA to which the author 
has made significant contributions. As a result we were able to defme the ID-related concepts used in this 
work in as consistent a manner as rarely done elsewhere. 
Furthermore we have discussed various existing approaches to IDS, attack, and vulnerability 
classification, and found that none of them is directly usable for our approach to IDS analysis. However. 
to some extent, important contributions, such as the IDS classification by Debar et al. [DeDaweOO. 
DeDaWe99], will be adapted as we develop our IDS description scheme in Chapter 5. Finally we have 
discussed existing approaches to IDS evaluation and therein provided a comparison of our approach with 
the important Lincoln Lab evaluation by Lippmann et al. [LFGHKMOO. LHFKDOO]. However. as the two 
approaches rely on fundamentally different concepts and aim at different goals. they are not meaningfully 
comparable. 
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Chapter 3 Overview 
In this chapter we provide a more detailed overview of our approach-thereby introducing the key 
concepts. We begin with an outline of the scheme that we employ for describing ID (ection 3. 1). in 
Section 3.2 we introduce our classification of attacks that yields descriptions of attack clas e . ecrion 3.' 
describes the actual analysis method for IDSs as it was implemented in the RIDAX prototype ( e tion 
3.4). Section 3.5 outlines a possible approach to validate the resuJts produced b RID X and identiEe 
the challenges involved. In Section 3.6 we discuss the resuJts obtaioed and outline further applications of 
the approach presented, such as the one described in Chapter 8. 
3.1 IDS description framework 
In the following we introduce a description scheme for IDSs that enables a detailed but conCI e 
description of those IDS characteristics that are relevant to the detection of attacks. The cherne ha been 
developed in a pragmatic manner based on the experiences gaioed by the development and deployment of 
IDSs and the in-depth analysis of attacks and vuJnerabilities in the context of maintaining IE . ecurity 
database YulDa [DacAle99]. Further details on YulDa will be provided in Appendix A. Example of ID 
characteristics that our scheme captures are the data that is available for analys is, the extent to which 
protocols are interpreted and verified, and the analysis techniques that IDSs may use to determine 
whether or not an observed activity might represent an attack. IDSs may be rather complex ystems, and. 
even more importantly, the characteristics of two IDSs may be fundamentaJl y different. In order to be 
able to describe such a variety of complex systems we chose a scheme that clearly separates the variou 
aspects of an IDS. 
In a first step we chose a system model that divides an IDS into sensors and detectors. The ensor 
corresponds to the e-box known from the CIDF model [CIDF98] and retrieves raw data from an 
information source that it then passes on to the detector. In CIDF terminology, the detector can be viewed 
as the combination of an a- and a d-box. Figure 8 illustrates this simple model (see also Section 2.1.2). 
Alanns 
Detec!ot' (a/<!-box) 
Raw Data 
Information Source 
Figure 8--IDS model used for our description scheme 
In a second step we introduce a scheme for representing IDS characteristics in a t\ n-dimensional and 
hierarchical manner. Using such a scheme it becomes possible to specify very detailed and specific lD 
characteristics using two comparatively simple parameters. One parameter denote a generalized 
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characteristic such as the ability to apply regular expression matching on data. This first parameter. 
however, does not specify the scope within which this IDS characteristic is available, i.e .. it doe not 
determine the kind of data regular expression matching can be applied to. Instead, thi is spe ified b the 
second parameter that determines the so-called IDS scope. The IDS scope specifies the scope of validity 
of generalized IDS characteristics in a hierarchical manner. 
3.1.1 IDS scope 
The IDS scope hierarchy is the result of an iterative process that includes not only thi ork n ID 
analysis but also our work on attack categorization in the context of the VulDa maintenan e [Dac e 9] . 
The scheme is divided into the three top-level scopes "networking " "user" and "ho t. " The ID pe 
"networking" and "host" are then divided into a number of lower-level scope uch a the ID pe 
"application layer" or "process." Beneath these lower-level scopes further e en more pecific cope an 
be defmed. The "user" IDS scope refers to a human user and is not di vided into lower-Ie el cope . 
Figure 9 provides an overview of the IDS scopes identified. 10 the outer right column it pro ide 
numerous examples of low-level IDS scopes that we have identified in the context of this work. Ole that 
this scheme is not fmalized but is meant to be extended as new technologies emerge. 
IDS Scopes User 
IPv4 
1Pv6 
X25 
ARP 
TCP 
UDP 
ICMP 
CORBA 
DC OM 
DNS 
SMTP 
FTP 
'1TTP [ HTIP 1.0 
HTTP 1.1 
CPU 
Siorage 
VO 
Memory 
Network Stack 
System 
:====~_ Function 
File 
Directory 
Unk 
Special 
Signal 
Socket 
FlFO 
Shared Memory 
Message 
Semaphore 
CORBA 
DCOM 
Vanable 
RegislJy 
Figure 9--IDS scope tree with examples of low-level ID scope 
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We extended the IDS scope hierarchy shown in Figure 9 further by adding attribute to the ID pe If 
needed. These attributes express, for instance, whether a transport layer ID cope i connection onented 
or whether multiple transactions are supported within one session. Applied to hrtp. the latter pernuts us lO 
distinguish semantically between hrtp versions 1.0 and 1.1 (unlike hrtp version 1.0, hrtp versIOn 1.1 
supports multiple subsequent http requests within one session). 
IDS scopes play an important role in this work because we also use them for clas ifying attac - . Their use 
thereby supports us by ensuring consistency across all the models de eloped and propo ed in thi w rk. 
The concept of IDS scopes will be developed in Section 4.1. To a large degree it i based n insight 
gained during the operation of the VulDa database (Appendix A). 
3.1.2 IDS characteristics 
The IDS model we use in this work is il lustrated in Figure 8. in our de cription cherne \ e therefore 
distinguish between sensor characteristics and detector characteristic . The majority f the e 
characteristics are represented by a 2-tuple consisting of an ID scope and a generalized lD 
characteristic. In addition to the IDS-scope-dependent characteristic, we al 0 u e a mall number of lD -
scope-independent characteristics for describing some generall y va lid propertie of the component 
described. Figure 10 shows the hierarchy of IDS characteristics that are u ed in the ID de ription 
scheme. The detai ls ofthis scheme, which is outlined in the following, are de eloped in hapter . 
IDS Characteristics 
Oblect 
ObJ8ct AttTlbutes 
Request 
Arguments 
Result 
Dala 
Protocol Control Dala 
IDS Scope Indep 
Sensor Characteris1lCS 
IDS Scope 1ndIp. 
Det.a. ........ 
Figure 10--Top-levels of IDS characteristics hierarch 
3.1.2.1 Sensor characteristics 
O3Ia Normalaatlon 
Instance Part AnalysIS 
Instance AnalysIS 
The sensor component of an IDS is responsible for retrieving data from a data ource and malang it 
available to the detector. We use very few IDS-scope-independent characteristics, the mo t important of 
which is the information source type. The information source type describes hether the data i captured 
in the form of raw data or in the form of log data as a process or the operating y tern create II Thl I 
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illustrated in Figure 11 . Raw data sources are further separated into external and internal data ource . 
External sensors capture data before it actually reaches its destination., hereas internal sensors are 
implemented by a component that is embedded into the element surveyed. 
The information source type is an important characteristics because it determines the extent to which the 
data provided needs to be pre-processed before the detector can analyze it. For instance, using a network 
packet sniffer provides data that requires substantial pre-processing before application la er data an be 
analyzed because the data has to traverse a number of network layers. Figure II provide an overvie\ of 
the information source type hierarchy used along with some examples of actual ensor type . 
External Networ1< Pacl<et Sniffer 
Raw Data 
Integrated Networ1< Sensor 
Internal Integrated AppllcalJOn Sensor 
Information Integrated OS Sensor 
Source Type 
System Level OSAud~~ Accounong 
Log Application Level ApphcalJOn log 
Meta 10 Alarms 
Figure II-Information source types hierarchy including example 
The IDS-scope-dependent sensor characteristics are used to describe the data items that a en or i 
providing to the detector. Each category of sensor characteristics shown in Figure 10 repre ents a number 
of actual sensor characteristics. The category "protocol control data," for instance, contains ensor 
characteristics such as "destination ID" and "destination name." The semantics of these characteristic i 
oruy clearly defined once they are combined with an IDS scope. Considering the above example, the 
sensor characteristics "destination ID" combined with the IDS scope " lPv4" denote the fact that the 
sensor described is able to provide the IP address to the detector. Another example is the category 
"object" that contains the two characteristics "name" and "ID." Combined with the ID cope "proces ," 
these characteristics denote the fact the sensor is able to capture the name and the lD of processes. 
When describing a sensor, the proposed scheme enables us to systematically and conci ely identify the 
data items a sensor is able to provide to a detector. 
3.1.2.2 Detector characteristics 
The description scheme for detectors is more complex than the one for sensors because their task is more 
complex and may vary far more than that of a sensor. For their description we also use a small number of 
IDS-scope-independent characteristics. The most important of these are the ones that reflect whether the 
detector operates in a knowledge- or behavior-based manner. These properties have been adopted directly 
from the IDS classification by Debar et al. [DeDaWeOO, DeDaWe99] . 
One part of the IDS-scope-dependent characteristics describes the data pre-processing capabilities of the 
detector. Here it is described whether an IDS is able to filter observations based on data items such as the 
IP address and whether the detector is able to normalize data items. An example for data nonnalization i 
the decoding of an http URL that uses hexadecimal encoding of characters appearing in the URL as tt t 
often used to obfuscate attacks [PtaNew98 RFPOO]. 
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The other portion of IDS-scope-dependent detector characteristics descnbes the actual analysis 
capabilities of a detector. We distinguish the two high-level categories "instance part analysis" and 
"instance analysis" (see Figure 5). The semantics of a so-called "instance" is defined when it is combined 
with an IDS scope. For example, considering the IDS scope "1Pv4," an instance denotes a complete IP 
PDU and an instance part denotes a fragment of a fragmented IP PDU. Applying the IDS scope 
"process," an instance denotes a process and an instance part stands for a thread. Making this distinction 
between instances and instance parts is necessary because certain detectors are only able to analyze an 
observation when it is available in its complete form whereas others may also be able to analyze 
individual parts of it. Yet other detectors may be able to analyze instance parts only. However. apart from 
this difference the hierarchies beneath the two categories are identical and are composed of what is called 
the "analysis level" and "analysis techniques." The entire hierarchy is illustrated in Figure 12. 
We use three different analysis levels to express the degree to which a detector attempts to analyze an 
instance or an instance part: 
• Basic analysis: This level expresses the fact that a detector has a basic awareness of the instance 
or instance part, i.e., it is able to associate an observation to a specific IDS scope. 
• Logic verification: The detector is able to verify whether the observation confonns to the 
specification. An example is the syntax verification of an http request. 
• Semantic verification: The detector is able to determine the potential impact of its observation. 
An example is the detection of a syntactically correct http request that attempts to retrieve 
confidential information. 
In order to achieve any of above analysis levels, detectors use analysis techniques such as regular 
expression matching, etc. Note, however, that for a given attack a detector is only able to achieve any of 
above analysis levels if all pre-conditions are met. This means that all the required data must be available 
and that the detector must be able to perform all the required pre-processing steps such as the 
normalization ofURLs. 
For our scheme we have identified two kinds of analysis techniques. The "general analysis techniques" 
denote techniques that can be applied to individual instances as well as across multiple instances and 
instance parts: 
• 
• 
Timing analysis: These characteristics reflect the detector's ability to draw conclusions from 
instance properties such as their duration or the time period of observation, e.g., specific hOUTS. 
Data analysis: These characteristics describe a detector's ability to analyze data by applying 
techniques such as string matching or regular expression matching. 
The "cross-instance analysis techniques" describe techniques that can only be applied across multiple 
instances or instance parts: 
• 
Sequence analysis: This category covers the various techniques a detector can employ to 
discover sequences in its observations. It is, for instance, used to describe whether a detector is 
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able to recognize sequences at all , and if so, whether it is able to do so tolerating errors in the 
sequence. 
Statistical analysis: This category is used to describe the characteristics of tatistical anal is 
methods that detectors may use . It is, for instance, used to describe \ hether a detector use 
sliding windows, a decay function or both. 
Figure 12 provides a simplified view of the hierarchy of characteristics that are used in the ID 
description scheme for describing instance- and instance-part-related detector characteri tic . The round-
edged boxes represent the analysis techniques . 
duraOon 
time period 
stnng matChing 
adv. string matChing 
regular el(pression 
size venfication 
fIXed seq. matching 
advanced seq. m 
stateful 
timing 
I <combinations of C 4 characteristics> 
Figure 12-Simplified hierarchy of instance- and instance-part-related detector characteri tics 
3.1.3 Creation of IDS descriptions 
The IDS description scheme introduced enables a detailed description of IDSs. In order to ensure tbat the 
resulting descriptions are not only concise but also repeatable, the creators of IDS descriptions bave to 
obey the following rule : 
Rule: Every IDS characteristic must be expressed using the highest-level 
IDS scope applicable. 
This rule is necessary because it is possible to create valid, but possibly incomplete IDS descriptions that 
do not use the highest-level IDS scope applicable for each IDS characteristic. It thereby prevents 
ambiguities such as the version-specific description of http protocol version-independent IDS 
characteristics. Such characteristics should be described at the IDS scope "http " but could as well be 
described twice: once for the IDS scope "http version 1.0" and once for "http version 1. I ." Although sucb 
descriptions may be correct and complete at the time they are created they may be rendered incomplete 
as the scheme evolves and new IDS scopes are added. 
In the context of this work we have created descriptions for a number of IDSs. In the following we 
discuss an abbreviated example description of WebIDS [Alrngre99] (for a complete de cription ee 
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Appendix C.4). All the IDS characteristics mentioned are highlighted "ith double quotes. WebIDS is a 
comparatively simple IDS that is aimed at the detection of attacks targeted at webservers. 
Example: The sensor component of WebIDS, i.e., the parser that is used to parse the webserver access 
logfile, retrieves all the information that is written to a CLF logfile [Weinma98]. The information source 
type is therefore "application log." This means that the detector portion is provided with almost the 
entire information associated with a web request, including the URI (universal resource identifier). IP 
source address etc. The URI is represented as an "argument" sensor characteristic of the IDS scope 
"http. " Jfbasic http authentication is used, the logfile even includes the user name. which is represented 
by the sensor characteristic "object name" for the IDS scope "user" (see Figure) 0). Note, howewr. that 
it does not include any of the http headers or the data that is sent by an http POST request. This is data 
sent by the client, i.e., browser, on the lines after the actual request and includes information about the 
virtual host, cookies, data from submitted forms etc. 
The detector component of WebIDS uses several modules to analyze the http request. The most important 
one is the module that analyzes each "http" "instance" at the "semantic" level using "regular 
expression matching" for signs of known attacks. Moreover the detector contains a module that performs 
certain statistical analysis across multiple http requests, i.e., across multiple "http" instances. The 
description of these characteristics will be discussed at a later stage as further details need to be 
introducedfirst (see first example in Section 5.3.3.3.2). 
3.2 Description and classification of attacks 
Attacks can be classified according to numerous criteria~epending on purpose of the attack 
classification (see Section 2.2.4). The attack classification that we use in this work is based on 
descriptions of attacks and differentiates among classes of attacks based on attack properties that are 
relevant with regard to their detection by an IDS. The attack description scheme that we propose uses IDS 
characteristics to express the requirements an IDS has to meet in order to be able to detect a given attack. 
The resulting descriptions capture the nature of the attack but not all of its details. As a result, 
descriptions of different attacks may be identical-thereby identifying and defining an entire class of 
attacks. Hence, an attack class is defined by the set of all attacks having the same attack description, i.e., 
attack class description. 
Example: There exist many different URL-based buffer-overflow attacks [CAJ30}, CVE002JOO, 
CVE087499j against webservers. The description of any such attack will be identical even though the 
attacks may target different vulnerabilities that exist in different webserver products and therefore use 
entirely different overflow strings. However, from an IDS perspective the requirements for detecting any 
member of this class of attacks are the same. 
6 A webserver may serve many different sites using the same physical host and server pro.cesses. l?e so-
called http header field "Host," which is sent after the actual http request, determines the site to which the 
request is targeted. 
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Based on these considerations a two-step process for classifying attacks can be defined: 
1. Description of attack: The attack to be classified is described using the scheme presented below. 
2. Classification: If there exists a description of an attack class that is identical to the newly created 
attack description, the attack is a member of this previously descnbed class. If no such attack 
class description exists, the newly created attack description identifies a new attack class. 
The actual description of an attack, i.e., an attack class, is composed of attack class desCription building 
blocks that each describe a specific aspect of the attack. The re-use of already existing building blocks 
• limits the effort required for describing an attack, and thereby also 
• ensures consistency and maintainability among the descriptions of different attacks that belong 
to the same class. 
New attack class description building blocks are created and added to the library of already existing 
building blocks whenever a new attack cannot be described using the already existing building blocks. As 
the number of readily available attack class building blocks increases, the number of additionally required 
building blocks that are required for each newly created attack class description decreases. 
In the following sections we outline the components involved in this attack classification and description 
scheme. The details, however, are developed and described in Chapter 6. 
3.2.1 Attack class description building blocks 
Each attack class description building block only describes a very specific aspect of an attack class. It 
does so by specifying the characteristics that are required of an IDS in order to analyze the aspect 
described. It is, however, important that the description should cover all conceivable approaches an IDS 
could take for analyzing the attack. Practically, these descriptions have to be extended as new approaches 
for analyzing the described attack aspect are discovered. Therefore all existing attack class descriptions 
that make use of a given attack class description building block are extended implicitly whenever the 
building block is extended. 
In general one can distinguish two categories of building blocks that formulate the requirements an IDS 
has to meet in order to 
• take notice of the attack, i.e., to verify whether all required data is available, and requirements 
that need to be met in order to 
• analyze the actual attack. 
As a further measure to ensure consistency across attack class descriptions and to limit the effort of 
creating further attack class descriptions, the building blocks are formulated at the highest possible IDS 
scope (see above rule). When used for describing an attack class, the building blocks can also be used for 
describing the attack class at any IDS scope that is beneath the IDS scope of their specification. 
Moreover, the description of a building block may itself make use of other building blocks. 
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Example: We have created a building block that specifies the requirements for analyzing the data of an 
application layer transaction. When creating an attack class description we can then specify whether the 
bUilding block is to be used for http or smtp (mail) etc. 
This bUilding block itself may make use of other building blocks. For instance. in the case where the 
information source is a network packet sniffer (see Figure 11). the building block may require the IDS to 
be able to provide the appropriate transport layer data. The bUilding block that specifies the 
requirements for the transport layer data may then set a similar requirement for the data of the next 
lower-level protocol etc. However, the building block specifying the application layer requirements has to 
cover also other sensor types. For instance, in the case of an IDS that operates based on data retrieved 
from log files, the application-layer-specific requirements are different and do not include requirements 
for transport layer data. 
As a further example we consider the description of an attack class that makes use of attack class 
description building blocks. 
Example: Consider the class of URL-based meta-character attacks. These attacks typically exploit 
shortcomings in the escaping of input parameters that are submitted to CGI scripts as part of the URI 
[CA0696, CA0797]. The attacks permit for instance the reading of private data. Using the available 
building blocks, this attack class can be described by only two building blocks: 
1. Application layer control data for http: This building block is equivalent to the one described in 
above example. It verifies whether the required input data. i.e .. the URI of the http request. is 
available. 
2. Suspicious string in the http URI: This building block verifies whether the detector is capable of 
analyzing http request at the semantic level and whether it can do so using some form of string 
detecting, e.g., regular expression matching. 
3.2.2 Systematic creation of attack class variants 
Earlier we mentioned that adversaries often attempt to obfuscate their attacks in order to evade detection. 
We take into account such obfuscation techniques by including hooks in the descriptions of attack class 
building blocks that allow us to analyze them under the assumption that the attack class has been 
obfuscated in a particular manner. Our scheme formulates so-called variations in a similar manner as the 
attack class building blocks by specifying the IDS characteristics that are required to deal with the 
obfuscation applied to the attack. In the context of this work we have created descriptions of seven 
variations that can be applied to attack class descriptions. It is even possible to apply several of them 
concurrently as long as they do not interfere by making use of the same system or protocol features in a 
different manner. 
Note that a new attack class is created whenever a given variation or combination of variations is applied 
to an attack class. Each variation extends the description of the initial attack class, which causes the set of 
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IDS characteristics required for analyzing the initial and the new attack class to be different. Finall , note 
that multiple variations may be applied to an attack class concurrently. 
Example: A variation that we described is the IP fragmentation obfuscation technique introduced in the 
example of Section I . I . This variation formulates the requirements an IDS has to meet ill ord r to 
reassemble fragmented IP PDUs. The variation can be applied to all allack class building blocks that 
involve the p rocessing of IP PDUs. For instance, if we analyze a network-based IDS that i 1I0t obI to 
reassemble IP PDUs the analysis will reveal that this IDS is not capable of detecting anack cla that 
involve this obfuscation technique. Note that based on the information source type the cheme 01 0 
recognizes that an IDS such as WebIDS is not affected by this variation because it does not have to 
process raw IP PDUs but instead retrieves its information/rom a log fi le. 
3.3 Putting it together: analyzing IDSs 
In the previous two sections we have developed a scheme for describing ID and a cherne for 
classifYing and describing attacks. In this section we show how IDS and attack cia de cription feed 
into an analysis method that determines the attack classes that a given IDSs has the potential of detecti ng. 
The IDS analysis method determines the type of alanns, i.e., generalized alarms, that an IDS potentially 
generates. Figure 13 illustrates this two-step process and shows a more detailed view of the ID analys is 
part of Figure I . Having described our approach in some detail , we will then provide an overview of the 
RIDAX prototype, which implements the approach. Finally we outline the issues invo lved in va lidating 
the results as produced by our RIDAX prototype . The details of the entire analysis process will be 
presented and developed in Chapter 7. 
Attack Class 
Descriptions 
(incl. Variation) 
Example: 
Attack: HTTP req. argo 
buffer-overflow 
Variation: IP fragmentation 
IDS Analysis 
Attack Class 
Analysis 
IDS characteristics 
r uired for 
analyzing selected 
attack classes 
IDS characteristics 
IDS 
Description 
Examples: 
Description of Snort 
IDS 
Alann Analysis 
(using alann cond.) 
Generalized 
Alarms 
Examples: 
Susp. app. layer req. argo (HTTP), 
Network layer fragmentatIon (lP) 
Figure 13-The two-step IDS analysis process (including exam ples) 
3.3.1 Attack class analysis 
Attack class descriptions may describe many different approaches how an IDS could analyze a gi en 
class of attacks (see Section 3.2.1). The attack class analysis step systematically explore aU the e 
possibilities while taking into account the characteristics of the IDS under evaluation. ote that at till 
stage the approach determines the manner in which the evaluated IDS processes, i.e., analyze . attacks 
39 
AITACK-CLASS-BASED ANALYSIS OF INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS 
from a given class. It is therefore not yet determined whether the IDS recognizes the fact that the analyzed 
class of activities actually represents a class of attacks. Neither does this step determine the alarms that 
the IDS is likely to generate. These are identified in the subsequent "alarm analysis" step. For a given 
attack class it is therefore determined whether or not the IDS is capable of analyzing the attack class 
considered. In some cases it may be found that the IDS offers multiple approaches for analyzing a given 
attack class. In such cases the analysis continues for each result independently with the alarm analysis 
step. In addition to the result whether the IDS considered is able to analyze a given attack class, the 
analysis also determines the approach the IDS uses to analyze the attack class by providing the set of IDS 
characteristics that were required of the IDS during the analysis. This set of IDS characteristics then 
serves as input to the alarm analysis. 
3.3.2 Alarm analysis 
The alarm analysis step operates based on the set of IDS characteristics that the IDS analyzed had to 
possess to analyze the attack class considered. As additional input this step makes use of the IDS 
description and of alarm conditions. Alarm conditions are an integral part of this analysis step and 
formulate the condition under which IDSs potentially generate alarms of a given type. These conditions 
are expressed in a manner that is equivalent to the manner in which the attack class building blocks are 
expressed, but are independent of attack class descriptions. The difference, however, is that they operate 
on the IDS characteristics that were required from the IDS for analyzing a given attack class rather than 
on the IDS description. In other words the second step verifies whether in the set of IDS characteristics 
obtained in the first step there exists a subset of IDS characteristics that matches any of the alarm 
conditions. If such a subset can be found, attacks belonging to the considered attack class are detectable 
by the IDS. 
As our approach operates based on attack classes, it is impossible to determine the specific alarms that an 
IDS potentially generates. Instead the approach determines the generalized alarms, i.e., the type of alarms 
that might be generated by IDSs. The semantics of these generalized alarms is determined by the set of 
IDS characteristics that are required for their generation. 
Example: WebIDS is capable of detecting URI-based buffer-oveiflow attacks against webservers. For the 
actual detection it uses regular expressions for verifying whether a URI matches a signature of a known 
attack. The first analysis step reveals the IDS characteristics that were required from WebIDS to analyze 
attacks of this class. In the second analysis step it is verified whether in the set obtained from the first step 
there exists a subset of IDS characteristics that matches any of the alarm conditions. For this example 
this step reveals that WebIDS has the potential of generating a generalized alarm. This generalized alarm 
is generated mainly because of the use of the regular expression matching capability. It therefore reveals 
that WebIDS reports this class of buffer-oveiflow attacks by means of a generalized alarm indicating that 
a suspicious string in an URI has been observed. In fact both the alarms WebIDS generates for buffer-
oveiflow attacks and the alarms it generates for meta-character-based attacks are represented by this 
very same generalized alarm, i.e., they are semantically identical. 
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Under certain circumstances alarm conditions may require IDS characteristics that were not required for 
analyzing the attack class, but that are required for the IDS to be capable of generating the generalized 
alarm described by the alarm condition. For instance, if the semantics of a generalized alarm is such that 
it includes the source IP address in the alarm message, the alarm condition must formulate this 
requirement in terms of IDS characteristics. 
Finally it should be emphasized that the alarm conditions are independent of specific IDS descriptions 
and attack class descriptions. They function solely based on IDS characteristics. The 14 alarm conditions 
we used in our experiments were created in the same context within which we created the attack class 
descriptions. For each attack class that we described, all conceivable generalized alarms that known IDSs 
might generate were identified and expressed in terms of alarm conditions. As a result of this approach, 
the alarm conditions have the inherent advantage that they also identify false alarms an IDS might 
generate. 
3.4 RIDAX prototype 
We have conducted a significant number of experiments using the RIDAX prototype, which has been 
implemented in Prolog [DiazOO] and makes use of a database [MySql] and some additional tools 
[Apache, phpAdm]. The IDS descriptions are stored in database tables that are accessed during the 
analysis process. The attack class descriptions and the attack class description building blocks are 
expressed in the form of prolog rules. The analysis process can thereby greatly benefit from the 
backtracking capabilities of Prolog in order to determine the manner in which an IDS analyzes a given 
attack class. The analysis results, i.e., the IDS characteristics used for analyzing a given attack class and 
the generalized alarms generated, are also stored in database tables. 
In the context of the RIDAX development we have created descriptions for 27 attack classes and 23 
attack class building blocks. After having applied up to two out of seven available variations concurrently 
to these attack classes, we obtained a total number of 498 distinct attack classes. The attack classes 
described were selected based on statistical data derived from VulDa [DacAle99] and were used to 
analyze different IDSs and different configurations thereof. These experiments are described in detail in 
Chapters 7 and 8. 
3.5 Validation of the approach 
RIDAX has been used to analyze five different configurations of four different IDSs. The results obtained 
enable us to outline the manner in which evidence can be provided that the predictions made by our IDS 
analysis approach are correct. However, a complete verification of the results produced by RIDAX or our 
approach in general is a major issue that exceeds the scope of what can be covered by this work: 
• Environment: An environment comparable with that of the Lincoln Lab experiments would have 
to be created in order to test different types of IDSs in a heterogeneous environment. 
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Attacks: Equivalence-class-testing requirements would need to be met (see Section 2.2.2). This 
means that for each attack class, including the ones determined when variations are applied to 
attack classes, a representative number of attacks is required for validation purposes. Assuming 
this number to be as small as five and considering the 498 attack classes to which the 27 attack 
classes descriptions expand when variations are applied, several thousand individual attacks 
would have to be implemented and exercised to validate the results RIDAX produced. Moreover 
these tests would need to be repeated for each IDS considered 
In other words, the same reasons that let us pursue the approach presented here render its validation a 
challenge. However, evidence can be provided that it is possible to predict the detection capabilities of 
IDSs and that these predictions can be made by means of a combined analysis of IDS descriptions and 
descriptions of attack classes. The validation of this claim can be outlined as follows: 
1. First we have used an existing IDS model to develop an IDS description framework. This was 
accomplished in a systematic fashion by focusing on the identification of IDS characteristics that 
are relevant to the detection of attacks. The basis for this work was the analysis of attacks 
pursued in the context of the VulDa work [DacAle99] with respect to attack properties that are 
observable. 
2. In the second step we used the resulting set of IDS characteristics for creating descriptions of 
attack classes. The descriptions are organized in a hierarchical fashion using attack class 
description building blocks and focus on observable aspects of attacks. Based on this description 
scheme we have defined a procedure that enables the unambiguous classification of attacks and 
that thereby ensures that there exists only one valid description per attack class. 
3. Finally it should be verified whether the actual IDS analysis provides correct results. Such 
verification can be achieved by comparing the output produced by RIDAX and the output 
produced by IDS implementations for specific attack classes and attacks that are members of 
these classes. In the following we outline such a validation by means of some examples. 
Example: We consider two http-related attacks. One belongs to the class of meta-character attacks that 
we already introduced in Section 3.2.1. An example for a vulnerable CGI script is test.cgi [CA0696j. The 
other example belongs to the attack class that represents http-header-related buffer-overflow attacks as 
mentioned in Section 3.1.3. An example for such an attack exploits a vulnerability [CVE084800} in the 
IBM Websphere application server plugin for the apache webserver [Apache}. Although both attacks 
concern webservers, they are disparate as they target different server components and involve different 
types of vulnerabilities (that require disparate exploitation). 
In the following we consider the IDSs WebIDS [Almgre99} and Snort [Roesch99j. In the case of Snort we 
consider a simple configuration in which IP fragments are not processed. If in addition we consider the 
possibility that attacks may be obfuscated by means of IP fragmentation we obtain the fol/owing table: 
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Table 2-Alarms generated by WebIDS and Snort including generalized alarms (in brackets) 
1051 http Meta-character Obfuscated http http header buffer- Obfuscated http 
Attack attack meta-character overflow header buffer-
attack overflow 
WeblOS test.cgi attack test.cgi attack Not detected Not detected 
(susp. string in URI) (susp. string in URI) (no generalized alarm) (no generalized alarm) 
Snort test.cgi attack Not detected Websphere http Not detected 
(suspicious string in (no generalized alarm) header buffer-overflow (no generalized alarm) 
URI) (suspicious string in 
http upstream data) 
In brackets we provided the description of the generalized alarms that RIDAX generates for the 
respective attack classes. The alarms are of course not identical, but the generalized alarms represent 
higher-level descriptions of the alarms generated by the IDS implementations. Similar tables could be 
created for other IDSs and other attacks. 
As mentioned in the introduction, there exist circumstances where the predictions made by RIDAX are 
not met by the actual IDS implementations. Such cases must be investigated carefully in order to 
determine whether it is the IDS implementation that does not behave as specified. whether a signature is 
missing etc., or whether it is our approach that produces wrong results. In the course of the experiments 
that we conducted with RIDAX, we did not observe any differences that indicated a failure of our 
approach. Differences were, for instance, observed in the treatment and reporting of fragmented IP PDUs 
(see the investigations by Marty [Marty02, p. 66] that were presented briefly in the example of Section 
1.1). In this example the differences are caused by the ad-hoc manner in which different IDSs decide 
whether or not to report observed IP fragments as suspicious. 
3.6 Discussion 
The approach presented analyzes IDS designs at a conceptual level and determines their potential of 
detecting given classes of attacks. Its major advantages are the following: 
1. Support of IDS designers: IDSs do not need to be implemented before the analysis can be made. 
The predictions made by our approach enable IDS designers to address weaknesses of IDSs at an 
early stage in the design process. 
2. Class-level results: The results produced by our approach predict the behavior of IDSs with 
regard to entire, clearly defined, classes of attacks. This is not only important for the design of 
IDSs but also for the specification of the requirements that they have to meet. Class-based 
requirements are preferable to requirements that are based on the enumeration of individual 
attacks, because the latter would be outdated within days. New vulnerabilities and attacks are 
discovered on a daily basis [SecFoc]. 
3. Test environment: Our approach operates based on descriptions of IDSs and attack classes and 
does therefore not require the set-up of a test environment. As, for instance. observed by 
Lippmann et al. [LFGHKMOO, LHFKDOO] and others, such test environments may be of 
considerable complexity (see also Sections 2.3.3 and 2.4.l). 
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However, our approach also has some disadvantages: 
1. Discrepancies between IDS design and its implementation: If the actual implementation does not 
obey the design and specification of the IDS, the behavior predicted by our approach may not 
correspond to the behavior of the IDS implementation. 
2. Limitations of the IDS description framework: Our IDS description framework is highly flexible 
and extensible, and enables detailed and concise descriptions of IDSs. However, IDSs often 
make use of highly ad-hoc methods to decide whether an alarm should be raised. Even though 
our model might be expanded to represent such highly IDS-implementation-specific 
characteristics, their description remains difficult, not least because they are rarely documented. 
Moreover note that an exhaustive validation of the approach is impractical. It is. however. possible to 
provide reasonable evidence that the results produced by our approach are correct by conducting a 
comparatively small number of experiments using existing IDS implementations and comparing the 
results obtained with the results predicted by our approach. The manner in which this can be achieved has 
been outlined in Section 3.5 and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. 
Finally, it should be noted that although the IDS description framework and attack classification are the 
result of a systematic analysis of IDSs and attacks, the schemes presented may not be able to represent 
future ID technologies. In such cases extensions of the schemes will be necessary, but simple to 
implement because the schemes themselves facilitate such extensions. 
3.6.1 Facilitating a systematic IDS design process 
Our IDS analysis approach supports the IDS design process by making predictions about the results that a 
given IDS design is able to provide. For an IDS designer this is helpful in determining whether the 
considered design meets the specification at an early stage of design process. Here our approach provides 
the advantage that the specification can be expressed in terms of clearly defined attack classes that the 
IDS has to be able to detect and, if required, how these attacks are to be reported. The approach even goes 
a step further by systematically analyzing the IDS design for large numbers of classes of obfuscated 
attacks-an analysis that would involve an enormous effort and costs when done with IDS 
implementations. 
However, it has to be made clear that the task of making IDS design proposals remains the responsibility 
of the IDS designer, i.e., our approach is not capable of making IDS design proposals based on the 
specification of an IDS. It merely helps an IDS designer to verify whether the proposed design fulfills the 
specification. In practice this is likely to result in an iterative process in which an IDS design is extended 
by additional components until the entire design meets the requirements set by the specification. The 
repeated analysis of complete IDS designs would be necessary because individual IDS components might 
influence each other (see for instance the propagation of effects caused by variations as discussed in 
Section 3.2.2). 
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3.6.2 Generalizing from attack classes to activity classes 
The attack classification and description scheme presented in this work can equall well be applied to 
classes of benign activities, i.e., activities in general . This is possible because the scheme de crib 
observable aspects of attacks (and activities) and therefore does not take into account the intent of 
activities because IDSs are not able to observe or determine it. Figure 14 illustrates the proximi of 
attacks, i.e., malicious activities, and benign activi ties. 
Benign activities 
Figure 14-Venn diagram illustrating the proximity of attacks and attJIck-simiJar benign activitie 
The fact that it is possible to generalize from attacks to activities does not have an immediate impact on 
this work because our approach focuses on the analysis of IDSs with regard to classes of attacks. It is, 
however, worth mentioning the possibility of generalizing from attacks to activities because it might be 
relevant to further applications such as the assessment of IDS combinations as discussed in an example in 
Chapter 8. There we shall pay particuJar attention to classes of benign activities that may potentiaJiy cau e 
the generation of false alarms, i.e., classes of benign activities that are "simi lar" to attacks when 
considered from the IDS perspective . 
3.6.3 Assessment of IDS combinations 
The resuJts produced by a tool such as RIDAX may serve as the basis for a series of applications other 
than the design of IDSs. One example is the assessment of the combination of IDSs or, more precisely, 
the measurement of gains that are potentially achievable by combining IDSs. This can for instance, be 
used to support the design process of an ID architecture. An ID architecture may consist of several 
diverse IDSs that distributed over the network surveyed. The alarms generated by these IDSs are 
collected and combined, i.e., correlated, in order to extract the maximum of information provided, while 
minimizing the total number of individual alarms (most importantly false alarms) that are presented to an 
human security officer. 
For such an application metrics need to be defined that measure the quali ty of the information the ID s 
provide . A property that one might measure in such a context is, for instance, the difficulty of 
discriminating between true and false alarms or the set of attack classes covered from a larger et of 
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attack classes. However, such an undertaking requires a number of extensions to the work as it has been 
presented here. For instance it is necessary to 
• include classes of benign activity in addition to the attack classes in order to be able to 
investigate the problem of false positives in more detail, and 
• investigate the mapping between attack classes and generalized alarms for combinations of IDSs. 
In Chapter 8 we illustrate this possible application further by developing example metrics and methods 
that are suitable for the assessment of IDS combination. 
3.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have provided an overview of our approach to IDS analysis. In contrast to existing 
approaches, where IDSs are evaluated based on benchmarks using actual attack implementations. our 
approach operates at the conceptual level of attack classes and uses descriptions of IDSs rather the actual 
IDS implementations for its analysis. It thus produces IDS analysis results of high generality. This makes 
it a useful tool for the designers of IDSs because it enables them to verify that their design meets the 
specification before the system has actually been implemented, i.e., early in the design process. 
Moreover, the fact that our approach operates based on clearly defined classes of attacks enables a more 
rigorous design process. Firstly, it allows the clear specification of requirements that the envisaged IDS 
regarding detected attack classes. Secondly, our approach uses these very same classes for its analysis. 
thereby enabling a rigorous verification of whether a given IDS design meets its requirements and 
allowing the identification of weaknesses in the design. Finally, our approach provides a high-level 
description of the alarms that the analyzed IDSs are capable of generating. These may serve as the basis 
for further work, such as the assessment of ID architecture designs that require the combined processing 
of the alarms that are generated by diverse IDSs. 
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Intrusion detection system scopes and the 
categorization of attacks 
An important part of the analysis of IDSs is the identification of a representative input set. Ideally the 
input set ensures that all factors relevant for ID are taken into account and exercised during the IDS 
analysis process. For our approach to IDS analysis, the input set may be composed of activities and their 
variants. Each of them represents an entire class of malicious or benign activities. In this chapter we 
compose a selection of activity classes that ideally represent the most relevant activities. Note, however. 
that in the remainder of this work we focus on classes of malicious activities, i.e., on attack classes. It is 
only in Chapter 8 where we will make use of both the malicious as well as benign activity classes 
identified in the following. The activity classes are identified in a systematic fashion by first introducing 
the IDS scope concept. This concept is used not only as part of the multi-dimensional activity 
categorization scheme, which is developed next, but also as a common underlying concept to assure 
consistency across the entire work. The activity categorization scheme developed is the one that we used 
to categorize a large number (358) of attacks taken from VulDa. Based on the statistical results derived 
from this attack categorization, we subsequently compose a representative set of 48 malicious and benign 
activity classes that we use throughout this work. The identified attack categories are of higher generality 
than the derived attack classes, i.e., each attack category covers multiple attack classes. 
Note that the concepts described in the following all resulted from an iterative process, which was 
pursued in the context of the VulDa development and maintenance described in Appendix A. By 
categorizing attacks, weaknesses of the scheme were identified and eliminated. This categorization effort 
therefore represents a pragmatic attempt to identify categories of activities suitable to analyze lOSs. It is, 
however, by no means to be seen as a general-purpose categorization or classification scheme for attacks. 
Moreover note that it was motivated and inspired by the concept of fault assumptions as introduced by 
Laprie et al. [LaAvK092] and briefly discussed in Chapter 2. A key element of their approach is that the 
factors that are believed to be relevant to potential causes of faults are identified systematically. In a next 
step one then considers the impact these factors and combinations thereof have in terms of faults, which 
corresponds well to our approach that develops a scheme geared at categorizing attacks based on 
properties that are potentially observable by IDSs. 
At first glance this categorization only provides us with the set of malicious activities to be used for the 
analysis ofIDSs. To address this issue we make the assumption that attack-similar activities can be found 
in the "proximity" of attacks (see Figure 14). This assumption seems to be valid, as the observable 
properties of a benign activity need to be similar to those of an attack if the benign activity causes a false 
alarm. We accordingly use our activity categorization scheme to identify classes of attack-similar 
(benign) activities by systematically selecting attack categories for which we then seek classes of benign 
activities that would be categorized identically or at least similarly. This is possible because benign and 
malicious activities may be assigned to the same or at least to very similar activity categories. However, 
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benign activities are not necessarily attack-similar simply because they were assigned to the same 
category as a malicious one. This is where we have to rely on our experience gained from developing and 
maintaining VulDa as well as developing IDSs. Based on this experience it becomes possible to identify 
classes of benign activities that are similar to attacks and that have the potential of causing false alarms. 
We therefore use results obtained from the categorization of attacks as an underlying grid that imposes 
structure on our approach and on the selection of input data for the experiments described in Chapter 8. 
As the classes of attacks considered are identified in a systematic fashion, we consider the identification 
of classes of attack-similar activities to be reasonably systematic as well. 
Example 1: It was observed that an IDS capable of detecting TCP SYN flooding auacks [Cn 196] on the 
network may generate a false alarm if a user, using http vI. 0, visits a web-page that contains many 
images. Such a WWW access triggers the initialization of many TCP connection handshakes in a very' 
short period of time, which may be confused with a rcp SYN flooding auack by an IDS. 
Example 2: Another example involves SMTP (simple mail transfer protocol). If an IDS is not capable of 
tracking the state of an SMTP session, mail-message data might be confused with SMTP commands. For 
instance we have observed that IDSs confuse the words "DEBUG" and "W/Z" ifcontained in the body of 
mail message with (old) attacks against sendmail [CAl190] that misuse the SMTP DEBUG and WlZ 
commands. 
4.1 IDS scopes 
The IDS scope concept is central to this work. Its development was initialized by our attack 
categorization effort. The motivation, however, was to identify a common underlying concept to assure 
consistency across the entire work. This primarily includes the goal of enabling the description and 
classification of various items at different levels of detail. Given this requirement, a hierarchical tree 
structure was chosen as the underlying component. This is also the reason that the IDS scopes should 
cover characteristics of greater generality that per se are not required for the categorization and 
classification of activities. The concurrent effort of describing IDSs, for instance, has also influenced the 
concept of IDS scopes. Hence, IDS scopes are a pragmatic and empiric concept that can be used for 
describing IDSs and activity classes. 
4.1.1 IDS scope tree 
The use of a hierarchical tree structure enables us to describe, for instance, IDS capabilities at a high 
degree of detail as well as at a high level of generality. This is required as IDSs may offer diagnosis 
capabilities applicable to any application layer protocol. Concurrently, they may also offer capabilities 
that are only applicable to a few specific protocols such as http. 
Example: Using IDS scopes one express the ability of an IDS to scan application layer data for 
suspicious strings (e.g., Snort [Roesch99)}, as well as the fact that another IDS is only capable of 
performing this type of analysis on http requests (e.g., WebIDS [Almgre99]). 
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The IDS scope tree described in the following has been derived from common system-partitioning and 
layering concepts such as the OSI model. The purpose of its sub-trees is to group more specific IDS 
scopes together. However, the tree was kept as simple as possible by focusing only on ID-relevant issues. 
As illustrated in Figure 9, we have identified the following three top-level IDS scopes: 
• Network: The network sub-tree corresponds to a simplified version of the OSI model. We 
decided not to take the presentation and session layers into account because IDSs generally treat 
them in the context of the application layer. 
• Host: It is less straightforward to identify the IDS scopes on the host level because here no 
layering concept as it exists for the network stack exists. We therefore focus on objects that are 
of interest to ID and that are observable. 
• User: Finally we have defined the top-level IDS scope user, which is not so much of relevance 
for the classification of activities but for the description of IDS capabilities. It will. for instance. 
enable us to express the ability of an IDS to relate its observations to a specific user, including 
the possibility that the user is using multiple sessions or even multiple user IDs concurrently. 
Note that we split middleware into two IDS scopes, because it cannot be assigned to either only the host 
or network sub-tree. One middleware IDS scope is used to describe an IDS' capabilities with respect to 
activities observable on the network. The second covers middleware functionality used only on the host. 
Figure 9 shows the IDS scope tree as it is used throughout this work. IDS scopes surrounded by boxes 
represent the higher-level IDS scopes, whereas those shown at the far right are lower-level IDS scopes 
that mostly represent implementations. In order to limit the complexity of the respective results we 
generally use the most high-level, but still applicable, IDS scopes. We do so for instance in the next 
chapter where we use the IDS scope tree to refme the semantics of IDS characteristics. However. the 
semantics of IDS characteristics that have been defmed at a given IDS scope need to remain the same for 
any of the lower-level IDS scopes. For instance, if an IDS is said to offer a given capability at the 
application layer protocol scope, this must also be true for all lower-level IDS scopes such as http. SMTP 
and DNS7. 
In Appendix C.l we provide more detailed definitions of all higher-level as well as of numerous lower-
level IDS scopes used in this work and shown in Figure 9. Note, however. that the lower-level IDS scopes 
discussed in this work merely represent examples that illustrate the generic nature and extensibility of the 
proposed IDS scopes concept. For instance, protocols such as SNMP (Simple network management 
protocol) or wireless LAN protocols (e.g., IEEE 802.llb) are not explicitly included in the following 
discussions, but are covered implicitly by higher-level IDS scopes. 
7 DNS: Domain Name Service; the directory service used on the internet to translate host names into IP 
addresses. 
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4.1.2 IDS scope attributes 
Considering an IDS scope such as the application layer one can easily identify lower-level IDS scopes 
such as http, DNS and FTP that differ significantly in the type of service they provide and. even more 
importantly in the way they function. For the analysis performed by IDSs the senice offered is of 
relatively low importance. The way these application layer protocols function is by far more important. 
These functional differences need to be respected when describing IDSs as they may significantly 
influence the semantics of IDS characteristics used to describe the capabilities of an IDS. Therefore these 
functional differences also have to be taken into account in classifying activities. Because the IDS scope 
tree is not suitable to capture such differences we introduced so-called IDS scope attributes that enable us 
to characterize IDS scopes in more detail. 
It is the goal of IDS scope attributes to allow the classification and description of items at a high level 
without having to descend to the level of specific protocols. It thereby becomes possible to express 
properties such as whether a specific application layer protocol can be run on top of a connectionless 
service, or whether it supports single or multiple transactions within one session. Note that for the 
purpose of this work we relax the formal definition of transactions as, for instance, known from database 
systems. We relax the definition to the extent that we consider an application layer protocol to support 
multiple transactions within a session if a protocol sequence can be repeated. This is the case if. for 
example, multiple mail messages can be sent within the same session. multiple documents can be 
transferred within one session etc. Examples: SMfP, http version 1.1, FTP. In describing IDSs. the IDS 
scopes enable us to create generic descriptions. We may, for instance, express that an IDS is capable of 
applying a simple pattern matching technique to application layer protocols operated on top of a 
connection-oriented service. In this way it is possible to describe IDSs in a highly generic fashion without 
having to describe the IDS at the level of specific protocols. 
Examples: When classifying an activity it is important to distinguish between protocols that use a single 
instance of a lower-layer service (e.g., http) and protocols that rely on multiple instances of lower layer 
services (e.g., FTP). This distinction is necessary because such differences may have a significant impact 
on the complexity of the analysis to be peiformed by an IDS. The service offered is of limited importance 
for the analysis peiformed by the IDS. Another, even simpler example is shown in Figure 15, which shows 
ICMP and UDP as being connectionless protocols, TCP as being connection-oriented, and UDP and 
TCP to be supporting an addressing scheme (i.e., ports). 
After having identified the IDS scope tree, we examined the higher-level IDS scopes in terms of 
functional properties that matter to ID. On the networking side, it is clear that we wish to distinguish 
whether a protocol is connection-oriented or based on datagrams, etc. On the host side, the attributes 
identified are of higher diversity and are, for instance, used in the context of inter-process 
communication. However, the precise definition of these attributes is important when implementing a tool 
such as RIDAX, but only of limited importance when explaining and developing concepts. Therefore we 
do not discuss all these attributes here but provide their definitions in Appendix C.2. 
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IDS Scopes 
Figure 15---An example how IDS scope attributes can be used to r efine transport layer ID scope 
4.2 Activity categorization scheme for attack-like activities and 
attacks 
Having introduced the IDS scopes concept, we may now develop our categorization scheme fo r acti itje . 
As underlying concept we first define a simple system model to describe the acti vity to be categorized. 
We do so by using existing concepts such as the IDS scopes just introduced and a simple object model. 
Note, however, that in order to simpli fy the attack categorization-task described in the fo llowing we do 
not consider the IDS scopes as a tree structure. Instead we use a selection of IDS scopes that can be found 
at a fi xed level of the IDS scopes tree- generally at the level just above leaf entries such a specific 
protocols (see Figure 9). 
4.2.1 System model for activity categorization scheme 
In developing our categorization scheme for activities the goals of the categorization need to be kept in 
mind, i.e., the scheme should refl ect activity characteristics re levant to the ana lysis performed by ruSs. 
Furthermore the choice of the categorization criteria has to be consistent with the goals of thi s 
categorization, and should not be too broad so that the effort remains of limited complexity, but still well 
focused. To achieve this we have to consider both IDSs and activities. This categorization scheme enables 
us to categorize activities based on cri teria that determine an IDS 's ability to detect a given activity, i.e., 
properties of the activity that are observable. This also means that we do not consider properties, such as 
the intent of the adversary, which are not observable, and would merely cause confusion. 
Considering an activity one can distinguish two main types of characteristics. First there are the static 
activity characteristics that can be viewed as representing objects required to exist prior to occurrence of 
the activity. Second there are the dynamic activity characteristics that denote the transient appearance of 
the activity. Based on these two main types of activity characteristics we have identified a total of fi ve 
sub-types- two sub-types of static activity characteristics and three sub-categories of dynamic activity 
characteristics. These static and dynamic activity characteri stics were identified using a simple system 
model geared towards describing the observable aspects of activi ti es as shown in Figure 16. 
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Activity Initiator 
(e.g. adversary, 
non-malicious user) 
r Static activity charactenstics ' 
( Dynamic activity characteristi~ I 
, Affected Oblect , 
' Methods ' 
Stale 
Figure 16-System model used to categorize activities 
Looking at Figure 16 from the left to the right, we fust find the activity initiator. The acti initiator i 
in most cases a hmnan user who causes an activity to occur by hislber actions . The e actions rna be of 
malicious or non-malicious intent. 
Once the activity initiator has initiated an activity, it is potential ly observable at numerou inlerfac 
objects until it finally reaches its destination, the affected objecl. It is not alway po ible to ob erve 
attacks at interface objects. For instance, it is not possible to detect attacks on the network if the data 
transferred is encrypted. However, it is often possible for an IDS to observe the igns of an activity on the 
affected object itself. These considerations lead to the introduction of the so-called SIalic aClivity 
characteristics comprised of one or more interface objects and the affected object . Formally the activity 
initiator object should be considered as being part of the static activity characteristic . However, the 
activity initiator object is generally not directly observable by an IDS, which is why it i not included in 
the scheme developed in the following . 
Another static element shown in Figure 16 that is not included in the static activity characteristic is the 
internal state of the affected object. It is not taken into account for the activity categorization cherne 
because this work focuses on real-time IDSs, i.e., on IDSs perfonning continuou monitoring, which 
generally are transition-based IDSs (see also Figure 7 and [DeDaWeOO]). State-ba ed lD s in general 
perform only a periodic analysis of the system to monitor. This means that the state of a system i.e., an 
object, is inspected periodically for erroneous system states that indicate a fault. 
Examples: Typical examples are security scanners such as Nessus [NessusOOj, ISS [ISSSca99], Satan 
etc., and system integrity checkers such as Tripwire [Tripw99]. The only state-based systems operating in 
real-time that we are aware of at the time of this writing are anti-virus systems. A well-known example of 
such a system is the Norton anti-virus product by Symantec [Symantec]. 
In addition to the static activity characteristics, i.e., objects involved in an activity, we also consider 
dynamic activity characteristics, i.e., the transient appearance of activities. Here we have identified two 
main sets of characteristics that describe the dynamic portion of an activity. These describe the invocation 
of methods on the affected object, and the type of communication used. Furthermore, we have identified a 
set of additional attributes that refine the dynamic activity characteristics and are observable by an ID 
These attributes describe characteristics such as whether the input data provided is rele ant to the attack. 
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Note that the term vulnerability was deliberately not mentioned here. The fault representing the 
vulnerability can typically be found either in one of the interface objects, in the affected object itself. or in 
the combination of several objects. However, when analyzing an activity for its aspects visible to IDSs, 
the location of the vulnerability is only of limited importance, which is why it does not appear in the 
system model (Figure 16). Moreover, the initiation of an activity threatening the security policy does not 
require any specific vulnerability to be present, e.g., the activity may represent an unsuccessful attack. 
However, the presence of the corresponding vulnerability determines whether an activity may lead to 
security policy violation, e.g., a successful attack or an intrusion. 
Before further developing the notions of static and dynamic activity characteristics. note that our 
categorization scheme is not aimed at describing the path from the activity initiator to the affected object 
. or the sequence of events involved. Such descriptions would exceed the goal of this categorization 
scheme by adding non-required information, thereby introducing unnecessary complexity. Instead we list 
the dynamic and static characteristics relevant to an activity, and defme activity categories by the set of 
activity characteristics required to describe the activity. Other approaches to attack description mostly use 
languages that describe the intermediate stages of attacks. For our purposes these approaches are by far 
too expressive, and would therefore impose unnecessary complexity. Examples for such work are the 
STATL attack language by Eckmann et al. [EcViKeOO] and the attack modeling work by Tidwell et al. 
[TLFH01]. STATL is part of the STAT tool suite [ViEcKeOO], and describes the system states and state 
transitions that attacks drive a system into, respectively cause. Specific ST A TL constructs are required to 
develop the attack scenarios for the respective ST ATL IDS implementations8. These constructs depend on 
the attack, the operating system considered and the information source monitored (called "domain" by 
Eckmann et al.) Whereas ST A TL is designed for describing specific attacks such that the resulting 
descriptions can be used to actually detect them, the modeling work by Tidwell et al. operates at a higher 
level and is geared towards describing attack scenarios that may consist of several consecutive individual 
attacks. 
4.2.2 Static activity characteristics 
Although the location of the vulnerability is of limited importance to the detection process, it has a 
significant influence on the set of interface objects and the affected object needed to describe the 
corresponding attack. In fact, the vulnerability implicitly defines the avenues of possible attacks. Roughly 
speaking, such an avenue can be considered as the set of interface objects and the affected object 
describing the static characteristics of the corresponding attack, i.e., the activity. Furthermore the 
vulnerability implicitly defines the data sources i.e., once again, the interface objects and affected objects 
an IDS may monitor to detect a given attack. 
8 USTAT is the host-based implementation for Unix (Sun Solaris) systems ~eP095, PorKem92]; 
WinSTAT the respective implementation for Windows NT; and NetSTAT the lmplementatwn of a 
network-based IDS. 
53 
A IT ACK-CLASS-BASED ANALYSIS OF INTRUSIO DETECTIO TE 
Figure 17 provides an overview of the activity categorization scheme to be developed in thi and the 
following sections. The figure not only includes the static activity characteristics, but also the dynarni 
ones. The latter are discussed in the next section. The figure shows how we distinguish between tan and 
dynamic activity characteristics, and how these are refined further into interface objects. affected obje ts 
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Figure 17-0verview of activity categorization scheme 
Remember, this scheme is the result of an iterative process taking place in the context of the ulDa 
operation. 
Next we describe the static portion of the activity categorization scheme as shown in Figure 17, starting 
with the affected object. The characteristics used to describe the affected object and the interface objects 
both represent a subset of the IDS scope concept introduced in Section 4.1. 
4.2.2.1 Affected objects 
It is the goal of a given attack to intrude a target object. More formally speaking, the goa l of an attack is 
to change the state of the target object to an error state with respect to the securi ty policy. However, as 
discussed in Section 2.1, a security policy violation does not necessarily involve malice. For this reason 
we introduce the term affected object instead of using a term such as attacked object or target object, 
which implies malicious intent. It is also worth recalling that the fault i.e. the vulnerability, that enables a 
successful attack need not necessarily be located in the affected object . 
In the following we list the affected objects chosen from the IDS scopes described in Section 4.). They 
have been identified by isolating the physical and logical ID-relevant components in a networked 
computing system. Naturally, we focus on components and finer grained sub-components known to be 
critical to security and ID in particular. We have done so by selecting IDS scopes at different levels in the 
IDS scope tree (see also Figure 9). Note that many of the scopes listed in the following are listed for the 
sake of completeness: They are listed because it is conceivable that they might play the role of an affected 
object for future attacks. 
• Storage device 
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110 device 
CPU 
Memory 
Firmware 
Operating system core 
Operating system module-Excluding the networks stack OS module. 
Network stack-the network stack is commonly implemented as an OS module. We list it 
separately because it is a prominent attack target. 
• Filesystem object 
• Process 
When we used this categorization scheme to categorize attacks taken from VulDa, the categorization 
revealed that processes represent a significant majority (76%) of the affected objects. This is not 
particularly surprising because the most noticed and reported attacks affect network services such as http. 
FTP, DNS etc., which are commonly implemented by (daemon) processes. For similar reasons it is also 
no surprise that filesystem objects are the second most-popular attack target (13%) (see Appendix B.3 for 
more detailed statistics). In a nutshell, it is certainly fair to state that the categorization did not reveal any 
surprises with respect to affected objects, but instead confrrmed the impression one obtains when 
browsing, for instance, the CERT [CERT] advisories or the Bugtraq IDs [SecFoc]. It highlights. however. 
the most relevant attack categories in a well-founded manner. 
4.2.2.2 Interface objects 
Whenever an attack is launched, it targets what we just introduced as the affected object. As shown in 
Figure 16, in order to interact with this object, the activity initiator has to involve one or more interface 
objects, or in other words attack interfaces. This can naturally be extended to the more general case where 
no malice is involved. In this case we simply describe the interface objects that an activity involves. 
However, we are only interested in those interface objects that could, when monitored, enable an IDS to 
recognize evidence of the attack being categorized and that are technically observable. This allows us to 
limit the choice of interface objects to the proximity of the attacked object. It would, for instance, 
probably not be appropriate to consider the adversary's keyboard as a potential information source for the 
detection of a webserver attack because that keyboard is practically not relevant to the detection of 
evidence of this specific attack. The keyboard may, however, serve as meaningful information source for 
detecting other attacks. 
As it is the case for the affected objects identified above, the list of interface objects was developed based 
on the notion of IDS scopes introduced in Section 4.1. In fact, most of the affected objects listed above 
may also serve as an interface object. However, there is an important number of (networking) objects that 
may be used as interfaces and that were not listed among the affected objects. A slight difference in the 
affected objects identified earlier is that we use IDS scopes attributes (see Section 4.1.2) to refine the 
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model. Moreover, note that we consider instances of networking IDS scopes rather than the 
corresponding communication layer abstractions, because IDSs operate on instances of communication 
layer protocols, e.g., PDUs. lbis enables us to consider these networking IDS scopes as objects. which 
ensures consistency among the (interface) objects identified. All this results in the following list of 
interface objects: 
• Physical layer 
• Medium access control 
• Logical link control 
• Network layer 
In the case of the transport layer we distinguish, using IDS scope attributes, between the connection-
oriented transport layer and the connectionless datagram service, as it may be a differentiator for the 
capability of an IDS to detect an ongoing attack. 
• Connectionless transport layer 
• Connection-oriented transport layer 
In the case of application layer protocols, we differentiate even further. We distinguish among protocols 
based on connectionless and connection-oriented services, and consider the number of transactions (see 
Section 4.1.2) that can be executed in the context of a single session. We further distinguish protocols that 
use more than one lower level service concurrently. We distinguish these different ways of operation 
because they may be a differentiator for IDSs. 
• Application layer based on a connectionless service 
• Application layer based on a single connection, single transactions. Typical examples are http 
version 1.0 or the remote shell. 
• Application layer based on a single connection, multiple transactions. 
Example: A typical example is http version 1.1 that supports persistent connections. We have 
observed that IDS are incapable of recognizing http attacks when the first request of a persistent 
connection was non-malicious. Another example is the mail transfer protocol SMTP; here the 
situation is similar, i.e., we have found IDSs that were unable to recognize attacks when the first 
mail message transferred was non-malicious. 
• Application layer based on multiple connections, single transaction. We ignore this category in 
the following because we are not aware of any protocol that qualifies for this category. 
• Application layer based on multiple connections, multiple transactions. A typical example is the 
file transfer protocol FTP. The analysis of such protocols is a nontrivial task for IDSs. 
Before continuing with the identification of interface objects that are primarily host oriented, we consider 
the special case of middle ware. When considering an activity that involves middleware. it is generally not 
possible to distinguish between host- and network-based use of middleware. Therefore we do not make 
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this distinction for our categorization scheme either. However, as we will see in the next chapter, it makes 
sense to distinguish the middleware-related characteristics of an IDS-separating the network and the 
host portion because this may have an influence on the degree to which an IDS is able to analyze such an 
activity. 
• 
• 
• 
Middleware 
110 device 
Operating system module: Some operating systems such as Linux or Solaris provide an interface 
that allows additional modules to be loaded dynamically. Such modules may represent an attack 
interface to the running kernel. 
• System call 
• Function call 
• Environment 
• Filesystem object: Filesystem objects typically serve as an indirect interface to processes and to 
the OS. 
• Process: A process may be used as an interface to variety of other objects such as the filesystem. 
Inter-process communication allows processes to communicate among each other. A number of different 
mechanisms have been developed over time: 
• Signal 
• Socket 
• FIFO 
• Shared memory 
• Messages 
• Semaphore 
Considering the results of the attack categorization with respect to interface objects as they are presented 
in Appendix B.2, one might be surprised to find again that most frequently processes are the interface 
objects used to stage attacks. In fact, in 36% of all attacks categorized processes are used as an interface. 
However, taking a closer look at the categorization results, one can easily identify the total of the diverse 
application layers to be most prominent attack interface used. This corresponds to the observation made 
above that processes implementing network services are the most prominent attack targets. 
4.2.3 Dynamic activity characteristics 
The dynamic activity characteristics of this categorization scheme focus on observable and transient 
attack-relevant characteristics. These characteristics will, to a large extent, enable us to analyze the attack 
recognition and identification capabilities of IDSs. We do not model the impact of attacks. as we focus on 
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real-time and transition-based IDSs. In other words, we focus on observable e\idence of attacks and not 
on the (possibly) resulting internal state change of the affected object. 
In Section 4.2.1 we have already identified the three sets of dynamic activity characteristics that descnbe 
the interaction among objects: Namely inter-object communication, method invocation, and some 
additional activity attributes. 
By separating the inter-object communication and the method-invocation characteristics it becomes 
possible to capture the differences between attacks staged over the network and attacks staged locally. 
However, this does not mean that network-related activities are only described by communication 
characteristics. In fact, in most cases activities have to be described by a mixture of network-related and 
host-related characteristics. 
4.2.3.1 Communication 
The communication characteristics we have identified are rather simple. This simple solution was 
possible because of the interface objects introduced earlier. These interface objects already capture a 
significant portion of communication-protocol-specific characteristics. In accordance with the separation 
of static and dynamic activity characteristics, this leaves us with the following two (network) 
communication-related, observable activity characteristics: 
• Uni-directional: The communication flows in one direction only. 
• Bi-directional: The communication flows between two peers, e.g., TCP connection but also UDP 
services such as DNS. 
Note that an attack involving a bi-directional protocol such as rcp does not necessarily need to be bi-
directional. In fact typical denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against a host's network stack. such as teardrop 
or land [CA2897], are often uni-directional only and consists of some malformed PDUs sent to the 
targeted host. In most cases the target host does not reply because the protocol used does not require it to 
do so or because the target has already become unresponsive, e.g., crashed. 
As explained in detail in Appendix B.l the bi-directional communication characteristic is the most 
frequent dynamic activity characteristics. This is no surprise in the light of the observations made with 
respect to the static activity characteristics, where we observed that attacks against network services are 
the most frequent ones. 
4.2.3.2 Method invocation 
The second set of dynamic activity characteristics is the set of methods invoked in the context of the 
affected object (see also Figure 16). The identification of these methods is relatively straight forward: 
• Object creation: A new object is created. This generally occurs in the context of an existing 
object such as the filesystem within which a new file can be created. 
• Object deletion: An object is deleted, e.g., deletion of a file. 
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Object read: The internal state or part of an object's internal state is read, e.g., the memory of a 
process or the content of a file. 
Object modification: The internal state of an object is modified, e.g., the content of the password 
file is modified. 
Execution within object context: The observable behavior of an object is changed such that it 
threatens the security policy, e.g., the execution path of process is modified The most typical 
examples are probably buffer overflow attacks [Aleph96, CA1395] and attacks involving special 
characters [CA0696, CA0797]. 
It is clear that the affected object, within whose context a given method is invoked, defines the semantics 
of these methods. Finally, note also that attacks usually involve the invocation of several methods 
concurrently. 
Also for these activity characteristics the categorization of attacks did not reveal any surprise. Appendix 
B.l shows that the "execution" method is the one most frequently invoked by attacks. This is clearly due 
to the highly popular buffer overflow attacks, but also to attacks that directly cause the execution of 
arbitrary commands on the target system. 
4.2.3.3 Activity attributes 
After having defined the dynamic activity characteristics describing the communication and the method 
invocation aspects, we have to admit that there are still ID relevant aspects of activities that have not yet 
been described. For instance it is not possible to distinguish between attacks where a given method is 
executed only once and attacks where the same method is executed repeatedly. 
Example: Categorizing attacks using the characteristics identified so far, it is not possible to distinguish 
between the (simple) creation of a jile or a link, and the repeated creation of a jile or link. The repeated 
creation of such jilesystem objects is typical for attacks exploiting race conditions. 
In order to address these issues we have identified additional activity attributes that allow us to refine the 
description of attacks, i.e., activities: 
• Input data relevance: The input provided to an object is relevant to the attack. This characteristic 
can be used to refine the description of buffer overflow attacks etc. It thereby addresses the fact 
that an IDS needs to be able to perform additional analysis on the data in order to recognize 
attacks in which input data is relevant. 
• Repeated activity: Certain types of activities can only be clearly categorized as being malicious 
when they are observed repeatedly. Typical examples are scanning activities or the exploitation 
of race conditions. 
• Internal origin: Some malicious activity may originate from inside the system to be protected. 
Typical examples are the hidden communication channels e.g., communication hidden in DNS 
traffic sent to the outside. Other examples include Trojan horses or the presence of an adversary 
among the employees of an organization. 
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• Multiple origins: In some cases attacks appear to have multiple sources. The recognition of this 
fact may be crucial to identify a given attack clearly. Examples are attacks such as Smurf 
[CAOI98] or distributed DoS attacks such as Trinoo [CIN0799]. Such attacks send a large 
amount ofPDUs with arbitrarily forged sender addresses to a target. 
Note that we do not describe the dynamic activity characteristics of an activity merely by acti\ity 
attributes. The activity attributes are only observable when combined with either communication or 
method invocation characteristics. In other words, they are merely a property of the activity in question. 
Again considering the statistics resulting from the attack categorized (see also Appendix B.l), we can 
once more verify the common observation of attacks on the Internet. In more than 50010 of all attacks 
categorized, the input data provided was directly relevant to the attack. Considering the resulting 
histogram shown in Figure 51 confirms the popularity of attacks against network services because a large 
portion of the attacks in which input data is relevant also involve some form of network communication. 
Considering the attribute "repeated activity," it is possible to verify the importance of race conditions and 
certain categories of DoS attacks. 
4.2.4 Categorization examples 
After having developed a categorization scheme for activities, there is clearly a need for illustration. In 
the following we provide four examples as they can be found in VulDa. At the end of this section we 
briefly discuss the question whether this activity categorization can be used to identify yet unknown 
attacks, and provide an additional example. 
Example 1: Weaknesses in the validation of the input provided over the CGI (common gateway inteiface) 
interface offered by webservers often lead to vulnerabilities. Classical examples are buffer overflow 
vulnerabilities such as the one present in Microsofts IIS webserver software [CAJ30l]. which was 
exploited by the worm called "CodeRed" [CA190l. CA230l]. The corresponding attack can be 
categorized as follows: 
• Affected object: process 
• Inteiface objects: application layer (single connection. single and multiple transactions) 
• Communication: bi-directional 
• Method invoked: execution within object context 
• Attributes: input data relevant 
Example 2: Another similar vulnerability is the test-cgi vulnerability [CA0797] reported in 1997. This 
test script enables an adversary to read protected Jiles from the webserver. So. the affected object is a 
Jilesystem object that is accessed by a process which itself is influenced by an application protocol 
request to the webserver. Last but not least. some special characters were used in the URL requested 
from the webserver. All in all this leads us to the following categorization: 
• Affected object: Jilesystem object 
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Interface objects: process, application layer (connection-based, single and multi transaction) 
Communication: bi-directional 
Method invoked: object read 
Attributes: input data relevant 
Example 3: The following example affects a product called Pitbull LX, which hardens the LimlX kernel to 
a degree that the classical root authority disappears. Pitbull LX is a product developed by Argus 
Systems9• In his Bugtraq posting [postle01 j, Postle provides the following desCription: 
The vulnerability stems from Pitbull LX's failure to apply its enhanced security features to 
all kernel variables made available in Iproc/sysl. Although the file-system will restrict 
access to the /proc/sys/ directory, these variables can be accessed through calls to sysctlO 
which only checks a process's standard unix credentials. Almost all variables are mode 644 
or 444. So any user can read the kernel variables and a root user can modify many of them. 
A process with uid 01°, can thus bypass Pitbull and modify some vel}' sensitive kernel data. 
(If that last statement makes you wonder what the problem is remember that "roof means 
nothing on a Pitbull system".) 
Based on this description we categorize an attack exploiting this vulnerability as follows: 
• Affected object: as core 
• Interface objects: system call, filesystem object, process 
• Communication: none 
• Methods invoked: object modification 
• Attributes: none 
4.2.5 Discovery of yet unknown attack categories 
So far we provided examples on how to categorize known attacks. In the course of this categorization also 
the question was raised whether it is possible to discover attacks that are not yet know using the activity 
categorization scheme. We believe this to be possible, although nontrivial. We have not been able to 
identify such an attack, but we made the observation that one can predict categories of attacks that are yet 
to be discovered, at least to a limited degree. 
Example 4: In the course of maintaining VuiDa, we began to wonder whether it is not possible that one 
can make use of the signal generated whenever TCP out-ol-band traffic is received to attack a process. In 
fact, just recently, a theoretical attack against some FTP daemons has been discovered [ZalewsOlj in 
which a remote attacker is able to inject executable data over the network that can then be activated by 
9 http://www.argus-systems.com 
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sending TCP out-ol-band traffic. The TCP out-ol-band traffic causes a signal to be sent to the process 
which then starts processing a signal handler. Unfortunately this signal handler contains calls to non-
reentrant system calls. which may lead to the execution of an arbitrary command. While we do not know 
whether this attack has already been successfully run against a FTP daemon, it has been prO\'en that the 
attack is theoretically possible-even though it is considered to be very difficult. This hypothetical attack 
would then be classified as follows: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
4.3 
Affected object: process 
Interface objects: transport layer (connection-oriented), signal. system call 
Communication: bi-directional 
Method invoked: execution within object context 
Attributes: input data relevant. repeated activity 
Selection of representative activity classes based on a 
categorization of attacks 
After having developed the categorization scheme for activities, we can use this scheme to identify attack 
classes that are of interest to the analysis of IDSs. Concurrently the results of such a categorization allow 
us to assess the utility of the categorization scheme. The results of the latter compare well with the 
experience we gained while working in the security field and while populating VulDa. 
At the time this categorization was made, approximately 800 attacks were described in the context of one 
of VulDa's vulnerability descriptions (see also Section A.3). In the time available, we succeeded in 
categorizing 358 of these attacks along the lines of the examples described above. The selection was done 
based on a randomly ordered list of vulnerability descriptions. We simply started at the top of this random 
list. Moreover note that the categorization scheme has become part of the maintenance process of VulDa. 
The categorization of attacks has thereby become an ongoing effort yielding increasingly representative 
results. 
Because the categorization scheme permits the use of almost arbitrary combinations of activity 
characteristics to categorize one attack, the number of possible attack categories is enormous. The only 
restriction is that only one affected object may be identified per attack. Given the possibility to create 
quite fme-grained characterizations of attacks, it is no surprise that 203 categories were identified (for 
detailed results see Appendix B). 
Figure 18 further suggests that our scheme has the correct granularity as no overly large number of 
attacks falls into the same category, and is not too fine-grained as there is no majority of attacks that form 
their own (single-member) categories. Figure 18 reveals that 41 % of all attacks categorized defme their 
10 In Unix systems the numerical user ID 0 (zero) corresponds to the "root" user, i.e., to the administrator 
account. 
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own category, i.e., belong to a category that has only one member. However. the figure also show' thaI an 
important percentage of attacks belongs to categories of attacks with several members . We have even 
been able to identify one category with 15 members, which thereby covers 4.2% of aU attacks. Given thi 
distribution, it is certainly not advisable to increase the granularity of the scheme as one might obtain 
results that are too detailed and therefore would no longer re eal the important attack categories. 
However, the granularity of the results suits our purposes well, and also corresponds to the ob ervations 
made during the daily operation of YulDa. 
10 [2.8%] ( 15 [4.2%] 
9 [5.0%] 
7 [5.8%] 
6 [5.0%] 
1 [41 .5%] 
4 [8.9%] 
2 [13.9%] 
Figure IS-Distribution of attack category sizes 
In a next step we have isolated the largest categories of attacks in order to use these attack categories to 
identifY the activity classes that shall be used to analyze IDSs. It is clear that normally one would choose 
at least the ten most frequent categories of attacks for the analysis of IDSs. In fact one should go quite a 
bit further than this. However, our choice focuses merely on attack categories relevant to the three IDSs 
(see Section 8.6.1) that we have chosen for our example application that assesses IDSs and combinations 
thereof. This means that we will not choose attack categories for analysis of which we know that none of 
the IDSs is designed for detecting them. The reason for this is not the fear of false results but merely to 
focus our efforts. Moreover, remember that the results provided in Error! Not a valid bookmark self-
reference. reflect the importance of attack categories in terms of the number of attacks found in YuJDa. 
The results thereby provide only an indirect and SUbjective view on the usage frequency of attacks. In 
other words, they only provide an indication of the popularity of an attack category re ealed by the 
number of distinct attacks assigned to it, but no indication on the popularity of an attack category based 
on observations made on real networks. 
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Table 3 lists the ten largest categories of attacks, and provides a brief description of the type of attacks 
assigned to each of these categories. 
It is clear that normally one would choose at least the ten most frequent categories of attacks for the 
analysis of IDSs. In fact, one should go quite a bit further than this. Howeyer. our choice focuses merely 
on attack categories relevant to the three IDSs (see Section 8.6.1) that we have chosen for our example 
application that assesses IDSs and combinations thereof. This means that we will not choose attack 
categories for analysis of which we know that none of the IDSs is designed for detecting them. The 
reason for this is not the fear of false results but merely to focus our efforts. Moreoyer. remember that the 
results provided in Error! Not a valid bookmark self-reference. reflect the importance of attack 
categories in terms of the number of attacks found in VulDa. The results thereby provide only an indirect 
and subjective view on the usage frequency of attacks. In other words. they only provide an indication of 
the popularity of an attack category revealed by the number of distinct attacks assigned to it. but no 
indication on the popularity of an attack category based on observations made on real networks. 
Table 3-The ten largest attack categories 
Nbr. Cat. Affected Interlace objects Dynamic Description 
size object characteristics 
1 15 Process - Process - Execution within This category covers local buffer overflow attacks 
-System call object context and special-character attacks that result in 
-Input data relevant observable change in the execution path. In most 
cases suid-root processes are targeted. The 
category almost exclusively covers attacks that 
involve command line arguments that are 
potentially observable at the system call used to 
launch the vulnerable program. 
2 10 Process - Process - Execution within This category is almost identical to category 1. 
object context The only difference is that the attack is in most 
-Input data relevant cases staged over the standard input instead of 
the command line arguments. 
3 9 Process - App. layer protocol - Bi-directional This category almost exclusively covers buffer 
(single connection, communication overflow attacks against webservers. A smaller 
single and multiple 
- Execution within number of attacks involve special characters 
transactions) object context instead of buffer overflows. but also lead to 
noticeable changes in the execution path of the 
-Input data relevant 
affected process. http v1.0 only supports a single 
request within one session, whereas http v1.1 
supports multiple requests within one session. As 
such a difference between versions is not known 
for any other popular protocol, this category 
contains http related attacks only. 
4 9 Process - App. layer protocol - Bi-directional This category is almost identical to category 3. 
(single connection, communication The only difference is that it affects other popular 
multiple transactions) 
- Execution within services such as FTP or SMTP . 
object context 
-Input data relevant 
5 7 Process -App. layer protocol - Bi-directional This category is almost identical to the third 
(single connection, communication category. The only difference is that it affects 
single transaction) 
- Execution within covers other, even simpler services such as http 
object context v1.0. 
-Input data relevant 
6 7 Process - App. layer protocol - Bi-directional This category mostly concems authentication 
(single connection, communication issues in services such as SMTP or IMAP. 
multiple transactions) 
-Input data relevant 
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Nbr. Cat. Affected Interface objects Dynamic Description 
size object characteristics 
7 7 Process - App. layer protocol - Uni-directional This category oovers dassical DoS attacks 
(no oonnection) communication against UDP-based services. In general simple 
-Input data relevant 'crash-packets' are used to stop Services such as 
Syslog or DNS. 
8 6 Filesys. -Process - Object read This category generally oovers local attacks in 
object which the oontent of protected files is read without 
the permission to do so. 
g 6 Process - Environment - Execution within Similar to attack category 1. The difference is that 
object oontext the data carrying the attack is passed to the 
- Input data relevant process over the environment e.g .• environment 
variables. 
10 6 Process - App. layer protocol - Bi-directional This category again oovers remote buffer overflow 
(no connection) communication attacks. They affect services such as DNS. 
- Execution within 
object context 
-Input data relevant 
Example: Compared to buffer overflow attacks, only relatively few netv.'orking-related DoS attack scripts 
are published. However, while observing internet traffic, one finds DoS attacks to be quite prominent. 
although they do not appear in the categorization statistics shown here. Another, even more extreme 
example is port scanning, which can be observed very frequently, but where the attack itself is essentially 
always the same and is therefore covered by a single of VulDa 's vulnerability descriptions. 
This said and considering It is clear that normally one would choose at least the ten most frequent 
categories of attacks for the analysis of IDSs. In fact, one should go quite a bit further than this. However, 
our choice focuses merely on attack categories relevant to the three IDSs (see Section 8.6.1) that we have 
chosen for our example application that assesses IDSs and combinations thereof. This means that we will 
not choose attack categories for analysis of which we know that none of the IDSs is designed for 
detecting them. The reason for this is not the fear of false results but merely to focus our efforts. 
Moreover, remember that the results provided in Error! Not a valid bookmark self-reference. reflect 
the importance of attack categories in tenus of the number of attacks found in VulDa. The results thereby 
provide only an indirect and subjective view on the usage frequency of attacks. In other words, they only 
provide an indication of the popularity of an attack category revealed by the number of distinct attacks 
assigned to it, but no indication on the popularity of an attack category based on observations made on 
real networks. 
Table 3, we choose attack categories 3-7 and 10, excluding categories I, 2, 8 and 9, which are not 
relevant to the IDSs we selected for assessment. However, the activity classes mentioned and selected so 
far only concern application layer services. To demonstrate the flexibility of our approach we choose to 
include transport and network layer activities as well. These activities were selected among attacks known 
to be popular (see also the example above and the list of the ten most popular attacks maintained by 
SANS [SANS]). Snort [Roesch99], one of the IDSs chosen for assessment (see Section 8.6.1), has the 
potential of detecting such lower-layer attacks. Thus, it can be expected that RIDAX reveals that Snort 
II The 10 largest attack classes include all classes with more than 5 members. 
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has the potential of detecting at least some of these lower-layer activities. This is discussed in greater 
detail in Section 8.6. 
Based on the results obtained by categorizing attacks and based on the additional reasoning mentioned 
we have identified a list of 48 activity classes, 21 benign and 27 malicious (see Table 4). that were used 
for our RIDAX experiments. In the first column of Table 4, we provide reference to the attack categories 
as identified in It is clear that normally one would choose at least the ten most frequent categories of 
attacks for the analysis of IDSs. In fact, one should go quite a bit further than this. However. our choice 
focuses merely on attack categories relevant to the three IDSs (see Section 8.6.1) that we have chosen for 
our example application that assesses IDSs and combinations thereof. This means that we will not choose 
attack categories for analysis of which we know that none of the IDSs is designed for detecting them. The 
reason for this is not the fear of false results but merely to focus our efforts. Moreover. remember that the 
results provided in Error! Not a valid bookmark self-reference. reflect the importance of attack 
categories in tenns of the number of attacks found in VulDa. The results thereby provide only an indirect 
and subjective view on the usage frequency of attacks. In other words, they only provide an indication of 
the popularity of an attack category revealed by the number of distinct attacks assigned to it, but no 
indication on the popularity of an attack category based on observations made on real networks. 
Table 3. In the second column we provide a rating of the activity category indicating whether the category 
is to be considered benign or malicious. Then, in the third column, we provide the IDS scope at which 
this activity category was specified. In column four it is then shown for which IDS scopes the IDSs are 
actually to be analyzed for. This parameter significantly influences the manner in which the activity 
category is refmed to an activity class. After having provided the activity class numbering as used in 
RIDAX, we finally provide a short description of the activity classes in the last column. 
Owing the flexibility of our activity categorization scheme, any of the activities identified in Table 4 also, 
at least partially, cover additional attack categories. For instance, consider an attack and one of the attack 
categories shown in It is clear that normally one would choose at least the ten most frequent categories of 
attacks for the analysis of IDSs. In fact, one should go quite a bit further than this. However, our choice 
focuses merely on attack categories relevant to the three IDSs (see Section 8.6.1) that we have chosen for 
our example application that assesses IDSs and combinations thereof. This means that we will not choose 
attack categories for analysis of which we know that none of the IDSs is designed for detecting them. The 
reason for this is not the fear of false results but merely to focus our efforts. Moreover, remember that the 
results provided in Error! Not a valid bookmark self-reference. reflect the importance of attack 
categories in tenns of the number of attacks found in VulDa. The results thereby provide only an indirect 
and subjective view on the usage frequency of attacks. In other words, they only provide an indication of 
the popularity of an attack category revealed by the number of distinct attacks assigned to it, but no 
indication on the popularity of an attack category based on observations made on real networks. 
Table 3. If the characterization of the attack requires a super-set of the activity characteristics used to 
describe the attack category, the attack would not belong to this category but to another, more specific. 
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category. This is the reason why the categorization resulted in the relative large number of 203 attack 
categories. 
Table 4-Activities selected for analyzing IDSs 
Attack Rating IDS scope IDS Activity Description 
categories of activity scope of Nbr. 
addressed category activity 
class 
3 Benign Application http 21 Class of http activities that use options strings that are so 
layer (single similar to attacks that even a sophisticated signature-based IDS 
connection, can be confused. 
single and 22 Class of http activities that use options strings that are so 
multiple similar to attacks that IDS only using simplistic pattern-matching 
transactions) techniques may be confused. 
Malicious 1 Class of http-request line-based buffer overflow attacks that 
cause the execution path of the process offering the http service 
to divert. 
2 Class of http-request line-based special-character attacks that 
cause the execution path of the process offering the http service 
to divert. 
3 Class of http-request-options-based buffer overflow attacks that 
cause the execution path of the process offering the http service 
to divert. 
4 Class of http-request options-based special-character attacks 
that cause the execution path of the process offering the http 
service to divert. 
6 5 Class of http-request options-based attacks that enable the 
adversary to read file or directory content that is protected 
otherwise. 
SMTP, 6-8 Class of protocol statement-based (e.g., http-request line) 
http,FTP attacks that enable the adversary to read a file or directory 
content that is protected otherwise. Usually an access control 
and/or authentication issue. 
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Attack Rating IDS scope IDS Activity Description 
categories of activity scope of Nbr. 
addressed category activity 
class 
3-7,10 Benign Application SMTP, 27,28, Class of activities where strings that would be considered 
layer http, 35 suspicious if used in the context of a protocol statement (e.g., 
Syslog http-req~est line) appear in the data portion of a protocol 
transaction. Although harmless, this may be confused with a 
real ~ck by lOSs using simplistic techniques to track protocol 
sessions. 
http, 12-14, Ordinary http, FTP, SMTP, DNS and Syslog requests. 
FTP, 29,30 
SMTP, 15-17, Classes of activities that use request strings that are so similar 
Domain, 36,37 to attacks that even a sophisticated signature-based IDS can be 
Syslog confused. 
18-20, Classes of activities that use request strings that are so similar 
38,39 to attacks that IDS only using simplistic pattern matching 
techniaues may be confused. 
N/a Malicious 9-11, Flooding of the server with requests. 
31,32 
4,5,10 FTP, 23,24, Classes of protocol statement-based buffer overflow attacks 
SMTP, 40,41 that cause the execution path of the process offering the 
Domain, targeted service to divert. 
Syslog 
4,5 FTP, 25,26 Classes of protocol statement-based special-character attacks 
SMTP that cause the execution path of the process offering the 
taroeted service to divert. 
7 App.layer Domain, 33,34 Classes of attacks that typically crash the process implementing 
(connection- Syslog the DNS service remotely. Example: SIG records BIND 
less) vulnerabilitv rCA 14991. 
N/a Benign Transport TCP 43 A single source is observed sending many requests to a server. 
layer There are settings in which the frequency of such requests may 
(connection- reach a level at which lOSs might suspect a DoS attack being in 
based) lorogress. Example: A firewall that masauerades many dients. 
Malicious 42 Typical SYN-flooding attacks. These attacks attempt to either 
temporarily or permanently overwhelm a server such that the 
services offered are no longer available. 
Transport TCP, 45-48 These attack dasses cover normal and ·slow" scanning of TCP 
layer UDP and UDP POrts. 
Network IP 44 There are many DoS attacks against a variety of TCP/IP stacks 
layer that exoloit vulnerabilities in the IP fraament reassemblv code. 
Example: Consider attack category 7 as listed in It is clear that normally one would choose at least the 
ten most frequent categories of attacks for the analysis of IDSs. In fact, one should go quite a bit further 
than this. However, our choice focuses merely on attack categories relevant to the three IDSs (see Section 
8.6.1) that we have chosen for our example application that assesses IDSs and combinations thereof This 
means that we will not choose attack categories for analysis of which we know that none of the IDSs is 
designed for detecting them. The reason for this is not the fear of false results but merely to focus our 
efforts. Moreover, remember that the results provided in Error! Not a valid bookmark self-reference. 
reflect the importance of attack categories in terms of the number of attacks found in VulDa. The results 
thereby provide only an indirect and subjective view on the usage frequency of attacks. In other words, 
they only provide an indication of the popularity of an attack category revealed by the number of distinct 
attacks assigned to it, but no indication on the popularity of an attack category based on observations 
made on real networks. 
Table 3. This category describes un i-directional, connectionless application layer attacks in which the 
input data is relevant to the attack If we query VulDa for attacks that show at least these characteristics 
we find not 7 but 10 attacks. This means that for this case there exist three additional attacks that are 
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closely related and that are at least partially addressed by activities 27-39 listed in Table 4. In fact. we 
find that the three additional attacks involve the additional activity characteristic "execution ,",'ithin 
object context." Again considering activities 27-39 we find that they cover many ID-relevant. i.e .. 
observable, aspects of these attacks. 
4.4 Discussion 
The categorization of attacks according to our activity categorization scheme had the goal of identifying 
the attack categories most relevant to ID such that we could then detennine the attack classes required for 
a systematic analysis of IDSs. As a consequence the categorization has to ensure that all aspects relevant 
to the analysis performed by IDSs are covered, thereby avoiding the irrelevant ones in order to limit 
complexity. As our categorization relies on a rigorous concept that combines the system model introduced 
in Section 4.2.1 with the richness of the data available in VulDa (see Appendix A), we are confident that 
we have indeed produced a highly viable categorization of attacks. However, statistics derived from the 
categorization of attacks taken from VulDa are not representative of the instances of attacks as they can 
be observed on a daily basis on the internet, for instance. The main reasons for this are the following: 
1. One can observe remote attacks far more frequently than local ones because it is much simpler 
for adversaries to identify and attack potential targets on the network than it is to attack a 
vulnerable and attractive machine the adversary already has legitimate access to. It would be 
considered unwise of adversaries if they were to compromise systems they already have 
legitimate access to, as the likelihood of them being tracked down is simply to high. 
2. There exists a large number of application layer protocols and therefore an even larger number 
of implementations of the corresponding services. This creates a large potential for 
vulnerabilities to be introduced and for the corresponding attacks to be published. On the lower-
level network layers, one cannot find a comparable diversity of protocols and implementations. 
As a consequence fewer attacks affecting these lower layers are found and published. Therefore 
such lower-layer attacks do not show up in the top-ten of the attack categories, although they are 
very popular. In order to compensate for this, we have identified and described additional classes 
of attacks and activities targeting these lower layers. 
3. The attacks found in VulDa are slightly biased towards attacks with significant impact, such as 
remote root-shell exploits etc. Accordingly some of the affected objects defined for the activity 
categorization were not used. The reason for this lies in the way VulDa was populated and in the 
overwhelming number of new vulnerabilities and attacks being discovered and published on a 
daily basis. This large number of new vulnerabilities forced us to focus on the most important, 
i.e., dangerous, vulnerabilities and attacks only. Therefore the fact that some of the affected 
objects were never used to categorize one of the 358 attacks clearly shows that they are unlikely 
to be used in high-profile attacks. 
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Finally, note that the activity categorization allows a more detailed characterization of attacks involving 
network communication. This is due to the fact that the network stack is fairly well structured by its layer 
scheme, which is not true for the host-level characteristics. This results in fewer, but larger attack 
categories that represent local exploits as shown in It is clear that normally one would choose at least the 
ten most frequent categories of attacks for the analysis of IDSs. In fact, one should go quite a bit further 
than this. However, our choice focuses merely on attack categories relevant to the three IDSs (see Section 
8.6.1) that we have chosen for our example application that assesses IDSs and combinations thereof. This 
means that we will not choose attack categories for analysis of which we know that none of the IDSs is 
designed for detecting them. The reason for this is not the fear of false results but merely to focus our 
efforts. Moreover, remember that the results provided in Error! Not a valid bookmark self-reference. 
reflect the importance of attack categories in terms of the number of attacks found in VulDa. The results 
thereby provide only an indirect and subjective view on the usage frequency of attacks. In other words, 
they only provide an indication of the popularity of an attack category revealed by the number of distinct 
attacks assigned to it, but no indication on the popularity of an attack category based on observations 
made on real networks. 
Table 3. Note also that based on the attack characteristics describing the network communication as either 
uni- or bi-directional, we were able to determine that 192, i.e., 54%. of the 358 attacks categorized 
represent remote attacks. Although the data has been identified as being slightly biased towards high-
profile attacks, the categorization results represent well the common observation one makes when 
monitoring forums such as Bugtraq [SecFoc] that report or discuss new vulnerabilities and attacks. 
Remember, the selection of activities, be they benign or malicious, that are to be used to analyze IDSs is 
one of the most important elements of any approach to IDS analysis. However. it is also one of the most 
difficult and controversial elements. The choice of activities not only significantly influences the analysis 
results, but also has to reflect the environment for which a suitable IDS is to be found. Because of these 
dependencies and because our approach operates at a rather conceptual level. we chose to develop a 
categorization of attacks and to use the categorization results to identify the activity classes to be used for 
our analysis approach. However, for the reasons given, it made no sense to rely solely on the 
categorization results. Additional facts such as the popularity of lower-layer network attacks. e.g .• the so-
called Teardrop and Land attacks [CA2897]. also had to be taken into account. The reason these 
frequently observed attacks do not appear more prominently in our categorization is that only a 
comparatively small number of distinct implementations of such attacks exists. Moreover, our choice was 
influenced by the set of IDSs chosen for the experiment with RlDAX. These IDSs all differ significantly 
in the way they operate, but all of them address remote, i.e., networking-related, attacks only. Because of 
this we decided to limit our effort of creating activity descriptions for the RlDAX experiments to 
networking-related activities. 
Finally one might ask whether 48 activity classes are sufficient to analyze IDSs. There are three aspects 
one should consider with respect this question: 
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1. Each of the 48 activity classes identified in Table 4 describes more than just single acti\ity-
they stand for entire classes of activities. 
2. In the context of working with IDSs and creating the attack categorization, we have realized the 
importance of the fact that activities might be altered for obfuscation purposes [PtaNew98. 
RFPOO]. A typical example is the fragmentation of PDUs at a lower networking layer. e.g .. 
fragmentation of IP PDUs. In Chapter 6 we describe the variations that we considered in this 
work and how we applied them to activities to create activity class variants. However. although 
we do not explain the concept of varying activities here, note that using this concept. we derived 
almost 1000 activity class variants from the 48 activity classes identified here. 
3. The RIDAX implementation represents a prototype that we use to demonstrate and validate our 
approach, which was achieved using the activities identified here. 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have introduced the concept of IDS scopes, which forms a cornerstone of this work. 
Using this concept, we developed a categorization scheme for activities that was then used to categorize a 
large number of attacks-the goal being the identification of a representative input set to our IDS analysis 
approach. By doing so we illustrated the difficulties one generally faces when attempting to compose a set 
of activities to be used for the analysis of IDSs. Using the categorization results we finally identified 48 
activity classes, each of them representing a complete class of activities, which we subsequently use in 
the RIDAX experiments described in Chapter 8: 21 of them represent benign and 27 represent malicious 
activity classes. Given the systematic fashion the activity categorization scheme was developed and based 
on further considerations made in this chapter, we are confident that the 48 activity classes identified are 
well suited to verifying and illustrating our approach by means of the RIDAX experiments. 
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Intrusion detection system description 
framework 
IDSs are complex systems as is their description. This was already apparent in Section 2.2.3. where we 
provided an overview of existing approaches to describe and classify IDSs. There is no generic 
classification or description scheme for IDSs as there is none for attacks. The goals of any such scheme 
will determine the criteria to be used. For the scheme introduced in this chapter. the goals are to describe 
the IDS capabilities that are relevant to the detection of attacks and to the generation of alarms. This 
includes the requirement that the description scheme developed in the following has to enable the creation 
of IDS descriptions that can be used as input to the RIDAX tool to analyze the IDS described. We achieve 
this by first introducing a system model that identifies the components an IDS consists of. The model 
represents a simplified version of the CIDF model [CIDF98], and consists of a sensor component. which 
is used to collect information, and a detector component, which perfonns the actual analysis. 
Subsequently we develop our description scheme for these components, and conclude the chapter by 
describing the database structure used by the RIDAX prototype (see Chapter 7). For a complete example 
of an IDS description, see Appendix C.4. 
Owing to the generic and extensible concepts used, our scheme is suitable for the description of a large 
variety of IDSs: It does not describe the implementation details of the analysis steps employed by a given 
IDS, but rather describes the fact that the IDS uses analysis techniques of a given type to perform its 
analysis at a given level of abstraction. The underlying concepts of our scheme have been developed by 
combining our own experience with insights gained by IDS classifications and taxonomies such as those 
of Debar et al. [DeDaWeOO, DeDaWe99] or that of Axe Iss on [AxelssOO] (see also Section 2.2.3). 
In view of the attack categorization scheme developed in the preceding chapter, it is clear that our IDS 
description and classification scheme has to be of greater detail than the existing ones. For instance. 
simply describing an IDS as either behavior-based or knowledge-based (see Figure 7, p. 16) does not 
enable us to draw precise conclusions about either the attack classes the IDS is able to detect or, for 
instance, the number of false positives it may potentially generate. Moreover, this issue cannot be 
resolved by considering further elements of existing classification schemes. As a consequence we propose 
a more specific scheme that uses IDS characteristics to describe IDSs. These IDS characteristics are 
defined by a two-tuple consisting of an IDS description item and an IDS scope. IDS description items 
denote generic, i.e., IDS scope-independent, properties of IDSs such as the capability of performing 
string-matching operations. In Appendix C.3 we provide an extensive list of examples of IDS 
characteristics and their definitions. Technically, i.e., in RIDAX, we use so-called IDS description 
attributes to represent IDS characteristics. Most of these attributes are booleans and simply represent 
whether a specific characteristic is present. However, some of them describe characteristics at pre-defined 
levels. For instance, for string-pattern recognition we distinguish between simple string matching and the 
more advanced regular expression matching. In practice this means that if an attribute represents the 
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characteristics "regular expression matching available," the lower-level characteristics such as imple 
string matching are considered to be present as well. 
Example: Consider the capability of Snort [Roesch99} to detect http buffer overflow attacks. We can 
easily describe the fact that the sensor portion of the IDS is capable of gathering application la)'er 
request arguments. This can be achieved using a single IDS desCription a nrib ure. Using a second 
attribute. we can describe the fact that the detector is capable of searching for specific string within 
application layer request arguments. Using these two attributes we are able to describe the core 
technique used by Snort to detect attacks such as buffer-overflow attacks. special-character attacks etc. 
However. it is clear that additional attributes are needed to describe the way Sn0l1 extracts the data from 
link layer PDUs etc. 
In order to enrich the expressiveness of our scheme further, we ha ve introduced the concept of instance 
analysis. This concept encompasses the description of analysis techniques and extends them with the 
description of the level of abstraction at which the analysis is being performed. Moreo er it pecifie the 
analysis domain, i.e., the instance concerned, within which IDSs are capable of performing the anal 
described. 
5.1 A system model for IDSs 
In our IDS model we split IDSs into a sensor. which gathers information from an information source, and 
a detector. which perfonns the analysis. IDSs may consist of several sensors and several detector . For 
instance, an IDS may collect information from several daemon-specific log fIles that is then analyzed by a 
single detector. The model proposed represents a simplification of the CIDF model [CIDF98] that 
combines the so-called a- and d-boxes into a single element called detector (see also Section 2.1.2) . 
sion Detection System 
Sensor (e-box) 
- Network probe 
- Logfile adapter I parser 
- Special monitoring 
module 
Raw data 
Infonmation Source 
- Network 
- Audit records 
- Syslog I Event Log 
- Application Log 
Events I 
Data 
j .~I.ar~~ ............ . 
Detector (aId-box) 
- Data Pr&-pIocaI8Ing 
- lnabnle AnaIyaIs 
(enor detecIIon. 
fd dIagnonaIs) 
Figure 19-Intrusion detection system model 
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In the following we develop an IDS description scheme that is based on this simple model (see Figure 
19). The model leads to the defInition of two categories of characteristics--one for the description of 
sensors, the other for the description of detectors. In the following we address each of them in a separate 
section. 
It is worth noting that in practice it is not always possible to draw a clear line between sensors and 
detectors, as shown in Figure 19. An example of such a system is the work: described by Kerschbaum t!f 
al. in [KeSpZaOO], where the IDS is embedded in the operating system. However, in general such systems 
still pennit sensor and detector properties to be described separately. 
5.2 Classification and description scheme for sensors 
In our model, sensors are systems that transform the information provided by an information source into a 
form suitable for further analysis by the detector. To understand and describe the information the sensor 
passes to the detector, one has to take a closer look at sensor internals. In most cases (e.g., commercial 
products) this is not possible. Fortunately, most sensors are very simple and just provide some basic 
parsing of the data supplied by the information source only. In most cases such simple sensors can be 
accurately described by taking a close look at the documentation of and the information sources used by 
the IDS, and by investigating the diagnostic output the detector generates along with the alarms. 
Figure 10, p. 32, provides an overview of the item categories that we use for describing IDSs. The figure 
includes the item sub-categories that we use to describe sensors and detectors. In the following 
subsections we develop all the IDS description items that we use to describe sensors. These items can be 
further distinguished as being either IDS scope-independent and IDS scope-dependent. In Figure 10, p. 
32, all categories that are not explicitly marked as being IDS scope-independent are IDS scope-
dependent. 
One of the fIrst observations made in this document was that the quality of today's IDSs is generally 
rather poor. In part this is caused by the sensor used, i.e., the information source, because in most cases 
the data transformation performed leads to loss of information. In other words, a sensor generally 
provides just a subset of the information available at the information source to the detector. Information 
may be suppressed on purpose because it is either believed not to be relevant for ID or because it is too 
costly to pass on the information and to analyze it. In addition information may be lost or damaged 
because of a failure in the information source, e.g., a misperception of a link layer PDU or because some 
system component is saturated and starts skipping data. 
Example: Consider a switched network that is monitored by a network-based IDS. This is generally done 
by configuring network switches such that they forward a copy of every PDU transferred to a spec!fic 
monitoring port of the switch. If the overall traffic monitored surpasses the capacity of the monitoring 
port the switch will start dropping packets. Even if the monitoring port and the system hosting the IDS are 
well equipped (e.g., gigabit Ethernet), information might be dropped at the detector for similar reasons. 
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Note that in this work we do not investigate the probabilistic aspects of whether a given acti\iry ,'.ill get 
processed. However, using the variations concept (see Section 3.2.2), we consider case u h as. for 
example, network PDUs that are not being received correctly by a network-based IDS. 
5.2.1 IDS scope-independent sensor characteristics 
The sensor characteristics deftned in the following are independent of IDS scopes. This means the do not 
have to be combined with an IDS scope in order to defme their semantics. ote that mo t of the e 
characteristics do not influence the detection capabilities of IDSs, but instead influence the emantic of 
the diagnostic information generated by IDSs, i.e., they are merely relevant to the de ign of alarm-
correlation systems. The only exception is the information source type, which may influence the anal 
result signiftcantly, i.e. , influence the alarms that are generated. 
Sensor 
(Information Source) 
IDS Scope Indep. 
Characteristics 
reporting time 
reporting timestamp 
reporting delay 
information source type 
Figure 20--0verview of IDS scope-independent sensor characteristic 
As Figure 20 shows, we have identifted the following four IDS scope-independent sensor characteri tic 
(the table headings describe the characteristic and the subsequent rows describe the permitted va lues): 
Reporting time 
Post-execution 
During-execution 
Pre-execution 
Table 5--IDS scope-independent sensor characteristics 
The reporting time denotes the point in time at which evidence of an activity is 
observed and reported to the detector. 
This property is not highly relevant to the detection process it elf, but it may 
influence the timeliness of the IDS, i.e., in the context of this work thi s 
characteristic is not of high relevance. However, when developing alarm 
correlation systems for ID architectures the timeliness of the ro architecture 
components, namely IDSs, is relevant and might be taken into account. 
In the most common case a sensor will pass the data to the detector after the 
activity has been terminated i.e., post execution. 
In some rare cases, a sensor will report an activity after it has started but 
before it terminates, i.e., during execution. 
This last case does not describe IDSs as it analyzes activities before they 
actually happen. Such systems may deny an activity from being executed and 
therefore are merely policy-enforcement systems. For an example of such a 
system, see the work of Hutchison and Welz {HucWe/OOj. 
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Reporting timestamp The reporting timestamp denotes the timestamp a sensor assigns to an 
observation when it is reported to the detector. Many ID sensors do not pro\ide 
such a timestamp and leave it up to the detector to set a timestamp whenever it 
finds something worth reporting, i.e., whenever the IDS is issuing an alarm. 
None 
Start of activity 
End of activity 
Reporting delay 
Less than 3 sec. 
Less than 1 min. 
Less than 15 min. 
More than 15 min. 
Batch 
Again, concerning the relevance of this characteristic to this work, the same as 
for the "Reporting time" characteristic applies. 
The sensor does not provide any timestamp information along with the 
reporting of an activity observed. 
The timestamp provided by the sensor corresponds to the time at which an 
activity has started. 
The timestamp provided by the sensor corresponds to the end of an activity. 
The delay between the point in time an activity is observed i.e .• identified, and 
the point in time at which the activity is reported to the detector. Based on our 
experience with various sensors, we arbitrarily express that property in terms 
of the ranges given below. 
Concerning the relevance of this characteristic to this work, the same as for the 
"Reporting time" characteristic applies. 
It takes the sensor less than 3 sec to forward the data describing the activity 
observed to the detector. 
The sensor data is processed in batch mode. There is no fIXed delay between 
the observation of an activity and the actual analysis of the activity data by the 
detector. 
5.2.1.1 Infonnation source types 
The information source type determines the view the IDS has of the system it monitors to a large extent. 
This fact is also taken into account in the IDS taxonomy by Debar et al. [DeDaWeOO], where IDSs are 
classified based on what they call audit source location (see also Figure 7). However, knowing the 
location at which information is gathered is important and useful for the description of IDSs although it 
only implicitly describes the inherent properties of the information gathered from the respective sources. 
Example: Considering a network-based IDS gathering an URL from the network, it is impossible for the 
IDS to clearly determine how the webserver software will interpret the URL-4!Specially if one 
additionally assumes the use of attack-obfuscation techniques. The situation is different if one considers a 
host-based IDS that analyzes the access logs as they are created by the webserver software. There the 
information is available in a form less prone to obfuscation and, more importantly, in the way the 
webserver has actually interpreted the respective request. In other words, in this example, the network-
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based IDS does not share the same view on the data as the monitored webserver. whereas a host-based 
IDS that analyzes the webserver logs shares the same view on the data. HOM;ever. with respect to 
variations one has to note that the host-based IDS has only a limited view on that data. 
Making such considerations, we have identified two main classes of information sources and a series of 
sub-classes. The two main classes are raw data sources and log data sources. The difference between the 
two is that raw data sources provide a nontransformed view of the data as it is part of an activity, whereas 
the log data sources represent a view on the manner in which data was interpreted by the monitored 
system, i.e., generally not on the data itself. 
We further divide the two classes into a total of five sub-classes that mainly denote the location of the 
information source within the system monitored. The raw data class is sub-divided into an external and an 
internal class of information sources. External information sources provide a view of the raw data before 
it reaches its destination, i.e., the monitored system. This is where classical network-based IDSs on 
network sniffers fit in (examples: [CiscoNR99, ISSNet99, Paxson98, Paxson99, Roesch99]). Internal raw 
data information sources access the raw data at the system monitored and in the same IDS scope as the 
system monitored does. In this class mainly network-based IDSs (e.g., [ISSSerOO]) that inspect the data 
on a host as it traverses the network stack have so far been implemented. However, it is conceivable that 
such sensors may also be implemented directly into applications or operating systems. Examples for such 
approaches are the work by Kerschbaum, Spafford and Zamboni [KeSpZaOO, SpaZamOO, ZambonOl], 
who propose an IDS that is embedded into the operating system, and Almgren et aI., who investigate a 
webserver sensor [AlmLinOl] module that inspects transport layer data as it is received by a webserver 
daemon. 
The second main class of information sources, the log data sources, can be divided into three sub-classes. 
Here we distinguish information sources provided by operating systems such as audit logs [LCRM98], or 
system accounting logs, sources provided by applications. and so-called meta information sources. 
Access logs are a typical example of application logs [Weinma98], as they are maintained by webservers. 
For the meta information source, the most typical examples are probably alarms as they are generated by 
other IDSs. These alarms generally include interpretations of observed activities. Such sources typically 
feed into alarm-correlation systems, and therefore are beyond the scope of this work. 
Figure 11, p. 33, provides an overview of the information source type classification introduced and also 
includes the information source type examples mentioned above. In the table below we describe the 
information sources in more detail. 
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Figure 21--Overview of scope-dependent sensor items 
Example: In the following we provide brief definitions of sensor characteristics to itlu trale holl' Ihe 
sensor items shown in Figure 21 are combined with IDS scopes to define them. 
(ij ~ u (I) E (I) scopes 0.. Ol Q) 0.. 0.. ~ iii ~ ~ 9: u 0 >-Sensor items I- :::J I (fl 0.. u:: 
Object name 1 2 
Basic arguments 3 4 5 
Optional arguments 6 
Up-stream data 7 8 
PDU-data 9 
status data 10 11 
I I I I 
Figure 22-Examples of sensor attributes 
The shaded fields in Figure 22 denote characteristics thaI are not defined because the combination of 
sensor item and IDS scope would not result in a meaningful characteristic. The numbered characteri tic 
can be interpreted asfollows: 
1. Name of the executable that was used to create the process. 
2. Name of a file. 
3. Arguments provided along with an http request 
4. Arguments provided to a system call. 
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5. Arguments provided to a program, i.e., command. 
6. http header options provided along with an http request. 
7. Reassembled stream ofTCP data as it can be found at the socket inteiface. 
8. Data sent to the http server, e.g., http POST request data. 
9. Payload ofIP, TCP, and UDP PDUs. 
10. Current state of a process, including the register and memory content. 
11. Content of a file. 
This example aims at illustrating the pragmatic approach taken. Extensive examples of definitions of 
sensor characteristics defInitions can be found in Appendix C.3.1. In the following tables we now provide 
definitions of all sensor items supported by our scheme. 
Object 
Name 
ID 
Object attribute 
Type 
Access permissions 
Owner 
Size 
Timestamp 
Duration 
Table 7-IDS scope-dependent sensor item5-i)bject 
The object category consists of two items (for examples, see Table 58): 
The name of an object is generally human readable and. in most cases. 
uniquely identifies an object. 
An object identifier uniquely identifies an object by a numerical or possibly 
alphanumerical identifier. 
Table 8--IDS scope-dependent sensor item5-i)bject items 
The object attribute category provides additional items required to describe an 
object. Note that the state of an object is captured in the data category. See also 
Table 59. 
If an IDS is able to obtain the information on the type of an object. it can 
differentiate between similar objects in the same IDS scope. e.g.. to 
differentiate amongfiles. directories. links. etc. 
Access permissions of a given object specify the objects. e.g .. users etc.. that 
are permitted to access the object. 
The owner denotes the ownership of an object. This may include the notion of 
group ownership. Examples are Unix filesystem objects. 
The size of an object usually represents the storage or memory required to 
represent the object. 
The timestamp item denotes timestamps such as creation time or login time. 
The duration item denotes durations such as lifetime or the time consumed. 
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Table 9-IDS scope-dependent sensor items-arguments 
The argument category is used to represent arguments supplied to calls. 
process, requests, etc. We distinguish only two different properties I see also 
Table 60): 
The basic arguments represent the arguments directl\" associated with a 
request. call. etc. 
Optional arguments represent arguments that require the sensor to perform an 
additional effort to provide them. 
Table 10--IDS scope-dependent sensor items-request 
The request category is also very small. It is used to name calls, request etc. 
See also Table 6l. 
The name of the request. 
The ID of the request made. 
Table ll-IDS scope-dependent sensor items-protocol control data 
Protocol control data The protocol control data category is more complex than most of the other 
categories. It needs to capture the variety of protocols that have been defined. 
See also Table 62. 
Source ID 
Source name 
Destination ID 
Destination name 
ID 
Size 
Fragment control 
Flags 
Options 
The source ID typically denotes the source address of the PDU considered. 
Like the source ID. but a name is used instead of a numerical ID. 
The definitions of the destination ID and the destination name is identical to 
the definition of the source ID and source name. The only difference is that 
they denote the receiver instead of the sender of a PDU. 
Like the destination ID. but a name is used instead of a numericallD. 
The ID of a PDU helps a protocol to distinguish requests. 
The size field denotes the size of a PDU. 
Fragment control information is lIsed to reconstruct fragmented PDUs. The 
most typical example is probably the IP protocol. 
Flags are usedfor a large range offunctionalities. 
Protocols often offer a number of other fields and options that are not covered 
by the items listed above. We summarize these fields and options here. 
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Table U-IDS scope-dependent sensor items-data 
The data category is also quite complex. In this category we coUect aU 
properties that can be considered as data of any kind As to be explored further 
in future work, one can conceive attack-obfuscation techniques that may render 
any kind of data related to an activity invisible to the detector. A typical 
example is the fragmentation of IP PDUs, which may make it impossible to 
analyze the payload of IP PDUs for IDSs that are not able to recompose IP 
PDUs. This effect can then be described by rendering the data portion related 
to the activity invisible to the detector. See also Table 63. 
This item represents the stream of data fed into an object. e.g .. a process. 
This item represents the stream of data generated by an object. e.g .. a process. 
This item represents the data that is sent to a server by a client. The most 
prominent examples are sockets. pipes. and application layer protocols such as 
http. 
This item represents the data returned by a server to a client. 
The item PDU-data represents the data portion of a PDU This item applies for 
a wide variety of protocols such as UDP. TCP. ICMP. IP. MAC etc. 
Status data represents the internal state of an object. 
Having provided the definitions of all sensor items, we are now able to describe sensors using sensor 
characteristics that are created by combining a sensor item and an IDS scope. 
Example: Consider the IDS WeblDS [Almgre99}. This IDS parses webserver logs in the common log 
format (CLF) [Weinma98}. Therefore its sensor is able to provide the following information to the 
detector (first listing the sensor item. then the IDS scope): 
• Request name / http 
• Basic arguments / http 
• Source ID or source name /IP (depending on the server configuration) 
• Object name / User (only if the server peiforms http authentication) 
5.3 Classification and description scheme for detectors 
The detector is the IDS component that performs error detection andfault diagnosis. It does so based on 
the information provided by the ID sensor. The detector is generaUy the most complex component of the 
IDS. It is also the component that varies the most among the various approaches proposed and 
implemented by the ID community. 
We have identified three categories of characteristics that distinguish the description of detectors. These 
sets, which have already been illustrated in Figure 10, p. 32, are caUed as follows: 
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IDS scope independent characteristics: This category of IDS scope independent charactensti 
very similar to that of the IDS sensors. 
Data pre-processing: The data pre-processing characteristics are IDS scope-dependent and define 
the operations a detector is able to perform on the data provided by the sensor befo re the data i 
analyzed for signs of errors. 
• Instance analysis : The characteristics of the instance analysis category are also ID cope-
dependent, and describe the detector 's capabilities to perform error detection and fault diagno i . 
In the following sections we develop these characteristics at the required level of detail. ith re pecl 10 
complexity, the first two sets of characteristics are similar to the sensor characteristics de eloped abo e. 
The third set is more complex and requires extensive descriptions. umerous examples can be found in 
Appendices C.3 .2 and C.3.3 . 
5.3.1 IDS scope-independent detector characteristics 
The set of IDS scope-independent detector characteristics is similar to the set used to de cribe ensors. 
Namely, the alarm timestamp and the alarm delay characteristics shown in Figure 23 have very imilar 
definitions to the corresponding sensor characteristics discussed in Table 5. 
IDS Scope Indep. ~ alann timestamp 
alann delay 
L __ C_ha_ra_ct_e_ri_sl_ics__ behaVIor-based knowledge-based 
Figure 23--Overview of IDS scope-independent detector characteristics 
However, the set of IDS scope-independent detector characteristics as defined in Table 13 also contains 
two characteristics that do not appear among the respective sensor characteristics. These characteristics 
are used to distinguish knowledge- and behavior-based detection methods as described by Debar el at. 
[DeDaWe99] (see also Section 2.2.3). 
Alarm timestamp 
Alarm delay 
Table 13-IDS scope-independent detector characteristics 
The alarm timestamp denotes the point in time at which alarms are generated, 
with respect to the information reported by a sensor. In other words it tell us 
whether the alarm timestamp refers to the beginning or the end of a sequence 
of sensor reports that led to the generation of an alarm. The allowed values are 
identical to those of the reporting timestamp attribute discussed in Table 5. 
The alarm delay denotes the delay a detector adds between the reception of the 
last sensor report that leads to the generation of a given alarm and the actual 
creation of the alarm. The allowed values are identical to the ones of the 
reporting delay attribute discussed in Table 5. 
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This boolean characteristic is used to denote the fact that the described dele tor 
applies a behavior-based detection method or at least uses a beha\; or-based 
component. See also Section 2.2.3. 
This boolean characteristic is used to denote the fact that the de cribed detector 
applies a knowledge-based detection method or at least uses a knowledge-
based component. See also Section 2.2.3 . 
Note that it is conceivable that detectors combine knowledge- and behavior-based technique . Because of 
this we have introduced two distinct characteristics to describe the detection method. 
Example: The IDS WebIDS [Almgre99} uses a database of signatures describing known anacks against 
webservers. It would therefore be described as being knowledge-based. Daemon Watcher [WeDaD 00]. 
on the other hand, would have to be described as being behavior-based because it compares the ab n ' d 
system behavior with known models afnormal behavior, i.e., it does not use auack signature . 
5.3.2 Data pre-processing detector characteristics 
In general the detector has to pre-process the data provided by the sensor because it may not yet be in a 
fonn suitable for further analysis, i.e., the data needs to be normal ized. Also in some case the detector 
suppresses data for various reasons such as preventing the system from being overwhelmed. 
Data 
Pre-Processing 
Data 
Normalization 
Slngie-t>yte character decodlflg 
multJ-by1e character decodlflg 
5 tnng resolubOf"l 
data decodlflg 
symmetric cryptographoc operauons 
asymmetroc cryptographic operatIOns 
~-----.,.. address 
FI ~er protocol control daIS 
object 
object annbute 
request 
argument 
data 
weekday 
daytJme 
Figure 24--0verview of data pre-processing detector items 
Figure 24 provides an overview of the data pre-processing items that can be described as follows: 
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Table 14-Data pre-processing detector items--data normalization 
Data nonnalization 
Single-byte 
character decoding 
In particular application layer protocols often offer several different ways to 
express the same fact, i.e., it is often possible to formulate a sensor item using 
varying syntactical expressions that have the same semantic meaning. For 
examples see Table 64. 
Such a high degree of freedom in the representation of data enables adversaries 
to modify their attacks slightly such that it becomes significantly more difficult 
for IDSs to detect them. Sometimes this high degree of freedom actually 
enables the staging of an attack. For instance, this may be the case if the 
attacked object performs sanity checks on the data which would nonnally reject 
such suspicious data. However, if these sanity checks do not take into account 
the various data encoding techniques, the adversary might be able to stage an 
attack by encoding the malicious data-thereby bypassing these sanity checks. 
Generally speaking, data normalization is especially important for knowledge-
based systems, because a detector's inability to normalize data may cause 
attack signatures to fail in matching suspicious data. 
Single-byte character decoding represents the ability to decode single bytes 
that have been encoded by some placeholder-typically their numerical ASCII 
value. 
Multi-byte character Standards such as the UNI character encoding standard support the 
decoding representation of large alphabets (more than 255 characters). Often those 
encoding schemes offer several possible representations for the same 
character. which increases the complexity of the decoding work to be 
performed by the detector. 
String resolution 
Data decoding 
Escape sequences are frequently used to change the appearance of data. 
Examples are the quoting of strings. the use of a backs lash character in front of 
a character that does not need to be escaped. or the use of shortcuts. If such 
techniques are used. an IDS needs to recognize them before performing any 
forther analysis. 
Data may be encoded in various ways and has to be decoded for meaningful 
analysis. Typical encoding techniques are the compression of data or the 
base64 encoding. 
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We are not aware of IDSs that perform cryptographic transformations on (he 
data they observed. However, it is conceivable that IDSs perform such 
transformations on the data they observe. In our case this applies (0 sensor 
items, as they were identified in Section 5.2.2. For instance, it is conceivable 
that a network-based IDS monitoring a webserver, that uses SSL (secure socket 
layer) to encrypt customer data and transactions, holds a copy of the 
webserver 's private key. Knowing the webserver 's private key enables the IDS 
to monitor encrypted https traffic. Note that we do not promote such solutions 
as they carry inherent weaknesses such as the cost in terms of processing. the 
problem of recovering from missing or corrupted PDUs, privacy issues. risks 
created by the fact that private keys are stored at multiple places etc. 
Table IS-Data pre-processing detector items-filtering 
Filtering may be an important measure to eliminate false positives or 
undesired alarms in general. A typical example is the filtering based on 
network addresses if a given host is known to cause many false alarms. even 
though the host itself is known to be harmless. For instance. this may be 
caused by a broken implementation of the host's TCPIIP stack, which 
generates many fragmented packets. Another cause might be a host that is 
used to scan the network for vulnerabilities and would therefore cause a 
flood of alarms to be generated each time a network scan is performed. 
Our model allows fllters to be defined on every information category as 
defmed in Section 5.2.2. In addition to those data categories. address data. 
weekday, and daytime have been added. 
See Table 7. 
See Table 8. 
See Table 9. 
See Table 10. 
See Table 12. 
Excluding address data. See Table 11. 
Address protocol control data is listed separately as it is one of the most 
important sensor items used in filtering rules. 
We have extended the list by two notions of time period-weekday and 
daytime. These two time-period notions may be necessary for an IDS to 
eliminate alarms known to be caused by harmless, regularly occurring 
activities. An example are DNS zone-transfers that are scheduled on a 
regular basis. 
Example: WebIDS [Almgre99] is an IDS capable of reversing the hexadecimal encoding allowed in 
URLs to represent non-printable characters. This co"esponds to the data normalization capability of 
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decoding single byte encoding for the http IDS scope. In addition the IDS supports jiltering based on th 
URL, the request name and the source IP address. This results in the following list of data pre-proces ing 
attributes for WebIDS: 
• Single byte character decoding / http 
• Argument-based filtering / http 
• Request-based filtering / http 
• Address-based filtering / IP 
5.3.3 Instance analysis detector characteristics 
In this section we develop the part of the IDS description scheme used to describe the error detection and 
fault diagnosis capabilities of detectors . As expected, while developing the description scheme for 
sensors, it became apparent that different IDSs analyze the same activity from various different 
viewpoints . Accordingly this is also true for detectors. To address these differences, which in fact may 
influence the analysis performed by the detector significantly, we introduced the so-called notion of 
instances, which is then used to express the various detector characteristics. An instance represent the 
instantiation of an IDS scope, e.g., a process, an http request, etc. These instance-related characteri tic 
are further divided into analysis techniques and analysis levels. Analysis techniques are used to describe 
the techniques, such as pattern matching, that detectors offer. Analysis levels describe the Ie el of 
abstraction at which the analysis is performed. 
However, before being able to describe the analysis techniques and levels, we have to fully develop the 
instances concept. If combined with an IDS scope, the instances concept can be used to identify the 
aspect of the IDS scope that is to be considered. An instance of http fo r example, represents an http 
request. The result is as simple as it is pragmatic, but does not yet meet our requirements fully . IDSs often 
operate on parts of instances only or on multiple instances concurrently. We therefore generalized the 
instances concept by introducing the notions of instance parts and instance groups (see Figure 25). Using 
these additional notions the concept permits detector capabilities to be described, fo r example, with 
respect to single elements of an http request and http (v 1. 1) sessions that consists of several http requests. 
I Single Instance (no parts) I 
Iln~~~ce In~~~celln~~~cel Multiple 
:===t===~==~ Instance IInstance Instancellnstancel Parts· 
I Part Part I Part I 
.) used for cross-instance part analysis 
(a) 
Multiple Instances 
(used for cross-instanace analysis) 
Instance ) Instance 
Instancellnstancellnstance Group 
Part I Part I Part 
(b) 
Figure 25--Concept of instances, instance parts and instance groups 
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Depending on the IDS scope of an instance, a detector may be analyzing instances. instance pans. or both 
(see Figure 25a). This can be illustrated further by considering an instance of the IDS scope IP. There it is 
intuitively clear that the instance is equivalent to an IF PDU. However, as mentioned earlier. an IP PDU 
can be split into so-called fragments. Using the more generic notion of instances. these fragments are 
equivalent to instance parts. 
In addition these IF fragments are strongly interrelated because the receiver needs to be provided .... ith the 
information required for recomposing the original IF PDU. The fact that a more or less strong dependency 
among instance parts and also among instances might exist leads to the introduction of instance groups 
and instance part groups. More generally, such groups consist of instances and instance parts that are-
by defInition-related at a higher abstraction level. 
Even though instances and instance parts may be completely unrelated by design and therefore do not 
compose a group, they may nevertheless influence each other. In fact, many practical security problems 
arise because instances interact in a way they were not designed for or interact even though no interaction 
at all was foreseen. This also has to be addressed in this scheme. We do so by introducing so-called cross-
instance analysis, and cross-instance part analysis reflecting the fact that multiple unrelated instances or 
instance parts are analyzed concurrently (see also Figure 25). 
Example: See Table 16, which shows the interpretation o/the various instance-related terms. 
Table 16--Examples how to combine IDS scopes with instances etc. 
IDS scopes I Processes Application protocols Link, network and Link, network and 
Instance notion transport layer transport layer 
(connectionless) (connection-oriented) 
Instance part Thread Protocol statement or PDU fragment Connection segment 
command 
Instance part group Multiple threads of a Multiple statements of Multiple fragments of Multiple segments of a 
process a transaction aPOU connection 
Multiple instance Unrelated threads Seemingly unrelated Unrelated fragments Unrelated segments 
parts statements 
Instance Process Transaction .• POU Connection 
Instance group Application I service Session N1A N/A 
Multiple instances Unrelated processes Unrelated transactions Multiple PO Us Multiple connections 
Having developed the concept of instances, we now continue with developing the actual description 
scheme for detector analysis capabilities. The description scheme consists of two symmetric parts: one 
addresses the analysis of instance parts, the other the analysis of instances. This has already been 
introduced in Section 3.1.2.2. Figure 26 shows the entire scheme in more detail. Focusing on the part 
describing the instance part analysis, we consider instance part group analysis to be a sub-branch of cross-
instance part analysis. We do so because the former can be considered to be a subset of the latter (see 
again Figure 26). More precisely, the analysis of an instance part group can be viewed as the cross-
instance part analysis of instance parts that share common criteria. The same naturally also applies to 
12 We use the term transaction in the same generalized fashion as it was introduced in Section 4.1.2. 
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instances, and is illustrated in Figure 26, i.e., the two main branches are identical except for the fact that 
the upper one describes instance part analysis and the lower one describes instance analysis . 
stnng matctllng 
ac!v. stnng matching 
regutar exp<esslon 
size venficahon 
r---- ________ string matching 
ac!v. string matChIng 
regular exp<ession 
sae venfication 
Figure 26--Description scheme for instance analysis 
However, the scheme shown in Figure 26 consists of even more items that we develop in the following. 
We distinguish the following items: 
• Instance analysis levels 
• Generic analysis techniques 
• Cross-instance analysis techniques 
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With the first item we aim at capturing the level of abstraction at which a detector is capable of analyzing 
instances and instance parts of a given IDS scope. With the remaining two items we describe the 
techniques that a detector may employ to achieve the analysis level identified by the first item. In 
Appendix C.3.3 we provide numerous example definitions for the characteristics developed in the 
following. 
5.3.3.1 Instance analysis levels 
As shown in Figure 26, we distinguish between analysis levels and bi-directional analysis levels for every 
type of instance and instance part analysis. The introduction of the notion bi-directional analysis levels is 
motivated by the fact that a detector may have to analyze protocols and other instances that are of bi-
directional nature. The corresponding characteristics reflect whether an IDS is capable of associating bi-
directional parts such as a system call or a http request and its return code. 
When considering the different analysis levels, we distinguish three different levels, namely basic 
analysis, logic verification, and semantic verification. These analysis levels were inspired by Dobson's 
[Dobson89] abstraction levels and need to be interpreted separately for each instance analysis type. 
Dobson's approach to system modeling [Dobson89] represents a systematic and hierarchical concept to 
model and to analyze systems. Its core is the modeling of systems at several hierarchically dependent 
levels of abstraction and a model of the communication among the various system components. Systems 
are described at five different levels of abstraction. The two highest levels are the linguistic and the 
conceptual; they describe a system in a non-fonnal but increasingly structured fashion. At the next lower 
level, the semantic level, Dobson starts to describe the system formally. This formal description is then 
refined in the logical level to explore the various viewpoints one might have on the system. The lowest 
level is the descriptive level, and deals with the technology used to implement the system. 
The scheme proposed in the following represents an adapted and simplified version of Dobson's 
abstraction levels. We defme the three analysis levels at a conceptual level and provide interpretation 
guidelines with respect to the various instance analysis types. Numerous examples can be found in 
Appendix C.3.3. Note that every higher-level analysis level comprises any possible lower-level analysis 
level. Moreover, for practical reasons, we consider every single instance that cannot be split into instance 
parts to consist of one single instance part. For example, we consider every single threaded process to 
consist of one thread. 
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Table 17-Instance and instance part analysis levels--basic analysis 
Basic analysis 
Single instance and 
instance part 
analysis 
Instance and 
Instance part group 
analysis 
Cross-instance and 
cross-instance part 
analysis 
Basic analysis denotes the fact that a detector performs very low-level analysis 
such as simply recognizing the thing of interest, which can be an object. a 
request etc. The thing of interest is defined by the respective instance or 
instance part-analysis item sub-branch and the effective IDS scope. 
The detector identifies instances and instance parts. e.g., the IDS is able to 
distinguish protocol sequences or protocol statements. Based on this 
knowledge the IDS might apply fUrther analysis. such as string matching. on 
the observed data. See also Table 65 and Table 66. 
The detector associates instances and instance parts as belonging to the same 
group. In the case of instance parts one can view it as the parts of an instance 
being associated by the detector. See also Table 67 and Table 69. 
The detector associates instances and instance parts that are forma/~v 
unrelated. See also Table 68. 
Table 17 provides the defInitions of the instance and instance part analysis level basic analysis with 
respect to the three different main types of instance and instance part analysis. We omit the repetition of 
the respective defInitions for the bi-directional instance and instance part analysis levels because they 
strongly resemble to what is already defmed in Table 17. They merely extend the corresponding 
defInitions to the analysis of bi-directional instances and instance parts. We also do so in the defInitions 
of the analysis levels logic verification and semantic verification. which will be discussed in the 
following. 
Table IS-Instance and instance part analysis levels--\ogic verification 
Logic verifIcation 
Instance and 
Instance part 
analysis 
Instance and 
instance part group 
ana(vsis 
Cross-instance and 
cross-instance part 
analysis 
The analysis level logic verifIcation denotes the fact that a given detector 
verifIes the thing of interest at the logical level. Again, the thing of interest is 
defmed by the respective instance or instance part analysis item sub-branch and 
the effective IDS scope. In most cases this is equivalent to syntax verifIcation. 
The detector verifies the logical correctness of instances and instance parts. In 
most cases this is equivalent to syntax verification. In this context it is worth 
noting that in the domain of ID, instances need not to be complete or logically 
correct to be considered an instance. In fact many attacks are manifested by 
incomplete instances. See also Table 65 and Table 66. 
The detector verifies the logical relation among instances and instance parts 
belonging to the same group. See also Table 67 and Table 69. 
As we are not aware that cases in which a logical dependency among instances 
and instance parts that by definition are unrelated exist, we do not further 
define this particular level. 
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Again we omit the definition of the bi-directional counter parts. However, a simple illustrative example is 
TCP: there a detector is considered to be performing bi-directionallogic verifIcation if it verifIes that the 
TCP-PDUs exchanged in both directions fulfill the protocol specification. 
Table 19-Instance and instance part analysis levels---semantic verification 
Semantic 
verification 
Instance and 
Instance part 
analysis 
Instance and 
instance part group 
analysis 
Cross-instance and 
cross-instance part 
analysis 
If a detector perfonns its analysis at the semantic level it means that it verifies 
the semantic correctness and acceptability of the thing of interest. The thing of 
interest is defmed by the respective instance or instance part analysis item sub-
branch and the effective IDS scope. In most cases this is equivalent to the 
verification of security policy compliance. For example, the detection of the 
fact that a confidential document is being sent to some non-trusted party. using 
a perfectly valid mail transaction, i.e., mail message, falls into this category. 
The detector verifies the semantic correctness of the instances and instance 
parts. See also Table 65 and Table 66. 
The detector verifies the semantic correctness of the relation among instance 
and instance part group members. See also Table 67 and Table 69. 
The detector verifies the semantic consistency and acceptability among 
instance parts and instances. See also Table 68. 
Bi-directional semantic verification can be illustrated by the example of a detector detecting the fact that a 
protected, non-pUblic web page was revealed to the public. In order to do so, the detector has to recognize 
that an http request asking for a protected page is being fulfilled by the webserver. 
Example: To illustrate the description scheme for analysis levels just introduced, we consider an excerpt 
of the WebIDS {Almgre99] description. WebIDS mainly operates within the http IDS scope. Within this 
IDS scope it is able to verify the semantics of http request i.e., instances--even at the bi-directional 
analysis level. This means that it can not only detect suspicious requests (semantic instance verification), 
but also determine whether they were successful (hi-directional semantic instance verification). It does 
not peiform semantic verification across requests, but is able to identify groups of requests i.e., instance 
groups, based on a common source IP address or user ID (hasic analysis of instance groups). 
5.3.3.2 General analysis techniques 
In addition to the instance analysis levels, Figure 26 also shows the instance analysis techniques. The 
corresponding characteristics describe detectors at a relatively high level by describing the resulting 
detector capabilities rather than their implementation. For instance, the stateful analysis of a sequence can 
be achieved using various techniques such as state machines or petri nets. (Although state machines and 
petri nets are not the same, they both represent a stateful technique to analyze sequences.) 
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The general analysis techniques apply to each of the six instance and instance part analysis types. We 
consider all these techniques separately, i.e., per analysis type. We do so because we need to reflect 
differences such as the fact that a detector is capable of performing string matching on IP fragments. i.e .. 
instance parts, but not on groups oflP fragments or on completely recomposed IP PDUs. 
As shown in Figure 26, we have identified three subsets of characteristics that describe techniques 
applicable to single instances and single instance parts: 
• Control item analysis techniques 
• Data item analysis techniques 
• Timing analysis techniques 
They describe the observable aspects of instances such as PDUs. We have. however. separated the pure 
data items from the control items to increase the level of detail of IDS descriptions. Consequently control 
item analysis techniques cover all the sensor items described in Section 5.2.2. but not the data items 
described in Table 12. These are covered by the data item analysis techniques instead. Note that not every 
technique represented by one of the items defmed in the following is applicable for every type of instance 
analysis. 
5.3.3.2.1 Timing analysis techniques 
The set of characteristics denoting the timing analysis techniques is the smallest and can be represented 
by just two items: 
Timing analysis 
techniques 
Time period 
Duration 
Table 20--Instance and instance part timing analysis 
The time period item denotes that the detector is able to verify whether the time 
period e.g., daytime, instance, instance part, instance group etc., observed is 
acceptable. 
The duration item denotes that the detector is able to verify whether the time it 
took the monitored system to perform a task is acceptable. 
5.3.3.2.2 Control item analysis 
Especially, but not solely, when verifying the logical and semantic correctness of instances, instance parts 
etc., control items need to be analyzed for their content. As illustrated in Figure 26, we have identified 
four additional items for expressing the corresponding detector characteristics. Three of them address the 
content and one the size of the control item. 
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analysis 
String matching 
Advanced string 
matching 
Regular expression 
matching 
Size verification 
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Table 21-Instance and instance part control item analysis 
String matching allows a given sub-string to be identified within a string. 
Advanced string matching additionally offers the possibility to go further than 
the identification of known strings by allowing case-insensitive matching and 
the use of "don't care" character placeholders. 
Regular expressions generally allow a far more sophisticated specification of 
the matching conditions. Examples: Perl {Per187] regular expressions. 
Size verification is a very simplistic check on the elements of a given instance. 
If the detector has a basic analysis of the instance in question on~\'. si::e 
verification can be seen as a very limited syntax check. If the detector is able to 
verify the logical correctness of an instance, the size check may be applied in 
addition to identify suspiciously sized instance elements. 
Note that a detector may perform control item analysis without verifying the syntactical correctness of the 
instance. This actually is an important cause of false positives and false negatives. For example. IDSs that 
"blindly" apply string matching on protocol statements may generate erroneous reports of suspicious 
strings that are hannless or even normal in the context they appeared (this problem is similar to the one 
described in the example on p. 48). However, by applying string matching on protocol statements it is 
possible to perform some limited semantic verification. which is often used to identify undesired 
keywords in a flow of data. 
Example: Again considering WebIDS {Almgre99J. WebIDS is capable of applying regular expression 
matching on control items of the http protocol. This includes the URL, but excludes data such as data 
transfer in the context of an http POST request. Characteristics addressing the laner type of data are 
discussed next. 
5.3.3.2.3 Data item analysis 
The set of items defmed above in the context of control item analysis explicitly excludes the sensor (data) 
items introduced in Table 12. This is done because in real IDS implementations the data portion of an 
instance is often not as easily accessible as other sensor items related to an instance. An example is http, 
where the http request is often treated differently from the data associated with the request, i.e., the 
document served to the client or the data posted by the client (see also above example). As a consequence 
the capabilities of a detector with respect to data items may vary because of this. 
We do not repeat the item defmitions here because they are identical to those provided in Table 21. 
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5.3.3.3 Cross-instance analysis techniques 
When considering multiple instances or instance parts concurrently, a detector can apply additional 
analysis techniques to those just identified. The two additional categories of analysis techniques that we 
were able to identify describe the detector's capabilities to verify the sequence of instances and instance 
parts and to analyze the statistical properties of instance and instance part sequences. 
5.3.3.3.1 Sequence analysis techniques 
The different types of sequence analysis that we identified are quite similar to those identified for the 
analysis of control items in Section 5.3.3.2.2. However their semantics differ to some extent as they 
address state transitions rather than string or information processing in general. 
Sequence analysis 
techniques 
Table 22-Instance and instance part sequence analysis 
Fixed sequence Fixed sequence matching allows a given sub-sequence to be identified within a 
matching sequence. 
Advanced sequence Advanced sequence matching also offers the possibility to go beyond a mere 
matching identification of known sequences by allowing the use of "don·t care" 
placeholders and wildcards. 
StateJuI sequence In the case of stateJuI sequence analysis the detector analyzes a given sequence 
analysis of instances or instance parts using a technique that keeps the state of past 
observations. Examples are state machines. petri nets etc. 
5.3.3.3.2 Statistical analysis 
Statistical analysis of sequences, as implemented by IDSs such as Bro [paxson98] or Snort's [Roesch99] 
port-scan preprocessor, is required to detect port scans, flooding attacks etc. The definition of these 
characteristics varies from those developed thus far. Instead of individual items we use four-tuples, each 
of which can be used to express a combination of detector characteristics. Each of the four item types 
represents a given characteristic that the statistical analysis performed by a detector may have. 
~ 
Comparison 
~ 
History 
Accumulation 
.... 
"'<16 (combined) 
.,~ characteristics> 
Figure 27-0verview of characteristics describing statistical analysis capabilities 
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As illustrated in Figure 27, the combination of these four characteristics results in a total of 16 combined 
characteristics that are used to describe statistical instance and instance part analysis techniques. Note that 
IDSs typically qualify for several of these 16 combined characteristics concurrently. 
The following tables defme the four characteristics, which have been identified by extending the work of 
others such as the Ph.D. thesis ofKurnar [Kurnar95], who has identified four different types of statistical 
measures. He, however, listed only four types of techniques found in the context of audit log analysis. i.e .• 
these techniques were less general than those defined below. 
Comparison 
Relative 
Absolute 
Timeframe 
Limited 
Unlimited 
Table 23--Statistical instance and instance part analysis--comparison 
Relative vs. absolute measure 
A detector is considered to be performing relative measurements of class 
instances and instance parts if it compares the measurements made for one 
class to measurements made for another class. 
A detector performing absolute measurements of instances and instance pans 
merely considers a class of instances without taking other classes into account. 
Table 24-Statistical instance and instance part analysis--timeframe 
Limited vs. unlimited timeframe measurement 
The detector measures, i.e., counts, instances and instance pans with respect to 
a given limited timeframe. The resulting measurement is a frequency. This is 
commonly implemented using a sliding window. 
The detector simply counts or accumulates instances, instance parts, or 
measurable properties of these. This means that the timeframe is unlimited. 
Table 2S--Statistical instance and instance part analysis-history accumulation 
History 
accumulation 
Complete 
Decay 
Unit 
Cost 
Complete vs. decay 
The detector accumulates measurements made within the measurement 
time frame without fading out older measurements. 
The detector gradually decreases the weight of past measurements that were 
made within the measurement time frame. 
Table 26-Statistical instance and instance part analysis-unit 
Occurrence vs. cost 
The detector simply measures the fact that instances and instance pans occur. 
The detector applies a cost function to the instances and instance parts 
observed. Typical examples are measurements of memory or CPU time 
consumed. 
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Example 1: We again use the now well-known WebIDS [Almgre99} to illustrate the description of 
statistical analysis capabilities. WebIDS may not calculate statistics on the requests made within a group 
of http requests, i.e., within an http v1.1 session, because the information source does not reveal this 
information, but may do so across all the http requests observed. It operates in limited and unlimited 
timeframes, i.e., with or without sliding windows, and it can do either complete or decaying history 
accumulation. Finally it only operates on the fact that an http request was made and not on the cost (e.g .. 
number of served bytes) associated with a request. These characteristics can be expressed by the 
following attributes: 
• Absolute, limited, complete, occurrence-based statistical analysis 
• Absolute, limited, decaying, occurrence-based statistical analysis 
• Absolute, unlimited, complete, occurrence-based statistical analysis 
• Absolute, unlimited, decaying, occurrence-based statistical analysis 
Example 2: Snort's [Roesch99} capabilities to statistical analysis can be described in an even simpler 
manner. The only such capability Snort v 1.7 offers is implemented by its portscan detection module. This 
module operates at the transport layer and counts the number of TCP connection attempts to different 
ports made by a source within a given time frame. This also applies for UDP PDUs. As a result Snort 's 
capabilities to statistical analysis at the transport layer can be expressed with a single attribute: 
• Absolute, limited, complete, occurrence-based statistical analysis 
More recent versions of Snort provide increased capabilities for statistical analysis by including modules 
provided by external sources. An example is the SP ADEISPICE preprocessor provided by Silicon Defense 
[StHoMcOO}, which extends Snort with statistical anomaly detection capabilities. 
5.4 Description of intrusion detection systems 
In the sections above we have described an extensive and flexible description scheme for IDSs. In the 
context of this work we have created descriptions of the five IDS configurations. These IDSs and their 
selection are discussed in more detail in 8.6, where we use their descriptions as input to RIDAX. A 
complete IDS description example is provided in Appendix CA. The IDS descriptions were stored in a 
database that was created using the database scheme described in following subsection. For the 
implementation of this IDS description storage facility we use a combination of open-source software: 
• MySQL database [MySql]. 
• Apache webserver [Apache]. 
• PHP [PHP] scripting interpreter module. 
• phpMyAdmin [PhpAdm], a package of PHP scripts that allows a simple and efficient 
administration and population of the database. 
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MySQL is an open-source database that receives significant support in the Linux community and is easy 
to use and maintain. In addition interfaces to many applications and tools such as perl. Prolog. PHP. 
Apache etc. already exist. Lastly we needed a simple interface to maintain and populate the database 
which we implemented by using the phpMyAdmin package, which we operate on an Apache webserver. 
We have extended phpMyAdmin slightly to simplify the population of the database. 
The RIDAX prototype directly accesses this database system to load IDS descriptions as well as to store 
the analysis results. 
5.4.1 Database structure used to describe intrusion detection systems 
In the context of the MAFTIA project [D3MafOl] and as a foundation for the RIDAX prototype we have 
developed and implemented a database structure that is capable of representing IDS descriptions created 
according to the scheme developed in this chapter. This also includes the specification of the sensors and 
detectors a given IDS consists of. 
The database scheme consists of two groups of tables: 
1. The first group of tables documents and reflects the description scheme developed in this chapter 
and the notion of IDS scopes including the IDS scope graph as introduced in Section 4.1. 
2. The second group of tables is used to represent the IDS descriptions. Database consistency is 
ensured by referring to the first group of tables, i.e., using foreign keys. 
The entity relation (ER) diagram shown in Figure 28 captures the first two groups of tables mentioned. 
The diagram itself is based on the notation by Elmasri and Navathe [ElmNav94], but was simplified to 
improve readability by suppressing the numerous ER-diagram attributes. 
The high degree of symmetry in the entity relationship diagram is apparent. This is due to the fact that an 
IDS entity consists of either one or several sensor entities and one or several detector entities. The 
representation of the sensor and detector attributes is very similar. Both use the combination of the IDS 
scope entity and the sensor, or, respectively, the detector-specific item description entities to express their 
characteristics. In the case of the sensor entity the attribute description entity describes the various 
information items a sensor has the potential to provide (see also Section 5.2.2). The attribute description 
entity affiliated with the detector entity describes the capabilities an IDS has the potential to offer for the 
analysis of activities (see also Sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3). As indicated in Figure 28 by double-lined 
borders, both attribute entities, i.e., sensor attributes and detector attributes, are so-called weak entities. A 
weak entity type is defined by the fact that its entries become unique only when also considering an 
externally supplied element. In this particular case all the relevant primary key information is supplied 
externally. In addition to the attribute entities, both the sensor and the detector entity are used to represent 
the generic characteristics as described in Sections 5.2.1 and 5.3.1. 
The IDS scope entity reflects the concepts introduced in Section 4.1. It is not only used in the context of 
the representation of IDS component characteristics but also for the representation of the IDS scope 
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hierarchy, i.e., the IDS scope dependency graph. This is achieved by introducing a relation that defines 
one IDS scope to be an IDS sub-scope of another IDS (super-) scope. 
Last but not least, the entity relationship diagram also requires documentary information to be included in 
the description of IDSs. Numerous description fields (suppressed in Figure 28 for ease of readability) and 
the introduction of the IDS vendor entity achieve this. The IDS vendor entity simply represents the fact 
that a vendor may offer more than only one IDS. 
IDS 
(1.1) 
(IoN) (1.N) 
IDS scopes 
(D.N) 
Figure 28--Entity relationship diagram of the database used to store IDS descriptions 
5.5 Discussion 
The IDS description scheme developed in this chapter represents an empirical, but highly systematic, 
approach to the description of IDSs. It is certainly true that the resulting scheme is too complex for 
somebody seeking informal classifications such as the ones proposed by Debar et al. [DeDaWeOO], 
Axelsson [AxelssOO], and others. However, as the goal was not the creation of an informal classification, 
but of a description scheme suitable for our pragmatic automated approach to IDS analysis, this issue is 
not relevant. 
Given the hierarchical nature of the IDS scopes introduced in Section 4.1, one might argue that the 
description scheme as it has been developed thus far carries the danger of being ambiguous, i.e .. that 
descriptions are not repeatable in exactly the same manner. The hierarchical nature of the IDS scopes 
allows an IDS to be described either at a more specific or at a more generic level at which both 
descriptions would be equally valid. This issue can be resolved by imposing a policy that defines the level 
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of detail at which IDSs shall be described (see also Section 3.1.3). One could. for example. require that 
IDSs are to be described as generically as possible or as detailed as possible. However. this issue becomes 
even more complicated because often detailed information about the capabilities of an (commercial) IDS 
is not publicly available. In such cases one has to estimate the capabilities of an IDS by observing its 
behavior when confronted with particular attacks and by investigating the type of alarms a given IDS is 
able to generate. This issue motivated the development of the Thor IDS analysis framework [Marty02). 
However, in most cases, one can also obtain significant information by examining the information 
sources used by the IDS more closely. In doing so it is often possible to deduce facts such as the way IP 
fragments or TCP streams are being processed by an IDS. Finally note that because of how activities are 
described, the impact of differing IDS descriptions on our analysis approach, including RIDA)(, is limited 
as long as the semantics of the descriptions does not differ significantly. As we shall see in the next 
chapter, one of the key design factors for attack class descriptions is that the descriptions have to operate 
based on the semantics of IDS characteristics and not based on specific IDS attributes that were used to 
express them. 
Another point worth mentioning is the fact that the distinction between behavior-based and knowledge-
based IDSs becomes less obvious. This is due to the fact that most attributes used to describe IDSs can be 
used to describe both of these IDS types. We have compensated for this drawback by i.ntroducing separate 
attributes (see Section 5.3.1) that allow us to describe the detection method employed by the IDS. It is 
interesting to note that these attributes primarily influence the types of the generalized alarms that are 
generated for a given attack class and far less the attack classes that are identified as being worth 
reporting. 
Our scheme does not explicitly distinguish between IDS characteristics relevant to fault diagnosis and 
those relevant to error detection because in ID it is often not possible to distinguish them clearly (see also 
Section 2.1.1). This particularly applies to the more popular knowledge-based IDSs because they attempt 
to identify signs of known attacks and thereby often already perform some limited form of fault diagnosis. 
Once these systems recognize a known attack, they thereby detect the error and at the same time can 
already provide an indication about the cause of this error (i.e., fault diagnosis). The latter may happen in 
the form of an alarm identifier. In the case of behavior-based systems the ability to perform fault 
diagnosis is more limited because these systems generate more or less meaningless alanns once they 
detect that the system is no longer in an acceptable state. In other words, behavior-based systems detect 
errors that may lead to security failure and security failures implicitly. 
5.6 Conclusion 
The goal of our IDS description scheme is to enable the creation of IDS descriptions that are suitable for 
the analysis of IDSs as performed by RIDAX (see Chapter 7). As a result we have developed a scheme 
that achieves this and that thereby forms one of the foundations of this work. One might argue that the 
scheme is quite complex. It is certainly more complex than existing IDS classifications, but these are not 
meant to be used for the automated analysis of IDSs. Considering the goal pursued, our IDS description 
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scheme yields highly concise descriptions of IDSs that are modestly small (for an example see Appendi:>; 
C.4). This is partially due to the fact that most IDSs offer only fairly limited capabilities. However. the 
use of (hierarchical) IDS scopes has an even more important impact on the size of IDS descriptions (see 
Section 4.1). 
Moreover this scheme provides us with the building blocks for the description and classification of 
attacks. As explained in the subsequent chapter, attack classes are described by the set of IDS 
characteristics required for their analysis. 
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Chapter 6 Description and classification of attacks 
For the analysis of a given activity, an IDS first of all has to collect a sufficient amount of data associated 
with the activity, and then analyze it. For this, the IDS needs certain capabilities. As outlined in Section 
3.2, our approach describes attack classes, i.e., classes of malicious activities, by fonnulating these 
capability-requirements in terms of IDS characteristics that describe the capabilities of IDSs (see Chapter 
5). More precisely we describe attack classes by means of the characteristics required of an IDS for 
analyzing a given class of attacks. 
For the classification of attacks we use the same method. As explained in Section 3.2 we classify attacks 
by fIrst describing them using IDS characteristics that are required for their analysis. The resulting 
description of the attack will be of reasonable detail, but not of sufficient detail such that it would be 
possible to implement the attack merely based on its description. Thus it is conceivable that several 
attacks can be described by the same description. In other words, such a description describes an entire 
class of attacks. Hence in the second step of the attack classifIcation process. it is verifIed whether an 
attack class with an identical description has already been identifIed. If such an attack class exists. the 
attack to be classifIed can be associated to this class. In the other case, if no such class exists. the attack 
belongs to an attack class that has not yet been identifIed and the attack's description can be established 
as the description of the newly identifIed attack class. 
Although the creation of attack class descriptions may seem relatively simple for a particular IDS and a 
given class of attacks, it becomes signifIcantly more complex for a larger number of IDSs. attack classes 
and attack class variants. Each IDS may analyze attacks in a completely different manner. Moreover, 
depending on its capabilities, an IDS may choose from several different means to analyze a given attack. 
We address this issue by using the rule-based language Prolog [DiazOO] for describing attack classes. Its 
backtracking capability [CloMeI94] enables us to explore the various ways in which IDSs may analyze 
classes of attacks efficiently and independently of specifIc IDSs. 
However, although the problem can be addressed using a rule-based approach. special care has to be 
exercised to defme a scheme that permits efficient, concise and repeatable descriptions of attack classes. 
In order to avoid the creation of large and repetitive descriptions of individual attack classes or even 
attack class variants, and to ensure consistency across descriptions of attacks that belong to the same 
class, we use a modular approach using several components: 
1. Attack class description building blocks: Many attack classes share important characteristics, for 
example, they represent an application layer request or a network layer PDU. The building 
blocks express such shared characteristics by describing a particular aspect of entire classes of 
attacksl3 as identifIed in Chapter 4. These descriptions rely on the hierarchical nature of IDS 
13 In fact attack class description building blocks typically describe properties of entire super-classes. i.e .. 
of multiple classes, of attacks such as "buffer overflow attack against a process." 
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scopes by describing attack class components at the highest-level IDS scope possible. Hence, the 
descriptions are made such that they can be instantiated at any lower-level IDS scopes. such as 
"JP" during the analysis process. 
2. Attack class descriptions: An attack class description is a rule that describes classes of attacks as 
identified in Section 4.3. However, in practice these descriptions primarily specify the IDS 
scopes and the combination of attack class description building blocks relevant to the attack. The 
IDS analysis process will then analyze these attack class description building blocks for the IDS 
scopes specified by the attack class description. 
3. Attack class variations: Attack class variations14 are rules that express the additional IDS 
characteristics required to analyze classes of attacks, assuming that the latter have been altered 
slightly. Attack class variants can be defmed by the name of the attack class and the list of 
variations included during the evaluation of the corresponding attack class description. The set 
of variations applicable to an attack class is identified based on the list of IDS scopes relevant to 
the attack class. In practice, variations are hooked into the applicable attack class description 
building blocks. For instance, the variation describing the fact that a network layer PDU has 
been fragmented is included during the evaluation of the attack class description building block 
describing the fact that a network layer PDU is involved. 
4. Expectable alarms: Expectable alarms are generalized alarms that IDSs can be "expected" to, 
i.e., might, generate when observing a given attack. In this approach every attack class variant is 
associated to a list of expectable alarms, i.e., expectable generalized alarms, for two reasons. 
First, for a given attack, IDSs may generate more than just one correct alarm. Second, every IDS 
analyzes attacks differently, which means that multiple, semantically different alarms have to be 
accepted as true positives. For benign activities, the list of expectable alarms would of course be 
empty. Moreover, we prefer to associate expectable alarms with attack class description building 
blocks and variations rather than with individual attack class descriptions as this significantly 
simplifies the creation of attack class descriptions. 
The following sections describe these components in greater detail, explaining their role in the IDS 
analysis process. In Appendix D, we provide BNF defmitions for attack class descriptions and examples 
of attack class descriptions, attack class description building blocks, and attack class variations. 
6.1 Attack class description building blocks 
We introduce the concept of attack class description building blocks in order to simplify the task of 
creating attack class descriptions. In the context of this work, 23 attack class description building blocks 
14 For ease of readability, we hereafter refer to "variations" instead of "attack class variations." 
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were created. These were identified and described in the context of descnbing the 27 attack c1assesl~ 
identified in Section 4.3 (Table 4, p. 67). 
Attack class description building blocks describe super-classes of attacks. i.e., they describe attack 
characteristics that are shared by multiple attacks classes. The attack class description building block 
describing argument-based buffer overflows is a good illustration of this. It was defined such that it can 
be used not only in the context of a specific IDS scope such as http but in an entire range of additional 
scopes such as the more generic application layer scope, the process, or the call IDS scope. Thus attack 
class description building blocks are highly reusable components for the description of attacks and attack 
classes. The relevant building blocks can be identified based on our attack categorization (see Chapter 4) 
by considering super-classes of attacks. Such super-classes unity multiple classes by permitting multiple 
values for classification attributes or by suppressing an attribute completely. 
6.1.1 Instantiation of attack class description building blocks 
Attack class description building blocks are highly generic building blocks that are specified at a high-
level IDS scope. As such they are too generic when it comes to describing a specific class of attacks such 
as an http argument buffer overflow. This led to the concept of "instantiating" attack class description 
building blocks to a lower-level IDS scope when used for the description of an attack class. This becomes 
possible by using two IDS scopes to specity the validity of a building block. The first is the high-level 
IDS scope at which the attack class description building block was specified. This scope is fixed by the 
description of the building block. The second is what we call the effective IDS scope and represents a 
parameter that can be set whenever the building block is used to describe an attack class. Note, the 
instantiation of attack class description building blocks is not to be confused with the instantiation of 
classes as known from object-oriented technologies. The instantiation of an attack class description 
building block merely transforms a generic description into a more specific description. 
Example: Consider an attack class description building block that describes argument-based buffer 
overflow attacks at the application layer and the process IDS scope. By combining this attack class 
description building block and another attack class description building block that describes basic 
application layer requests, it becomes possible to describe an http request argument-based buffer 
overflow attack. To achieve this, we simply have to instantiate the two attack class description building 
blocks at the effective scope http. 
A practical example of how attack class description building blocks are instantiated is given in Section 
6.2.1. 
15 At a later stage of this work, we used this method to describe also classes of benign activities. In total 
we created 48 descriptions of malicious and benign activity classes. 
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6.1.2 Analyzing multiple IDS types 
Because attack class description building blocks have to address all the IDS types that have the potential 
of analyzing them, we formulate them in such a way that they permit the analysis of IDSs that apply 
different analysis techniques and monitor different types of data sources. For instance. there is a 
significant difference in the way the analysis is done by IDSs such as Snort, WebIDS or Daemon Watcher. 
Firstly, the information source (see Section 5.2.1.1) that is monitored differs in each case. Secondly. also 
the way the attack class is analyzed for suspicious elements differs significantly. WebIDS and Snort are 
similar in that they look for the presence of strings known to be suspicious. DaemonWatcher uses a 
completely different approach that analyzes the sequence of system calls of the monitored process for 
deviations from normal behavior. All these different paths of analysis need to be taken into account in the 
description of attack classes and attack class description building blocks. 
Example: Consider the attack class description building block describing a basic application layer 
request such that one can determine whether the IDS analyzed is capable of recognizing the fact that such 
a request was made. In the case where the information source used is raw network data. i.e., a sniffer as 
used by Snort. the IDS has to be capable of extracting the data first from link layer PDUs. and then from 
network layer PDUs etc. Once it is clear that the data required is available the analysis can be continued. 
It has to be verified whether the detector is capable of employing the required analysis techniques, and 
whether the analysis is conducted at an appropriate analysis level. For another class of IDSs such as 
WebIDS. the analysis part remains the same, but the verification of whether the data required for the 
analysis is actually available is different-again determined by the information source type. Finally. for 
the class of IDSs that monitors system audit logs. the requirements for the sensor and the detector are 
different again. 
In summary, the information provided by the sensor determines to a large degree the manner in which the 
detector analyzes a given class of attacks. However, the availability or absence of any IDS characteristic 
may enable or disable a given approach to analyzing a given class of attacks. It is also conceivable that an 
IDS may analyze an attack class using two or more different approaches, hence causing the analysis 
procedure to produce multiple results for the very same attack class. In the following, we assume that the 
IDS will always choose the most effective approach. 
6.1.3 Dependencies among attack description building blocks 
One could argue that in the ideal case attack class description building blocks should be independent of 
each other, because they describe independent analysis steps required from IDSs. For example, when 
designing a system communicating over an application layer protocol, one considers this application layer 
protocol to be independent of PDU fragmentation taking place at the networking layer. Normally this is 
certainly the case, but in the case of ID the layer and system boundaries are often not respected as 
precisely as one would wish. In fact many attacks involve such non specification-conformant elements 
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that violate the concepts oflayer and system boundaries (e.g., data suddenly being executed in the case of 
buffer overflow attacks). 
Example: In the application layer buffer overflow example introduced in Section 6.1.1, it is conceivable 
that a network-based IDS is able to process normal network layer PDUs and to extract transport and 
application layer data as long as they are not fragmented. If they are fragmented, such an IDS might no 
longer be able to reconstruct them. In this particular case this would mean that although the IDS is 
capable of analyzing application layer request arguments, these arguments cannot be analyzed because 
the fragmentation either hides the data from analysis or causes the entire ana(vsis process to fail. 
Although our attack class description building blocks can take such issues into account, they may lead to 
repetition and rather complex attack class description building block descriptions. To avoid unnecessary 
complexity of single attack class description building blocks and to guarantee consistency, we allow the 
inclusion of other attack class description building blocks within the description of any given attack class 
description building block. 
Example: The attack class description building block describing the basic analysis requirements for 
application layer requests when monitored by a network sensor requires that transport layer data be 
available. This is achieved by simply having the attack class description building block describing the 
application layer request require the attack class description building block that describes basic 
transport layer analysis. The latter attack class description building block then in turn requires basic 
network layer analysis etc. 
Thus attack class description building block descriptions may include any other attack class description 
building block, which is an ideal mechanism to describe dependencies such as they occur among the 
various network stack layers. 
6.1.4 Example of an attack class description building block 
Numerous examples of attack class description building blocks, attack class descriptions and attack class 
variations are given in Appendix D. The used prolog rules, variables and atoms are also described in this 
appendix. However, in order to illustrate the manner in which attack class description building blocks are 
constructed the following example is provided ("adbb" and "ADBB" are standing for "attack description 
building block"): 
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
* adbb/argBOF - buffer overflOW attacks using arguments 
* i.e., the request line of protocol session or the ar~ents 
* of a function call etc. pattern matching based detect~on. 
*/ 
adbb(basic, ADBB, ADBBScope, IDS, Detector, EffectiveScope, ScopeList, 
DIAGIN, DIAGOUT, Variations, Variations, notBlk) :-
/* The detailed meaning of the argument list of this rule is 
explained in Appendix D.2. This attack class description building 
block does not itself apply variations. */ 
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/* PART 1: Naming and IDS scope selection */ 
/* The name of the attack class description building block: argument 
buffer-overflow */ 
ADBB=argBOF, 
/* The top-level scopes at which this attack class description 
building block can be evaluated: application layer and calls 
(see Figure 9). */ 
(ADBBScope=app_l; ADBBScope=call), 
/* Verify whether the scope list ScopeList contains a scope 
that is covered by the top-level scope. Moreover determine 
and/or verify the effective IDS scope for which the 
attack class description building block is to be evaluated 
(see Figure 9). */ 
selectSubScp(ADBBScope, EffectiveScope, ScopeList), 
/* PART 2: Information source requirements */ 
/* Require the sensor to be able to provide the information needed 
for analysis: The request arguments (see Figure 21 and 
Table 9). */ 
reqSensorAttrib(IDS, _, EffectiveScope, args, basic, DIAGIN, DIAG1), 
/* PART 3: Detector requirements */ 
/* Require the detector to be able to verify the logical correctness 
of the arguments (see Figure 26 and Table 18). */ 
reqDetAttrib(Detector, EffectiveScope, si_ip, logic, DIAGl, DIAG2), 
/* Require the detector to be able to either verify the string size 
or to apply string matching to the arguments (see Figure 26 
and Table 21). */ 
(reqDetAttrib(Detector, EffectiveScope, si_ip_info, size, 
DIAG2, DIAGOUT); 
reqDetAttrib(Detector, EffectiveScope, si_ip_info, string, 
DIAG2, DIAGOUT», !. 
The descriptions of attack class description building blocks, attack classes and variations generally 
consists of three parts as shown in above example. In the fIrst part the name is defmed and the effective 
IDS scope at which the attack class description building block is to be evaluated is selected or, if already 
given, verifIed. Then, in the second part, the information items that are required for analyzing the 
described attack class description building block are specifIed. In the last part the actual analysis 
requirements are specifIed. In Sections 6.2.1 and 6.3.4 similar examples will be given for attack classes 
and variations. 
6.2 Attack class descriptions 
So far we stated that attack class descriptions are primarily composed of attack class description building 
blocks. However, a complete description requires additional description elements, which leads to the 
following list of elements that activity descriptions may be composed of: 
1. Attack class description building blocks as described above. 
2. IDS characteristics required in addition to the ones formulated by attack class description 
building blocks. 
3. The list of IDS scopes that are to be used for the instantiation of attack class description building 
blocks. 
The second element addresses aspects of attack classes that are highly specifIc to the class described, i.e., 
that are too specifIc to be described by a dedicated attack class description building block. However. we 
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generally avoid their inclusions into attack class descriptions because they may make it more difficult to 
consistently repeat the attack description process. 
The third element has multiple functions. First it specifies the IDS scope to which the attack class 
description building blocks have to be instantiated. Its second function, which will be explained 10 
Section 6.3, concerns the selection of variations to be applied to the attack class. 
Example: The description of a buffer overflow attack may specify that it has to be considered at the IDS 
scope http and that TCP and IP have to be considered as the underlying protocols. 
6.2.1 Example of an attack class description 
Most activity descriptions are fairly simple-provided appropriate attack class description building blocks 
have been identified and described in the first place. The following code excerpt is a slightly simplified 
example showing the rule used to describe an http buffer overflow attack using Prolog. 
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
* attack/11/argBOF - httpd argument buffer overflow attack 
* ActNbr: 1 
*/ 
attack (basic, Attack, EffectiveScp, IDS, Detector, ScpList, MaxVars, 
Diagln, DiagOut, VarsToApply, BlockFlag) :-
/* PART 1: Naming and IDS scope selection */ 
Attack=argBOF1 , EffectiveScp=http2, 
/* define the IDS scopes involved in this attack class */ 
ScpList=[EffectiveScp, tcp, ipv4, ieee_802_3, sys_call1 3 , 
/* PART 2: Variations */ 
/* select the variations to consider */ 
selectVars4 (MaxVars, VarsToApply, ScpList, Diagln, DIAG2), 
/* PART 3: Description of the actual attack class */ 
/* This attack is in fact a layer 7 request */ 
adbbs(eval, reqCtlUp6, app 1', IDS, Detector, EffectiveScp, ScpList, 
DIAG2, DIAG4, VarsToApply, VarsNotYetApplied, BLK1 8 ), 
/* Verify whether the IDS was able to analyze the attack class 
description building block 
* reqCtlup/app 1 without being blocked due the lack of 
* Characteristics. */ 
relBlkFlag(BLK1, BlockFlag)9, 
/* now check for the attack class specific things, i.e., the BOF */ 
adbb(eval, argBOF10 , app_l, IDS, Detector, Effect iveScp , ScpList, 
DIAG4, DiagOut11 , VarsNotYetApplied, _, BlockFlag). 
The rules and predicates used to describe this attack class are difficult to understand unless one is familiar 
with Prolog and the context. Being a rule-based language, Prolog will start at the top by trying to satisfy 
this rule by evaluating each predicate. These predicates may fail or succeed. In the case of failure Prolog 
performs backtracking [CloMeI94] until an alternative solution is found. If no such solution is found, the 
entire rule fails. In this particular case backtracking is equivalent to the search of an alternative way of 
analyzing the attack class described. 
The above example shows that attack class descriptions are composed of three parts. In the first part the 
attack class is identified and the list of relevant IDS scopes is defmed. In the second part the set of 
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variations to apply is selected. Then, in the third part, the actual attack class is described. This description 
has to follow the path that infonnation takes when being analyzed by an IDS, i.e., it starts \\ith the 
prerequisites for any form of more advanced analysis (see also Section 6.1.3). In this example we first 
verify whether the IDS is actually aware of application layer, i.e., http, requests. Then, in a final step. the 
IDS's approach of detecting http buffer-overflows is analyzed. 
In order to complete the description of this example, we have added superscript numbers in the example 
that denote Prolog clauses that represent important attack class properties such as the name of the attack 
class (for further details see Appendix 0): 
1. The atom argBOF denotes the generic name of the attack class. However, for a complete 
identification of the attack class also the following atom must be taken into account. 
2. The atom http denotes the so-called effective scope, i.e., the primary IDS scope of the attack 
class. It is the second element that is used to name the attack class. 
3. The list assigned to the variable ScpList represents the list of IDS scopes for which attack class 
description building blocks are to be evaluated (see also Section 4.2.1). For instance this list 
includes the IDS scope ipv4 that triggers the evaluation of network layer attack class description 
building blocks for the IDS scope IP version 4. 
4. The rule se1ectVars selects the set of variations to be applied to the attack class. This is done 
primarily based on the IDS scope list ScpList. This rule relies on backtracking and will provide 
a list of variations to be applied in the variable VarsToApp1y. This list will always have no more 
entries than specified in MaxVars. 
5. The adbb rules are used describe attack class description building blocks (see Section 6.1). 
6. This and the following atom specify the attack class description building block to be considered. 
In this case the atom reqCt1Up stands for the control information of a request sent to a server 
(i.e., no data included). 
7. The atom app _1 represent the second part of the attack class description building block name, 
and initiates the selection of the attack class description building block specified for the 
application layer. 
8. After the evaluation of the adbb rule the BLKl variable is either set to notB1k, adbbB1k or 
varB1k. If the variable is not equal to notB1k, this means that the IDS was found to be able to 
analyze the attack class description building block in the selected analysis path. As shown in this 
example, in many cases the analysis of the attack class is not aborted because of an attack class 
description building block that could not be analyzed. A "blocked" attack class description 
building block simply means that there was an IDS capability missing that prevents the IDS from 
performing further analysis of the attack class on the path considered. The analysis performed so 
far may already be sufficient to raise certain alarms, e.g., that alarm that fragmented POUs have 
been observed. The analysis that has been performed so far is recorded in the variables DIAG2 . 
DIAG4 etc. The fmal recordings are returned in DiagOut. 
109 
AITACK-CLASS-BASED ANALYSIS OF INTRUSION DETECT10~ SYSTEMS 
9. The relBlkFlag rule is a simple helper rule that is required to enable Prolog to continue the 
evaluation of the attack class if several attack class description building blocks or variations are 
to be evaluated in sequence. If BLKl has the value notBlk, BlockFlag will be an uninstantiated 
variable. Otherwise BlockFlag will be made equal to BLKl. At the end of the attack class 
description the variable BlockFlag carries the information whether any of the attack class 
elements, i.e., attack class description building blocks or variations, caused the IDS to stop 
further analysis of the attack class. 
10. The atom argBOF and the following atom app_l specify that the attack class description 
building block describing argument-based buffer overflows at the application layer is to be 
included. The attack class description building block will be evaluated at the scope http that is 
specified by the variable EffectiveScp. 
11. The variable DiagOut contains the diagnostic information needed for further analysis. This 
includes information such as the sensor and detector attributes required during the analysis. 
which then enable the identification of alarms that the IDS has the potential to generate. 
Note that we only provide an example of an attack class description here. We do not include examples of 
attack class description building blocks, simply because in general their descriptions are large and 
complex, and would require far more detailed explanations than seem appropriate in this context. Instead. 
some examples have been included in Appendix D. 
Moreover note that for the description of benign activities we may require certain IDS characteristics not 
to be available. This is necessary if we describe an attack-similar benign activity, which might be 
confused as a malicious one if the IDS is using simple analysis techniques, but that would not be confused 
if more advanced techniques were used (see also Appendix D). As a consequence the attack class will 
only appear as having been analyzed as an attack if the IDS was not sufficiently sophisticated. 
Example: Considering the SMTP (simple mail transfer protocol) example provided in Chapter 4, p. 48. 
There it is shown that IDSs, which are not capable of tracking the state of SMTP sessions, but just use a 
pattern matching technique instead, may confuse mail message data with SMTP commands. In this case 
we express this fact by letting the analysis of the attack class only succeed in its incomplete manner if the 
IDS does not implement the more advanced technique. 
6.3 Using attack class variations to create classes of attack variants 
Attacks may be obfuscated in an attempt to elude IDSs [Horiz098, JiSiIrOO, PtaNew98, RFPOO, 
SasBeeOO, Stewar99]. There exist tools such as Whisker [RFPOO], Fragroute [Song02] and its predecessor 
Fragrouter [Song99] that implement such obfuscation techniques. Here we show how such obfuscating 
transformations of attack classes can be described by means of attack class variations. These are 
independent of, i.e., not associated to, particular attack classes. We also provide some background 
information and explain the difficulties of analyzing altered attack classes. i.e., attack class variants. In a 
next step we explain how these attack class variants can be created by applying variations to attack 
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classes. Finally we discuss the impact variations have on the analysis of an IDS when applied to attack 
classes. 
Primarily knowledge-based IDSs that use some form of attack signature to identify known attacks are 
susceptible to obfuscation techniques. Generally the goal of varying attacks is to change the appearance 
of the attack such that existing attack signatures will no longer match. In real-world environments these 
techniques unfortunately proved to be fairly effective [Marty02]. To make matters worse. most variations 
can be combined with each other---especially if two variations affect different layers or sub-systems. To 
render IDS analysis even more complicated, variations may impact the analysis performed by IDSs in 
numerous ways. 
However, one might argue that the problem of recognizing obfuscated attacks should not be difficult 
because the attack target is after all capable of reversing the transformation applied to the attack. Also. 
one might argue that unnecessary attack transformations are suspicious by definition. Unfortunately 
neither argument is true (see also Section 3.2.2) because 
1. most techniques used to transform an attack also occur in the context of benign activities. 
2. normalization is costly (see also Section 5.3.2), and 
3. in some cases normalization is not possible-at least not in a non-ambiguous manner. 
Most attack transformations used to obfuscate attacks are completely valid with respect to protocol 
specifications etc., and are frequently used in the context of benign activities such as the hexadecimal 
encoding of special characters in URLs. 
Example: Consider the fragmentation of IP PDUs. PDUs may be fragmented in an attempt to partition 
the data carrying the attack. but also because some entity in the network supports only a small MTU 
(Maximum Transfer Unit) size. 
The normalization of data as done by the attack target generally is a rather costly task. If done by the IDS 
it often significantly impacts the performance of the IDS and possibly the performance of the system 
being monitored. Good examples are the reassembly of fragmented IP PDUs or TCP streams. 
For illustration purposes we cite the Snort documentation [Roesch99]. In the rue snort-lisapaper. txt 
the following is stated: 
... A Snort rule that has been tuned too tightly to key on a specific area of a packet's 
payload may overlook the real exploit that has been shifted to a different area within the 
packet. On the other hand. web CGI probes and attacks generally all take place at the 
beginning of the packet within the first thirty to fifty bytes. This can be a great place to 
optimize Snort content searching. 
This describes a way to optimize the performance of Snort. This optimization represents a restriction that 
might be used to elude Snort by obfuscating an http attack by artifically enlarging the http request line. 
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Another issue is that the nonnalization is not always non-ambiguous because multiple valid 
interpretations of the transformed attack class are possible, i.e., in some cases one can no longer call re-
transfonnation "nonnalization". This increases the complexity of the analysis to be done by the IDS as it 
might have to investigate multiple re-transfonnations of an attack. 
Example: Consider overlapping IP fragments in which the overlapping data differs. Here it is not clear 
how the target will reassemble such fragments, i.e., it is not clear whether the target will give preference 
to the data contained in the first fragment or to the data of the last fragment. In fact. such differences 
exist between Linux and Windows operating systems. It is certainly true that this might be unusual (or 
benign activities, but on the other hand, it is not necessarily an indication of malicious activity because a 
faulty network stack also may generate such PDUs. 
To make matters worse, most variations can be combined with each other-especially if two variations 
affect different layers or sub-systems. For instance it becomes possible to combine network layer 
[Horiz098] and application layer variations [RFPOO]. 
Before continuing with a more detailed description of the principles used to describe variations. it is 
worth mentioning that we have selected and described seven attack class variations in RlDAX. These 
range from simply corrupted link layer PDUs and fragmented network layer PDUs to encoding variations 
at the application layer. 
Generally, descriptions of variations are formulated in a fashion highly similar to that used for attack 
classes and attack class description building blocks. However, besides describing the IDS characteristics 
required for their analysis, they also have to support the following additional functions: 
1. Defme the IDS scope they are applicable to. 
2. Represent the differing impact that variations may have on the analysis. 
3. Defme the variations and attack class description building blocks they may be combined with. 
Last but not least, the variations have to be easily applicable to attack class descriptions and attack class 
description building blocks. 
6.3.1 IDS scope of attack class variations 
Similar to attack class description building blocks, variations are defmed at a high-level IDS scope, 
possibly including IDS scope attributes, and then instantiated to the more specific IDS scope that is 
defined by the attack class description. 
Example: The variation used to investigate the behavior of an IDS with respect to the presence of 
fragmented IP PDUs is described for the network layer IDS scope, additionally requiring the 
'fragmentation" attribute. The latter is required in order to prevent the variation from being applied to 
an attack class involving a network layer protocol that does not support fragmentation. During the 
analysis of an attack class variant that includes this variation, the latter is, for example, instantiated for 
the IDS scope IP. 
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As shown in Section 6.2.1, the list of IDS scopes relevant to an attack class is defined .... ithin the attack 
class description. It serves to select the variations that are applicable to an attack class (see Section 6.2.1. 
items 3 and 4). The attack class example in Section 6.2.1 illustrates the stage at which the variations to be 
considered are selected However, the example does not show how the variations are applied. It is clear 
that variations need to be applied at that exact stage in the evaluation of the attack class description. For 
instance, the variation describing IP fragmentation should be considered before the IDS is analyzed for 
any of its higher-level capabilities such as the analysis of TCP streams. The solution to this issue is 
relatively straightforward because we can take advantage of the fact that we use attack class description 
building blocks to describe basic attack class elements: We simply include the evaluation of the 
corresponding variations in these attack class description building blocks. As a result the selected 
variations are automatically included at the appropriate stage of the analysis process, because attack class 
description building blocks such as application layer requests include further lower-level attack class 
elements such as TCP connections. 
6.3.2 Impact of attack variations 
Referring to the preceding section, taking variations into account at the appropriate analysis stage has also 
the welcome advantage that their impact can be modeled in a consistent manner. They may impact the 
evaluation of an attack class variant as follows: 
1. Fatal impact: Any further evaluation of the attack class is blocked. In our description scheme this 
is reflected by setting a flag (see Section 6.2.1, item II). This may result in a false negative. 
2. Limited impact: Control items are suppressed or analysis techniques are rendered useless. but the 
evaluation itself is not blocked immediately. In our description scheme this is reflected by 
marking the affected IDS characteristics as "unavailable." As a consequence the evaluation may 
fail at a later stage and possibly result in a false negative, if one of the affected IDS 
characteristics is required for further evaluation of the attack class. However, it may turn out that 
the IDS has the potential of generating an alarm reporting the presence of a varied attack class, 
i.e., the possibility that an obfuscated attack has been staged. Note that in this case the stage of 
the evaluation at which the variation is considered is vital, simply because it does not make sense 
to suppress IDS characteristics after they have been used already. 
3. No impact: The analysis is not affected because the attack class variant is normalized by some 
intermediate system before the IDS analyzes it. This is typically the case for IDSs that do not 
operate on raw data but use some form oflog data (see Section 5.2.1.1). Generally this case does 
not need to be taken into account explicitly in the description of variations, as it is implicitly 
covered by the fact that variations are included in the appropriate attack class description 
building blocks. 
Example 1: Consider a network-based IDS. Thefragmentation of network layer PDUs may inhibit am' 
further analysis of the activity by a network-based IDS if the latter is not capable of recomposing 
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fragmented PDUs. However. the IDS may be able to generate an alarm reporting the presence of 
fragmented PDUs. which is of limited use only. Fragmented PDUs do not represent a threat. Moreover. 
they are found quite frequently in networking environments where different types of networking 
technology are being used concurrently. In other words the alarm reporting the presence of fragmented 
PDUs is only useful when combined with an alarm reporting some actual threat. In this case the 
combination of the two alarms indicates that an adversary tries to stage an attack in an obfuscated 
manner. which itself may be an indication for the high severity of the attack observed. 
Example 2: Consider an http attack involving some insecure CGI script. If an adversary stages an URI-
based attack against such a CGI sCript. the attack may be recognized fairly easily by some means of 
string matching performed on the URL of the http request. However. the adversary may attempt 10 hide 
hislher attack by obfuscating the URL by using the http protocol feature that allows everv character in the 
URL to be replaced by its hexadecimal representation. This is a technique that has been implemented in 
the Whisker tool [RFPOO}.Ifthe IDS is not capable of reversing the hexadecimal encoding. simple string-
matching algorithms will fail to discover the attack signature in the request submitted by the adversary. 
In this case. however. the impact of the variation is limited because it does not prevent the IDS from 
spending resources in analyzing the request. However. the variation renders its string matching-
technique useless. 
Example 3: Consider WebIDS [Almgre99} and assume that it is not capable of normalizing 
hexadecimally encoded URLs. The IDS would still be able to detect any known attack as long as the URIs 
carrying the attacks are not encoded. If we would apply the variation describing the fact that URIs are 
encoded to an attack. the IDS would be identified as not being able to reverse the encoding. In the case of 
encoded URLs. the URL-related pattern-recognition capabilities of the IDS become useless. We model 
this situation by having the variation marking the pattern-recognition characteristics as "unavailable . .. 
6.3.3 Combining attack variations 
lOSs need to be analyzed for attack class variants including more than just one variation. This is 
necessary because nothing but technical limits prevents an adversary from obfuscating attacks in two or 
even more different ways concurrently to render their detection even more difficult (it is for instance 
possible to combine network layer variations [Horiz098] and application layer variations [RFPOO]). In our 
scheme, variations are described independently of attack classes, so it is quite straightforward to apply 
multiple variations concurrently to an attack class. However, doing so will increase the number of attack 
class variants to be analyzed significantly. Moreover, some obfuscation techniques cannot be applied 
concurrently, for instance, because they abuse the same protocol features but in different ways. 
Example: As a generic example of contradictory variations one can consider two variations of which one 
represents the fact that PDU fragments are extremely large. whereas the other represents the fact that 
PDU fragments are extremely small. 
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As a consequence, the description of a variation needs to provide information about the variations it may 
be combined with. This can be achieved using a relatively simple concept. We include a so-called anack 
class variation index with the description of every variation. Then., when selecting variations (see Section 
6.2.1, item 4), we simply obey the rule that every variation selected must have a variation index not lower 
than and not equal to the index of all the variations already selected. If we now assign the same variation 
index to contradicting variations, we thereby ensure that they will never be applied to an attack class 
concurrently. Although this simple method has limited flexibility, it is sufficient for our PUIpOse and also 
ensures that each possible combination of variations is considered only once. 
Finally, note that any variation having a negative impact on the analysis of an attack class might also have 
a negative impact on the IDS's ability to deal with additional variations applied to the analyzed attack 
class. This is by no means different from the impact a variation may have on the analysis of any other 
attack class element. It, however, represents an additional reason why the order in which attack class 
description building blocks and variations are analyzed has to follow the natural path in which they are 
analyzed in the real world as well. 
6.3.4 Example of an attack variation 
The following example of a variation illustrates the analysis that an IDS has to perform when 
recomposing network layer fragments (typically IP fragments). Further details can be found in Appendix 
D. 
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
* variation/l1/l3frgNotFirst - fragmentation on layer 3 
* This variation makes the assumption that the suspicious data is 
* distributed over multiple fragments, and that the IDS needs to be 
* able to recompose these fragments in order to recognize the attack. 
*/ 
variation (blkChk, Variation, , IDS, Detector, EffectiveScope, 
DIAGIN, DIAGOUT, _, _, notBlk) :-
/* PART 1: Naming */ 
/* the name of this variation */ 
Variation=l3frgNotFirst, 
/* PART 2: Analysis capabilities required */ 
/* We require the IDS to be able to recompose fragments */ 
/* To do so the IDS needs to be able to deal with network 
* layer instances. In most cases this means IPv4 PDUs */ 
reqldeAttrib(Detector, EffectiveScope, si_i, basic, DIAGIN, DIAG1), 
/* In addition the IDS needs to be aware of instance parts, 
* i.e., IP fragments */ 
reqldeAttrib(Detector, EffectiveScope, si_ip, basic, DIAG1, DIAG2), 
/* Moreover the IDS needs to be able to associate instance 
* parts that belong to the same group, i.e., that belong to 
* the same IP PDU */ 
reqldeAttrib(Detector, EffectiveScope, ip_grp, logic, DIAG2, DIAG4), 
/* Part 3: Information items required */ 
/* In addition certain layer 3 header information and data 
* is required */ 
reqSensorAttrib(IDS, Detector, EffectiveScope, data, pdu, DIAG4, DIAG6) , 
reqSensorAttrib(IDS, Detector, EffectiveScope, prot_ctl, frag_ctl, 
DIAG6, DIAGOUT), !. 
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The description of a variation as well as of attack class description building blocks and attack classes may 
consist of several rules. If the first one fails, i.e., the IDS is not able to analyze it properly. several 
alternatives may be considered by the Prolog engine. Each altemative rule describes another way (always 
expressed in terms of the IDS capabilities required) how IDSs may perform their analysis. If. however. no 
alternative is found, a last rule may handle this case by marking specific IDS capabilities as "unavailable" 
(for possible consequences see Section 6.3.2). Such a rule lets the evaluation continue and does not 
activate Prolog backtracking. Then, at a later stage, when the IDS would be required to perform a given 
analysis, this analysis may fail because the IDS is not anymore able to perform it owing to the suppressed 
capabilities. This can be used to model the loss of information that occurs if, for instance. an IDS is not 
able to deal with fragmented IP PDUs (see example I in Section 6.3.2). In this example case the data 
portion of the PDU will not be available to any consecutive attack class description building block. The 
purpose of letting the evaluation continue in such a case is to determine what the IDS is able to achieve 
without the missing information or capabilities. In many cases the IDS may still be able to generate 
alarms that indicate, for instance, the presence of fragmented IP PDUs. See Appendix D.4 for 
implementation details. 
6.4 Expectable alarms 
So far we have developed the description scheme for attack classes and variations, but have not yet 
explained how the results of their analysis can be used to verify whether the IDS analyzed meets the 
expectations, i.e., specification. To do this, it is necessary to know the generalized alarms one expects the 
IDS to generate for any attack class. These expectations are tightly coupled to attack classes, attack class 
description building blocks and variations, and will be described in the following. 
However, note that the IDS analysis process itself will only be explained in the next chapter. This 
includes the specification of the so-called alarm conditions. which are an integral part of the IDS analysis 
procedure. They are used to judge whether an IDS design is capable of analyzing an attack class such that 
it can be considered capable of generating any given generalized alarm. 
Let us therefore assume that an IDS design has been analyzed for an attack class and was found to have 
the potential of generating a set of generalized alarms. To judge whether these alarms are to be considered 
correct, i.e., true positives, we need to extend the description of attack classes by this additional 
information. However, this is not trivial, because 
1. the application of variations to attack classes may change the set of expectable alarms, and 
2. IDSs may report the same attack class using differing generalized alarms. 
Moreover, for reasons of practicality in terms of development and maintenance, it seems desirable to 
couple the specification of the expectable alarms to attack class description components rather than to the 
top-level attack class descriptions. This is achieved by a simple solution that also resolves the issue that 
variations dynamically change the set of expectable alarms. In our solution we specify the expectable 
alarms per attack class description building block and variation. Only if inevitable. we also specify 
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expectable alanns for descriptions of attack classes. This may be required if activity descriptions 
themselves contain description components other than attack class description building blocks that may 
also cause the generation of legitimate alarms. Consecutively the specification of an expectable alarm is 
composed of the following four attributes: 
1. Component type: Attack class description building block, attack class or variation. 
2. Component name: Name of the attack class component. (For examples see Section 6.2.1. items 
1,6, and 8.) 
3. Generic alarm name: Name of the alarm (this will be discussed in Section 7.1.2.1). 
4. Alarm IDS scope: IDS scope at which the alarm condition is formulated. 
When analyzing the set of generalized alarms that an IDS was found to have the potential to generate for 
a given attack class, we fIrst compose the list of expectable alarms. We do so by unifying the lists of 
expectable alarms for every attack class component involved-including the alarms expectable owing to 
the presence of variations. It is clear that if analyzing a benign activity we on1y expect alarms indicating 
the presence of variations. In a next step we verify whether every attack class component for which at 
least one alarm is to be expected was reported. If, excluding variations, this is not the case. we consider an 
attack class as not detected (see also Table 27). Obviously we may also determine lOSs to generate 
alarms that are not among the ones on the list of expectable alarms. These alarms representfalse positives 
(see Section 7.1.3). 
Table 27-Rating of IDS analysis results based on lists of expectable alarms 
Activity consists of None of the expectable At least one alarm, but For every attack class 
(excluding activity alarms generated not one per malicious component at least one 
variations) activity component. is expectable alarm is 
generated generated 
Benign activity Benign N/A NlA 
components only (correct silence) 
Attack class Not detected Partially detected Detected 
components 
The reason for considering an attack class component "detected" if at least one of the expectable alarms 
has been generated is that different types of IDSs report the same attack class or attack class component 
differently. 
Example: The following example is based on the argument-based buffer overflow example in Section 
6.1.1. In this case an IDS may generate an alarm indicating the fact that a suspicious string was found. 
However it may also generate an alarm indicating that the execution path of the monitored process 
deviated from its normal path of execution. For this example the list of expectable alarms would contain 
both alarms in their generalized form. As explained. the attack would be considered "detected" as soon 
at least one of the expectable alarms is generated. 
Finally it is clear that we also use the list of expectable alarms to identify false positives and false 
negatives. If an alarm that is considered "expectable" is not generated, we consider this a false negati\·e. 
However, as shown in Table 27 this does not necessarily mean that we consider an attack as "not 
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detected." If we fmd that an IDS has the potential to generate non-expected alarms, we rate these as false 
positives. 
In the following chapter we describe the process of identifying and rating alarms. In Chapter 8 we \\ilJ 
then show how these analysis results can be used to assess IDSs. 
6.5 Discussion 
Working with the attack classification and description scheme developed in this chapter has revealed that 
the scheme is well suited for constructing descriptions of attack classes in an efficient manner. While 
describing attack classes, we generally try to use attack class description building blocks rather than 
creating highly complex attack class descriptions. Whenever possible we try to create such building 
blocks that describe aspects of attack classes in a highly generic manner, which helps reduce the effort of 
creating new attack classes descriptions significantly over time because we can reuse an increasing 
number of attack class description building blocks. 
In Section 2.2.1 we have identified a set of requirements that our attack classification would have to meet. 
Given the attack class description scheme that we have developed we are confident that all these 
requirements are met. The in-depth discussion of the manner in which this was verified will be provided 
in the next chapter, where also further validation issues will be discussed. 
One concern one might have with respect to the way we describe attack classes is the fact that we 
describe a number of different alternatives of how we envision an IDS could analyze attacks. It seems that 
IDSs that were not taken into account during the creation of the attack class descriptions cannot be 
evaluated accurately. However, we believe this to be an issue of limited importance only. On the one 
hand the descriptions created, especially those of attack class description building blocks, are highly 
generic. Thanks to their generic nature and modularity, it is possible to cover a large number of ID 
approaches by describing only relatively few analysis approaches. On the other hand it is still true that 
certain IDSs may not be evaluated accurately using the existing descriptions. Here we have to emphasize 
that the existing attack class descriptions can be extended or modified to support the analysis of new types 
of IDSs with only little extra effort. This can be achieved by enriching existing attack class description 
building blocks with additional alternatives to analyze the attack class element they describe, thereby 
extending the range of IDS types covered fairly efficiently, without having to revisit every single attack 
class description. 
The concept used to create attack class variants by means of attack class variations proved to be very 
effective in broadening the scope of our evaluation efforts. As we shall see in more detail in the remaining 
two chapters, the use of attack class variants increases the level of detail at which IDSs can be analyzed. 
Moreover, it permits the analysis of IDSs in closer to real-world situations than would otherwise be 
possible. However, the attack class variation concept has to be used with care to avoid causing misleading 
results by applying variations to attack classes where this would .be inappropriate. 
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Example: It does not make sense to apply the attack class variation describing the use of very' small rep 
segments when considering a TCP SYN-jIooding attack [CA2196. SKKSSZj because one would not be 
able to identify a meaningful data flow in the context of such an attack. 
Finally note that the scheme presented can equally well be used for describing of classes of benign 
activities. As explained in Section 3.6.2, this is possible because the intent (benign or malicious) of an 
activity cannot be observed by an IDS. 
6.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have developed a highly flexible, modular, and extensible description scheme for attack 
classes and attack class components that can even be extended towards the description of benign activity 
classes. The scheme, which is based on concepts developed in Chapters 4 and 5, supports the 
consideration of attack class variants, which proved to enrich the IDS analysis process significantly, It is 
clear that any such scheme will never cover all existing and upcoming IDS types upfront. In practice our 
scheme proved to be of high generality, because it is, for instance, capable of catering for IDSs as diverse 
as a host-based or a network-based systems using a single rule describing a buffer overflow attack against 
network services. 
119 
ATIACK-CLASS-BASED ANALYSIS OF INTRUSION DETECTIO~ SYSTEMS 
Chapter 7 Analysis of intrusion detection systems 
In this chapter we develop what has been outlined in Section 3.3: A method that performs a combined 
analysis of IDS descriptions and attack class descriptions. Note that the analysis described in the 
following could be generalized from the analysis of attack classes to the analysis of activity classes that 
may be benign or malicious (see Section 3.6.2). 
After having presented the method and the prototype implementation RIDA)(, we finally explore 
possibilities of validating the results produced by this method and discuss the challenges associated y.ith 
validation. 
7.1 IDS analysis process 
The actual IDS analysis process (see Figure 13) consists of two steps, which are repeated systematically 
for every individual IDS description and attack class variant. Each iteration analyzes a given IDS for a 
given attack class variant. In our RIDAX tool, this process is fully automated and takes advantage of 
Prolog's backtracking mechanism to systematically select IDSs and attack class variants for analysis. 
RIDAX even goes a step further and performs a rating of the generalized alarms in order to detennine 
whether they can be considered a true or a false positive. The latter is of particular interest if our method 
is used for analyzing attack classes as well as classes of benign activity. 
Figure 29 provides a more detailed overview of the data flow required for each iteration of the IDS 
analysis process as implemented by RIDAX. The process starts with the analysis of an attack class, i.e., 
attack class variant. This first analysis step provides a description of the capabilities that the IDS being 
evaluated has employed to analyze the attack class variant considered. These capabilities are described in 
terms of IDS characteristics. The process then continues with the alarm analysis step, which uses the IDS 
characteristics that were required to analyze the attack class variant considered as input. This alarm 
analysis step generates the list of generalized alarms that the IDS being evaluated has the potential of 
generating for the attack class variant considered. In the fmal step, these generalized alarms are rated 
whether they represent a true or a false positive. Moreover it is determined whether the IDS has the 
potential of suffering from false negatives, i.e., of not reporting attack classes as expected. This analysis 
also includes the rating of attack class variants, i.e., whether they have been detected, partially detected or 
not detected (see also Section 6.4). 
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Figure 29-0verview of the data required in and generated by eacb iteration of tbe IDS analysis 
process, including examples 
7.1.1 Attack class analysis 
Tbe fust step of the IDS analysis process (sbown in Figure 29) is tbe examination of the way that IDSs 
analyze attack classes and their variants. This requires the IDS descriptions and tbe attack class 
descriptions as input. 
Tbe analysis starts with the selection of the attack class variant for whicb the IDS is to be analyzed. This 
selection is made in a hierarchical manner, i.e. , first the attack class to be analyzed is selected from the list 
of available attack classes. In the second phase, the set of variations to be applied to the attack class is 
selected. A new attack class is only selected for analysis if all applicable combinations of variations have 
been considered. Similarly, a new combination of variations is only selected if all possibilities of bow the 
IDS considered may analyze the selected attack class variant have been examined. This means that tbe 
IDS analysis process might iterate multiple times for the same attack class variant-eacb time exploring a 
different analysis approach offered by the IDS (see also Section 6.1.2). 
The selection of the set of variations that is to be applied concurrently to an attack class is made by means 
of a recursive algorithm that relies on the attack class variation index introduced in Section 6.3.3. The 
example attack class description provided in Section 6.2.1 illustrates bow this selection is initiated by 
means of the selectVars statement (described by item 4, p. 109). Based on tbe list of ID cope 
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relevant to the attack class considered, this simple algorithm systematically searches for vananons iliat 
may be applied to the attack class, and that may be combined with the set of variations already elected. 
The algorithm adds a variation to the set of previously selected variations if its ariation index i higher 
than that of any of those already selected. The search for applicable variations stop once the number of 
selected variations has reached its maximum or all applicable variations ha e been considered. In the 
implementation of the analysis process, we have limited the number of concurrent! considered ariations 
to two, simply to constrain the number of possible combinations that ha e to be considered for eve 
attack class to a practical number. However, this restri ction does not influence the viability of the anal i 
results. Although it is true that variations may influence each other, our experiments did not reveal a 
single case in which two variations influenced a third any differently than a single ariarion djd. 
The systematic and complete selection of attack classes as well as the se lection of ariation rei on the 
backtracking provided by Prolog [CloMel94]. It thereby ensures, in a trrughtforward manner, tbat each 
attack class variant is considered, and that all possible analysis approaches are examined. 
Once the attack class variant has been selected, the attack class analysis proceeds by determining how it i 
analyzed by the IDS under consideration. The various input items used are shown in Figure 30 in more 
detail. For the description of IDSs we refer the reader to Chapter 5' for the de cription of attack cia e 
and their components, see Chapter 6. Owing to the rule-based manner in which attack cia e are 
described, most of the analysis process is defined implicitly. At this stage we ystematica ll y earch for 
ways to analyze the attack class variant considered using only the capabilities provided by the ID under 
analysis. While doing so, we record aU IDS characteristics employed for anal yzi ng the att ack class . 
Example: Consider an http argument buffer overflow attack being analyzed by a /olOwledge-based rDS 
such as WebIDS [Almgre99}. In this case one typically obtains an analysis result that shows {h at the IDS 
was analyzing the http instance at the semantic analysis level using a string-matching technique or 
possibly simply verifying the request length. In addition the result would reflect all sensor items required 
for the analysis. 
Activity 
Analysis 
Figure 30--lnput required for and output generated by the attack c1a.ss anal is step 
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If the IDS considered is incapable of analyzing the attack class variant considered, the resulting t of ID 
characteristics required for analyzing the attack class variant will lack the una ailable ID characteri ti . 
However, in general more than just the unavailable IDS characteristics will be missing in the re ull. 
Typically the IDS characteristics required for analyzing the attack class description building block or 
variation whose analysis failed, as well as the characteristics required for analyzing the omitted building 
blocks and variations will be missing. The analysis of further building blocks and ariations i omitted if 
no alternative way of analyzing the attack class variant considered exists (see also Section 6.3.2) . In the 
extreme case, in which the IDS considered is not even capable of observing the attack clas ariant, the 
result will be an empty set of IDS characteristics. 
To facilitate debugging and further analysis, all attack class components involved and the fact whether the 
IDS was capable of analyzing them are recorded in addition to the IDS characteristics employed. 
7.1.2 Alarm analysis 
Once the examination of how an IDS analyzes a given attack class variant is completed, we continue with 
the second step of the IDS analysis process, which is also automated. Based on the ID characteri tic 
that were required to analyze the attack class variant selected, we determine the generalized alarms lhe 
IDS considered has the potential to generate. This is achieved by evaluating the attack class-independent 
alarm conditions with the set of IDS characteristics identified. The definition of the attack cla ariant 
and the identification of the generalized alarms that IDSs have the potential to generate are lherefore 
independent. Note that for this to be true, the attack class descriptions should not include any indication 
on the generalized alarms the attack class described might be causing. This is achieved by not formulating 
any a priori expectations that might influence how attack class variants are being eva luated. This 
approach thus supports the identification of multiple genera lized alarms that an IDS potentially generates 
for a single attack class variant. 
IDS Alarm 
Analysis 
Figure 31-Input required for and output generated by the alarm analysis step 
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Figure 31 shows the input required for and the output produced by this step. As in the preceding step, the 
IDS descriptions are required. In addition, the alarm conditions and IDS characteristics that were required 
to analyze the attack class variant considered are required as input. On the output side, we find the set of 
generalized alanns that the IDS under considered was found to have the potential to generate. We also 
obtain the list of additional IDS characteristics that were required for the generation of the generalized 
alanns, in addition to some debugging information. 
In the following we provide insights into the alarm conditions, explain how they were identified. and 
discuss the semantics of the alanns that they specify the conditions for. 
7.1.2.1 A1ann conditions 
It was mentioned that alarm conditions determine whether an IDS has the potential to generate a given 
generalized alarm based on the set of IDS characteristics that were required for the analysis of the attack 
class variant considered. However, when looking at the details, the situation is more complex. Beyond the 
IDS characteristics needed for analyzing the attack class variant, additional IDS characteristics may be 
required by the alarm condition. This may be necessary if one wishes to differentiate between knowledge-
and behavior-based detection. In such cases it is important to differentiate clearly because the semantics 
ofalanns may differ significantly. 
Example: Once more consider our http argument buffer overflow example. An IDS is found to have the 
potential of generating an alarm indicating a malformed http URL if the IDS characteristics that were 
required to analyze the attack class variant meet the requirements specified by the alarm condition. The 
latter requires, among other things, that the following IDS characteristics were required for the analysis 
of the attack class variant: 
• Basic http arguments (see also Section 5.2.2) 
• String matchingfor http information items (see also Section 5.3.3.2.2) 
In addition, possibly among other characteristics, the IDS has to be knowledge-based. This is verified by 
requiring the corresponding IDS characteristic to be present in the IDS description (see also Section 
5.3.1), as opposed to the IDS characteristics listed above. These characteristics do not have to be present 
in the set of IDS characteristics required for the analysis of the attack class variant. 
As illustrated by the example above, it is possible to specify the requirements an IDS needs to fulfill to be 
capable of generating the alarm at highly specific IDS scope, e.g., http. Such a practice would, however, 
lead to the repeated description of conditions that only differ in the IDS scope they apply to. This would 
not only result in an unnecessary large number of alarm conditions, but would also cause an important 
loss of generality. As a consequence we require alarm conditions to be more generic. We achieve this by 
associating them with two different IDS scopes-similar to the method we used for the description of 
attack class description building blocks. This means that alarm conditions are defmed at the highest IDS 
scope level possible. Then, during the alarm analysis, we determine the effective IDS scope of the 
generalized alarm based on the IDS scopes of the IDS characteristics required for the analysis of the 
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attack class variant considered. The effective IDS scope of the generalized alarm may not be less specific 
than the IDS scope at which the alarm condition was specified. Technically, the identification of the 
effective IDS scope is achieved by taking advantage of Prolog's inference engine [DiazOO] (see also 
Appendix D.6.3). 
Example: Consider an alarm condition that could be triggered for our http argument buffer overflow 
example. Such an alarm condition might describe the fact that a suspicious argument was observed. and 
can be defined at the IDS scope "application layer. " Then. during the evaluation of all alarm conditions. 
the alarm-analysis process would recognize the fact that the analyzed attack class variant has required 
http attributes and that http is an application layer protocol. If then the set of IDS characteristics used for 
the analysis of the attack class variant meets the conditions formulated by the alarm-condition example. 
we consider the alarm to have been generated. This can then be interpreted as the fact that the IDS 
analyzed has the potential of generating an alarm indicating the observation of a suspicious http 
argument (Le .• URL) for the attack class variant considered. 
Remember, the important property is that alarm conditions are independent of both attack class and IDS 
descriptions. However, how does one know which alarm conditions to create if they are independent of 
attack class and IDS descriptions? The 19 alarm conditions that we created in the context of the RIDAX 
prototype implementation were identified by searching for attack super-classes in the attack 
categorization described in Section 4.2. We focused our effort on attack classes and variations for which 
we actually created descriptions (see Section 4.3). These alarm conditions are of high generality as they 
are defmed at a high-level IDS scope. In Appendix D we provide examples and a semi-formal 
specification. 
7.1.2.2 Semantics of generalized alarms 
When discussing alarm semantics one has to distinguish clearly between the generalized alarms generated 
in the course of our IDS analysis effort and alarms generated by IDS implementations. The alarms 
generated by IDS implementations denote the observation of a particular suspicious activity, whereas the 
generalized alarms generated in the context of our approach denote the potential of the IDSs analyzed to 
generate alarms indicating complete classes of suspicious activity. This means that the generalized alarms 
do not provide an indication of whether the signature database of a knowledge-based IDS actually 
contains signatures for specific attacks, but may provide us with information that is of great value for 
subsequent alarm-processing algorithms. These conditions may then be used to determine whether the 
potentially generated alarms carry any additional diagnostic information. In RIDAX we took advantage of 
this possibility by including a flag that indicates whether the IDS analyzed is capable of reporting the 
success state of the supposedly observed attack. 
Example: Referring to above example. and considering an IDS that "simply" checks for the presence of 
a string. Such an IDS is not capable of providing the information whether the supposed(l: identified attack 
was successfol as long as the reaction of the attacked process is not taken into account. This typically is 
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difficult for network-based IDSs but less so for host-based systems because for the laller it is aeneral/l' 
:;, . 
easier to get hold of the necessary information. 
This also means that in general the semantics of (seemingly) identical alanns that any two IDSs rnav 
generate differ. This is true for alarms generated by IDS implementations as well as for those generated in 
the context of our approach to IDS analysis. As a consequence we consider alanns generated by any two 
differing IDSs to be semantically different. 
We fully take advantage of all the information that alarm conditions rnay provide us with by using the 
following 5-tuple of alarm properties to defme and distinguish generalized alanns: 
1. IDS identifier (e.g., "Snort, v 1. 7, light-weight configuration") 
2. Generic alarm name (e.g., "suspicious argument string") 
3. IDS scope of alarm defmition (e.g., "application layer") 
4. Effective IDS scope of alarm generated (e.g., "http") 
5. Availability of attack success-state ("true" or "false") 
The use of this 5-tuple also supports us in differentiating alarm classes based. for instance. on the 
detection method used by the IDSs. Differentiating generalized alarms that behavior- and knowledge-
based IDSs generate is necessary because they differ significantly in their expressiveness and semantics. 
This difference is also reflected by the corresponding alarm conditions. Knowledge-based IDSs include a 
limited description of the attack identified in the alarm. They rnay also include additional diagnostic 
information such as IP addresses. Such alarms generally refer to identifiers such as eVE (see Section 
2.2.5.1). In the case of behavior-based IDS the situation is different. These IDSs commonly only express 
the fact that suspicious activity was observed by signaling the fact that the system monitored deviates 
from its normal behavior. Their alarm identifier rnay for instance express the fact that a strange, abnormal 
sequence of instances was identified. However, such an identifier reveals no concrete information about 
the cause of the non-acceptable sequence. 
Example: Considering our http buffer overflow example. Assuming that IDSs such as Snort, WebIDS or 
Daemon Watcher are found to have the potential of detecting this attack, the Co"espomiing alarms could 
look as follows: 
Table 28-Example of how various IDSs report a buffer overflow attack 
Alarm property 1105 Snort WeblDS DaemonWatcher 
IDS identifier Snort, v1.7, light-weight WeblDS DaemonWatcher for 
configuration httpd 
Generic alarm name Suspicious argument Suspicious argument Unknown execution path 
string string 
IDS scope of alarm Application layer Application layer Call 
definition 
Effective IDS scope of http http System call 
generated alarm 
Availability of attack False True True 
success state 
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As a possible application we will show in Chapter 8 how one can benefit by taking into account such 
semantic differences of alarms when combining alarms generated by diverse IDSs. However. note that 
there is no one-to-one mapping between generalized alarms and naming schemes for attacks or 
vulnerabilities, such as CVE. What we have instead is a many-to-many mapping between classes of 
attacks and real attacks. After all, one can view the generalized alarms defmed by the above 5-tuple as an 
alarm classification scheme that could be applied to alarms generated by IDS implementations to simplify 
their further processing. 
7.1.3 Rating of generalized alarms and attack classes 
As an additional step, the RIDAX implementation performs a rating of the generalized alarms that the 
IDSs considered were found to have the potential of generating. This is done based on the expectable 
alarms for the attack class components involved (see also Section 6.4). These are used to verify whether 
every attack class component for which at least one expectable alarm was specified generated at least one 
of the expectable alarms. If this is not the case, the attack class component concerned is rated as "not 
detected." 
The result of this step is three-fold. First, generalized alarms are rated to be true positives, false positives. 
or false negatives: 
• True positives: The (generated) generalized alarm is listed in the list of expectable alarms of any 
of the attack class components involved in the attack class variant analyzed. 
• False positives: The (generated) generalized alarm is not listed in the list of expectable alarms of 
any of the attack class components involved in the attack class variant analyzed. 
• False negatives: An attack class component with a nonempty list of expectable alarms exists that 
was not reported by any of the expectable alarms. 
Concurrently also the attack class components are rated: 
• Benign: There are no expectable alarms specified for the attack class component (the component 
might in fact be benign). 
• Detected: At least one of the expectable alarms was generated. 
• Not detected: None of the expectable alarms was generated. 
Based on these ratings for attack class components we then rate the complete attack class variant as 
explained in Section 6.4 (see Table 27, p. 117). Note that independently of how an attack class variant is 
rated, false positives may be present. In fact, false positives may obfuscate the result such that it becomes 
even more challenging to draw precise conclusions based only on the set of alarms generated for attack 
class variants. 
Example: Consider again the http argument buffer overflow attack (see also the example provided in 
Section 6.4). Moreover assume that the alarm analysis reveals that the IDS has the potential of reporting 
the attack class description building block describing the actual argument buffer overflow by means of an 
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alarm. We would rate this building block as "detected " if the alarm indicales Ihe observation 0 a 
suspicious string in the request. The same is true for any other alarm, such as an alarm reponing Ihe 
observation of a suspicious execution path, that is "expectable " for this attack class description building 
block. Accordingly any alarm that appears on the list of expectable alarms is raled as a rroe po i/il·e. 
Assuming that the buffer oveiflow building block is the only malicious one referenced in Ihe alfack clas 
description of the attack, we would consequently also rate the entire attack as "delecled. " If. holl' ' ·er. 
the same attack was reported only by a non-expectable alarm, we would rate the attack as "" 01 
detected, " and the alarm would be rated as a false positive, i.e. , the allack was delecled bur i"corr II)' 
diagnosed. 
Note that variations have a different impact on the rating of an attack class variant than other attack cia 
components. We rate the alarms generated or expected because of variations in the arne \ aya an other 
attack class component. Also, we rate attack class components describing variations as "detected," "not 
detected," or "benign." However, when rating attack class variants, we do not take the rating of ariations 
into account because variations do not impact the core of an attack class but merely alter its appearance. 
Example: It would not seem reasonable to rate an otherwise correctly reponed attack varianl as only 
"partially detected" merely because the IDS analyzed did not report the fac t that IP PDU carrying the 
attack werefragmented. 
Rating 01 
Gen. Alarms & 
Act Class Vars. 
Figure 32-lnput required for and output generated by the aJarm and attack class rating step 
7.2 Implementation: RIDAX, a tool for analyzing IDSs 
We have now developed all the concepts that we require for analyzing IDSs at a conceptual level. In this 
. . . hi h ts ototype that implements all of these sectIOn we prOVIde an overvIew of RIDAX, w c represen a pr 
concepts. 
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As explained, we chose to describe attack classes, attack class components, and alarm conditions in a 
rule-based fashion because it seemed especially well suited for identifying generalized alarms that an ID 
potentially generates (see Section 7.1). This solution is appropriate for creating and combining the generic 
and high-level descriptions of attack class components introduced in Chapter 6. For the implementation of 
RlDAX we chose the GNU implementation of Prolog by Diaz [DiazOO], as it is a rule-based language 
that meets our requirements, and in particular includes database connecti ity. The database connectivity 
is implemented by integrating Prolog with the MySQL database [MySql] using their re pective C 
interfaces. MySQL is already used to store IDS descriptions (see Section 5.4.1 ). 
In the following subsection we describe the database structure used to store the anal 
Subsequently we describe the most important phases of the analysis performed by RIDAX. 
7.2.1 Database structure 
re ults. 
During the analysis process RlDAX stores all the results generated into a database for later ana ly i . Thi 
database has close relations to the database used to store IDS descriptions (see Section 5.4.1 . Figure 33 
shows a simplified entity relationship diagram of thi s database, in which all the entitie taken from the 
IDS description database are shaded. These entities are not specific to the analysis re ull databa e but 
solely illustrate the relations to the database developed in Section 5.4.1. 
> ________ ~(1~.NL) ________ c===~=:~----~J(~1N ) Consisls 01 IDS 
~ V (O.N) 
Sl4>"rscope (O.N) 
IO N) 
e 
IO.N) IO.N) 
10S scopes 
subscope 
(O.N) 
Figure 33--Entity relationship diagram of the database used to store analysis result 
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The most important entity is the attack class variants entity. This entity links all the results that ha"e been 
collected during the analysis of an attack class for a given combination of variations. The attack class 
variants entity has relations to numerous entities representing the data collected during the analysis 
process. Most importantly it links generalized alarms, including false negatives, and attack class variants. 
In addition, four further entities are linked that are mainly used for development purposes. However. they 
may also be used to determine the additional diagnostic information an IDS might be providing along 
with the alarms it generates. These entities represent the IDS characteristics that were required for the 
analysis of attack class variants. Based on this data, it becomes possible to determine the additional 
information that an IDS provides along with an alarm. Furthermore, the variations and the attack class 
description building blocks entities are used to obtain some insight into the analysis process. Last but not 
least, the attack class entity links the analysis results of the attack classes (including attack class variants) 
with the IDS that has been analyzed. It thus enables us to obtain an overview of the analysis results on a 
per-attack-class basis across the various attack class variants analyzed. 
7.2.2 Analysis steps 
In the following we provide an overview of the IDS analysis steps as they are implemented in Prolog-
without going into details of the Prolog code. However, note that much of RIDAX relies on the 
integration of GNU Prolog with the MySQL database. 
7.2.2.1 Initialization 
In the initialization phase RIDAX connects to the database and transfers the information that is stored in 
the database to the Prolog engine. This data primarily consists of IDS descriptions and is used to assert 
numerous Prolog facts dynamically. These facts reflect the content of the database in such a way that the 
Prolog inference engine can use it (i.e., the IDS descriptions, the IDS scope tree, etc.). 
In a next step all the rules are loaded into the Prolog environment. Some of these rules control the flow of 
the analysis process, whereas others represent the descriptions of attack classes, attack class description 
building blocks, attack class variations, alarm conditions etc. 
Finally, the actual analysis phases are prepared by initializing the database tables required for storing the 
results. 
7.2.2.2 Implementation of attack class analysis 
After the initialization phase has completed, Prolog backtracking is used to evaluate all IDSs described 
for all the attack classes. This also includes the analysis of all possible attack class variants that may be 
derived from any given attack class. While doing so, all IDS characteristics required during the attack 
class analysis are stored as dynamically asserted Prolog facts and are written to the database. As 
explained in Section 6.3, variations may suppress sensor items or may render the analysis capabilities of 
detectors useless for further analysis; this is also taken into account by asserting dynamic facts. 
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7.2.2.3 Implementation of alarm analysis and rating 
After the Prolog rule representing an attack class description has reached its goal, all the alarm 
descriptions represented by Prolog rules need to be evaluated as well. This is where the advantages of the 
Prolog inference engine become very helpful. The alarm conditions are evaluated based on all the facts 
that were asserted dynamically during the attack class analysis phase. Any alarm rule that succeeds 
represents the creation of a generalized alarm, which is rated whether it is a false or a true positive before 
it is stored in the database. Concurrently all the missing generalized alarms are identified, which are then 
stored as false negatives into the database. 
After all the alarm rules have been evaluated, all dynamically asserted facts are retracted, i.e., discarded, 
and the process continues by evaluating the next attack class variant. This process is repeated for every 
attack class variant. In other words, every attack class is analyzed several times, once for every allowable 
combination of variations. 
7.3 Validation 
In this and the preceding chapters we have gradually worked towards a solution of what was claimed in 
Section 1.3. There it was claimed that an approach exists that is able to predict the classes of attacks that a 
given IDS design is able to detect. Moreover it was claimed that such an approach can be implemented 
based on the combined analysis of IDS descriptions and descriptions of attack classes-thereby avoiding 
the need of conducting experiments with specific attacks and actual IDS implementations. 
In Section 3.5 we highlighted the difficulties involved in validating our approach to IDS analysis and 
outlined the process that allows us to provide evidence that the results produced are correct. However. 
before we present the necessary steps to provide this evidence, we discuss the challenges involved in 
validating the IDS analysis results. 
7.3.1 Validation challenges 
One of the requirements for our approach was that the necessity to conduct experiments with actual IDS 
implementations has to be avoided. The reasons for this requirement were two-fold On the one hand our 
approach should assist IDS designers early in the design phase of IDSs in order to improve the efficiency 
of the design process, i.e., before the IDS design is implemented. On the other hand the approach aims at 
providing results of high generality involving only a limited effort. In other words, the results have to be 
provided at the level of attack classes. We chose a description-based approach because this enables us to 
meet the above requirements and to limit the effort involved. 
We face a number of issues when it comes to validating whether the predictions made by our approach to 
IDS analysis are correct and correspond to the actual behavior of IDS implementations. A systematic and 
complete validation would require that the class-level predictions made by our approach are compared 
with the behavior of actual IDS implementations. Such an undertaking would represent an enormous 
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challenge and in fact precisely exemplifies the problem this work attempts to address. It would be 
required that one or several rather complex environments are built such that IDSs can be analyzed under 
different conditions. The complexity of such environments would be comparable to the one used in the 
Lincoln Lab experiment or might even exceed its complexity (see also Section 2.3.3.1). Howeyer. the 
most challenging aspect of any such validation undertaking would be the number and diversity of 
individual tests to be executed. Complete validation would require the pursuing of an equivalence class 
testing strategy as discussed in Section 2.2.2. Applied to our approach for each attack class. including 
those derived automatically by applying variations to already known classes (see Section 6.3). several 
individual tests would have to be executed for each IDS analyzed. As outlined in Section 3.2.2. a 
comparatively simple setup using 27 attack class descriptions to which variations are applied may yield 
498 or even more distinct attack classes. The validation of the analysis results that our approach produces 
for these attack classes would therefore involve the execution of several thousands of tests for each IDS 
considered because the analysis results of each attack class need to be validated by multiple tests. Such an 
undertaking would significantly exceed the scope of this work and would also exceed the Lincoln Lab 
effort. In the following we will therefore outline an alternative solution that is able to provide evidence 
that the results produced by our approach are correct. 
Another issue that needs to be taken into account is the fact that under certain circumstances the results 
predicted by our approach to IDS analysis may not correspond to the actual behavior of IDS 
implementations. There exist numerous conceivable reasons for such inconsistencies: 
• Incorrect or insufficient IDS description: The description of an IDS does not reflect the 
characteristics of the IDS correctly. This may, for instance, mean that the IDS description does 
not describe the particular configuration of the IDS considered correctly. Moreover it might be 
the case that the IDS uses new techniques that are not yet covered by the IDS description 
scheme. In this case the IDS description scheme would have to be extended accordingly. 
• Incomplete attack signature set: If the set of attack signatures of a knowledge-based IDS does 
not include the signature for a given attack, the IDS will not be able to detect the attack even 
though it might in theory be capable of detecting it, i.e., even though it offers all the analysis 
techniques required. In this case the inconsistency is caused by the fact that our approach 
operates at the level of attack classes and therefore does not take into account signatures for 
specific attacks. 
• Incorrect attack class description: If the description of an attack class IS incorrect, e.g., 
incomplete, the IDS analysis results are likely to be incorrect. 
• Ad-hoc techniques and heuristics: If IDS implementations use ad-hoc techniques or heuristics 
that are tailored to the detection of a specific attack or to the avoidance of specific false 
positives, their actual behavior may differ from the prediction made by our approach. Consider. 
for instance, the example in the introduction of Chapter 1 (see also Section 2.4.2). There an IDS 
is described that will generate alarms for observed IP fragments whenever the fragments are 
smaller than a given, pre-configured size. The accuracy of such techniques is generally very 
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limited [Marty02, p. 66]. The difficulty with regard to IDS analysis is that such techniques may 
surpass the granularity at which our IDS description scheme operates. 
IDS implementation flaws: IDS implementations may suffer from implementation flaws. i.e .. 
bugs, that let their characteristics divert from the design. 
Failure of our approach to IDS analysis: Ifnone of above reasons could be identified as the cause 
for an inconsistency between the results that our approach produces and the manner an IDS 
behaves, then this would indicate a weakness in our approach. However, so far we were not able 
to prove that our approach always produces correct results by means of a complete validation for 
the reasons indicated above, but neither were we able to prove the contrary by encountering 
counter-examples among the numerous experiments that were conducted in the context of this 
work. 
However, despite these difficulties, we found our approach to produce correct and, most importantly. 
useful results. This fact is emphasized in the next section where meaningful evidence that our approach to 
IDS analysis provides correct results is provided. 
7.3.2 Validation procedure 
Above we explained the difficulties of complete validation using equivalence class testing. As an 
alternative we present a process in the following that is suitable for providing evidence that the IDS 
analysis results produced by our approach are correct. 
As a first step we discuss the validity of the IDS description framework and the attack classification and 
description scheme. They represent the input to our IDS analysis approach (see Figure 1). 
The IDS description framework represents an empirically developed scheme that describes roSs by 
systematically identifying system characteristics that are relevant to the detection of attacks. The scheme 
has been developed based on a simplified CIDF IDS model (see Figure 8) and combines concepts from 
IDS taxonomies such as the one by Debar et al. [DeDaWeOO], insights gained in the context of the VuIDa 
work [DacAle99], and experiences made while using and developing IDSs. The scheme rigorously 
separates analytic functions, i.e., techniques, provided by IDSs from the domain to which these functions 
can be applied. The resulting scheme is extensible and enables the unambiguous and concise description 
of IDSs and IDS designs with respect to their attack detection capabilities. 
The attack classification and description scheme uses the notion. of IDS characteristics as defmed by the 
IDS description framework for expressing the requirements IDSs have to meet in order to be able to 
detect a given class of attacks. The proposed attack classification scheme meets all the requirements (see 
Section 2.2.1) that a sound classification has to meet: 
• Orthogonality: For any attack there exists one description only. Thus any described attack can 
either be associated with an already identified class or identifies a new attack class. 
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Procedure: The classification procedure for attacks was defined in Section 3.2. It consists of a 
first step, in which a description of the considered attack is created, and a second step. in which 
the resulting description is compared with other already identified descriptions. 
• Observability: The description of attacks is based on clearly defined IDS characteristics that are 
used to describe the observable aspects of attacks. The resulting attack descriptions can be 
compared with each other. 
• Hierarchy: It is possible to create higher-level descriptions of attack classes by making use of the 
hierarchical nature of IDS scopes. However, this possibility was never used in this work.. 
• Consistency: Each attack that belongs to a given class is described by an attack description that 
is identical to the description of all attacks that belong the same class, i.e., attacks that belong to 
the same attack class share the same description as a common property. 
Assuming that the IDS description framework and the attack classification are viable. we can now 
investigate the validity of the results provided by actual IDS analysis procedure. Here it needs to be 
shown that the predictions made for IDS designs correctly reflect the actual behavior of the corresponding 
IDS implementations. A complete validation of the correctness of the predictions made could be achieved 
by means of equivalence class testing (see Section 2.2.2). As explained in Section 7.3.1, in this particular 
case such an approach involves significant challenges that are difficult to address. It is. however. possible 
to provide evidence that the results provided are correct. First, a diverse set of attack classes, attacks that 
belong to these classes, and a set of existing IDS implementations have to be selected. Then it has to be 
shown that the IDS implementations report the selected attacks by means of alarms that correspond to the 
generalized alarms that were predicted by the combined analysis of the designs of the IDSs selected and 
the description of the attack classes considered (see also Figure 2). This last step requires the manual 
comparison of alarms generated by IDS implementations and generalized alarms predicted by our IDS 
analysis approach, because the alarms generated by IDS implementations do not explicitly convey the 
information conveyed by generalized alarms. 
7.3.3 RIDAX example 
The following discussion is based on the example that we introduced in Section 3.5. There we identified 
the alarms that the IDS implementations WebIDS and Snort generate for two specific http attacks. These 
results were then compared with the analysis results produced by RillAX. In the following we provide 
some further background information related to this example and in particular to the information provided 
in Table 2. 
In their second column Table 29 and Table 30 provide the raw alarm messages as they are generated by 
WebIDS and Snort for the attacks indicated in the first column. In the third column we provide the 
predictions as they were made by RIDAX for the attack classes to which the attacks considered belong. 
The obfuscated variants of the attacks considered are identical to the ones discussed in Section 3.5 and 
represent the use of IP fragmentation. 
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We can verify whether the alarm messages and the predicted generalized alarms correspond to each other 
by taking a closer look at the manner these two IDSs detect these attacks. WebIDS (see Table 29) detects 
the test-cgi attack by applying a pattern-matching algorithm to the CLF [Weinma98] log file entries 
written by the webserver software. Among other information CLF log files provide the URI of the 
requests that the server receives. Given the fact that the test-cgi attack involves a specific URI and that 
our IDS description scheme represents URIs as a "request argument" of the IDS scope "http." the 
prediction made by RIDAX is correct. For the second, http-header-based attack, RIDAX has correctly 
predicted that WebIDS is not capable of the detecting the attack because http header data is not written to 
CLF log files, i.e., the attack is never visible to WebIDS. Concerning the attack obfuscation technique 
considered, WebIDS proved to be immune against IP fragmentation tactics. This is not surprising because 
WebIDS is not analyzing network data. 
Table 29-Alarms generated by and generalized alarms predicted for Web IDS 
WeblDS Syslog alarm message Generalized alarm 
http meta-character May 1 16:54:45 loghost webids(14080): • A1ann type: suspicious 
attack16 10239028_7 Ox3e3d43d3 pattern (cgi) argument string 
[CA0696, CVEOO7099] 10.4.2.116 /test-cgi 200 10.4.2.116 - -
• IDS scope of generalized [01/May/2002:16:54:45 +0200) "GET 
/cgi-bin/test-cgi?/* HTTP/1.0" 200 - alann: http 
CVE-1999-0070 CVE • IDS scope of alann 
definition: Application layer 
Obfuscated http meta- Detected; same as above Detected; same as above 
character attack 
http header buffer- Not detected Not detected 
overflow 17 [CVE084800] 
Obfuscated http header Not detected Not detected 
buffer-overflow 
In the case of Snort the results are slightly different (see Table 30). First of all we consider a simple 
configuration of Snort that does not support the re-assembly of fragmented IP traffic. It is therefore no 
surprise that the Snort implementation does not detect the obfuscated attacks. The RIDAX analysis results 
predict this behavior correctly by generating no generalized alarms. During the RIDAX analysis this 
attack class variation imposes the requirement that the IDS be able to deal with IP fragments, i.e., instance 
part groups of the IDS scope IP, which the considered IDS configuration is not capable of doing. When it 
comes to the detection of the two non-obfuscated attacks Snort performs better than WebIDS does. It 
correctly detects both attacks as predicted by RIDAX. The detection techniques used by Snort are similar 
to the ones used by WebIDS. It is therefore no surprise that a test-cgi attack is reported by an alarm that 
corresponds to the same generalized alarm as was predicted for WebIDS. Considering the second attack, 
the data source used represents an important differentiator. As seen above, the fact that Snort operates 
based on network data makes it susceptible to certain obfuscation techniques, but provides the eminent 
advantage that it can observe the complete communication between the client and the (web-)server. It can 
16 A directory listing can for instance be retrieved by launching the following on a unix command line: 
echo "GET /cgi-bin/test-cgi?/*n I nc vulnerable.server.com 80 
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therefore detect suspicious strings in http header data that do appear in CLF log files. Thus the RIDA._\: 
prediction for the http-header-based attack is correct because our approach describes http header data as 
"request options" of the IDS scope "http." 
Table 30-- Alarms generated by and generalized alarms predicted for Snort 
Snort Syslog alarm message Generalized alarm 
http meta-character May 1 11:06:54 snorthost snort: 
• Alarm type: suspicious 
attack [1:835:5] WEB-CGI test-cgi access argument string 
[CA0696, CVEOO7099] [Classification: Attempted Information 
Leak] [Priority: 2] : <ethO> {TCP} • IDS scope of generalized 
10.4.2.116:2631 -> 10.4.2.111:80 alarm: http 
• IDS scope of alarm 
definition: Application layer 
Obfuscated http meta- Not detected Not detected 
character attack 
http header buffer- May 1 11:10:56 snorthost snort: • Alarm type: suspicious 
overflow [CVE084800] [1: 9999'8 : 1] WEB-MISC Host-header options string 
overflow [Classification: Attempted 
• IDS scope of generalized Denial of Service] [Priority: 2] : 
<ethO> {TCP} 10.4.2.116:2646 -> alarm: http 
10.4.2.111:80 • IDS scope of alarm 
definition: Application layer 
Obfuscated http header Not detected Not detected 
buffer-overflow 
These examples, although comparatively simple, provide us with some evidence that the predictions made 
by RIDAX are correct. Moreover they illustrate the process that would need to be replicated for a large 
number of individual attacks in order to provide better evidence or even complete validation. 
7.4 Discussion 
In this chapter we have shown how IDS and attack class descriptions can be combined to predict 
detection capabilities of IDS designs. Our considerations also included the RIDAX prototype that actually 
implements the proposed approach to IDS analysis and an outline of how the results produced by RIDAX 
could be validated. By presenting this outline we provided some evidence that the predictions made by 
RIDAX are correct. This evidence could be improved by providing further examples. However, complete 
validation of whether the RlDAX predictions are correct represents a major challenge and would require 
thousands of further experiments. An undertaking of this kind would need to be addressed by using tools 
such as LARIAT [HRLCOl, RCFRLHOl] or Thor [Marty02] (see also Section 2.3.3). Such tools facilitate 
the automated analysis of IDS implementations for larger numbers of attacks, and in the case of Thor 
even provide the possibility to do this for systematically varied, i.e., obfuscated, attacks. However, it 
should be noted that the effort required would exceed the possibilities such tools currently provide. 
17 This attack can be demonstrated using the following unix command line: 
perl -e 'print "GET /servlet http/l.O\nHost: " . "x" x 1092 . "\n"' I \ 
nc target.server.com 80 
18 We had to create our own signature for this attack because an appropriate signature is not pro\ided by 
snort's default signature set. 
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In Chapter 8 we will provide further RIDAX prediction examples and will moreover show how our 
approach to IDS analysis can be extended towards the prediction of false alarms. 
7.5 Conclusion 
In this work we present an approach that performs a combined analysis of IDS descriptions and 
descriptions of attack classes in order to predict detection capabilities of IDS designs. In this chapter we 
have developed the method required to perform this combined analysis and presented the RlDAX 
prototype that we have implemented. Validation of the predictions made is a challenging task, but the 
considerations made in this work so far and, in particular, while outlining such a validation undertaking in 
this chapter make us confident that the results provided by RlDAX are correct. Our IDS analysis method 
can therefore be viewed as a suitable utility for IDS designers because it operates at a conceptual level. 
i.e., it does not involve actual attacks or IDS implementations. A tool such as RlDAX can therefore assist 
designers early in the design phase of IDSs by predicting where the design meets the specification and 
where it fails to do so. 
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A further application: The assessment of IDSs 
and combinations thereof 
In the preceding chapters we have developed schemes for describing IDSs and attack classes. and have 
presented an approach to IDS analysis that operates based on these descriptions. Our main goal is to 
provide guidance to IDS designers by predicting the classes of attacks a given lOS design has the 
potential of detecting. However, the insights that our approach to IDS analysis provides can also be used 
for other applications. In this chapter we will show how the RIDAX prototype can be extended to support 
the assessment of IDSs and arbitrary combinations thereof. The combination of lOSs is an important 
aspect of ID architectures. These may consist of diverse lOSs, i.e., lOSs that use different information 
sources and analysis techniques, that are being operated at different locations in the network. As a first 
step we will defme assessment criteria and metrics according to which lOSs shall be assessed. Before 
developing a method for assessing IDS combinations, we show how existing assessment metrics. as 
developed in the information retrieval field and already used by lOS benchmarking approaches, can be 
used to assess individual IDSs. In the second step we propose an alarm-processing method that combines 
the analysis results of multiple IDSs in a manner that takes into account the semantics of the generalized 
alarms. From the results obtained with this method, we develop metrics that enable the assessment of 
arbitrary IDS combinations in terms of the completeness and utility of the information they have the 
potential of providing. 
The goal of these metrics is to measure how an individual IDS or a combination of IDSs covers a given 
set of attacks, i.e., attack classes. Moreover they measure the quality (utility) of the coverage provided. 
This is achieved by making use of an information-theoretic approach to analyze the alarms sets that lOSs 
generate for given activity classes. This approach determines the suitability of the information provided 
by IDSs for fault diagnosis purposes, such as discriminating between true and false positives, or 
identifying the cause of a set of alarms. Once these metrics have been defined, we discuss the manner in 
which RIDAX had to be extended to calculate measurements according to these metrics. 
Note that in order to achieve this, we will make use of the possibility of generalizing the analysis 
performed by our approach from classes of attacks to classes of activities (see Section 3.6.2). The 
following discussion will therefore be based on classes of activities and their description components 
rather than on attack classes as was the case in the preceding chapters. Hence, when applicable. we will 
use terms such as activity class and activity class variant instead of terms such as attack class or attack 
class variant. This is necessary because the metrics envisaged also assess the potential of IDSs to generate 
false positives. This requires the analysis of IDSs with regard to the manner in which they analyze benign 
activities that are similar to attacks (see Sections 3.6.2 and 4.3). Finally we will provide results that were 
obtained by assessing five IDS example configurations and their combinations. Note that the results 
provided merely serve illustrative purposes. The assessment method presented here operates based on 
descriptions of IDS designs and classes of attacks, and does not take into account characteristics specific 
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to the environment such as the type and amount of network traffic or the network topology. We assume a 
normalized environment in which every activity class variant occurs exactly once. 
8.1 Related work 
In the following we will propose a method for combining the information provided by diverse IDSs and 
defme metrics that assess the information provided by the resulting combined system However. before 
doing so, we shall discuss some related aspects. First we will consider the manner in which system 
reliability can be improved using concepts known from the dependability domain, and discuss the 
limitations of such an approach. Then we will present and discuss assessment metrics as they are used in 
the ID and information retrieval domains. 
8.1.1 Dealing with false positives and negatives in the dependability 
context 
In MAFfIA D2 [D2MafOl) it is shown how error detection and fault-diagnosis mechanisms are to be 
viewed in the context of intrusion detection. Unfortunately, IDSs may fail in various ways. Ideally, one 
should try to apply dependability concepts such as fault masking to handle such IDS failures. However, as 
also indicated in MAFTIA D3 [D3MafOl), it is not straightforward to apply these concepts to ID. 
Whenever one deals with system components that are not sufficiently reliable to meet a given system's 
specification, a standard approach is to introduce redundant components into the system. Applied to ID, 
IDSs represent the components, and the system is the ID architecture. By letting the redundant 
components vote on the result, it is possible to increase the system's reliability. This has been explored 
extensively in the dependability field. However, it seems impossible to apply this concept to ID-one, but 
not the only, problem being that the failure rate of IDSs, e.g., the rate of false alarm, is too high 
[AxelssOO, JuliscOO, MCZH99, SchneiOO). This problem is illustrated in the work of Mathur et al. 
[MatAvi70). They prove that one cannot increase a system's reliability simply by adding redundant 
components, e.g., in an N-modular redundancy (NMR) scheme, if the failure rate of the individual 
components exceeds 50%. Unfortunately, many IDSs generate much more than 50% false alarms. 
In addition, the semantics of the alarms generated depends significantly on the capabilities of the IDS 
generating them This influences the information and the trustworthiness of the information carried by 
these alarms, which in itself significantly increases the complexity of error detection and fault diagnosis 
when the alarms generated by multiple IDSs are being combined. 
8.1.2 Assessment metrics 
Whenever one seeks metrics for assessing systems, it is crucial that one first defines goals of the 
assessment. In some cases the choice of the assessment criteria seems to suggest itself. However, in most 
cases, several criteria are conceivable. Moreover their importance may vary significantly depending on 
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the usage envisaged of the systems-a fact that naturally also applies to the asse mem of ID 
[Wilkis02]. 
8.1.2.1 Assessment metrics used in ID 
The evaluation of IDSs with regard to the attacks they detect is a first, vital step in the conte>.'1 of ID 
assessment. However, so far the interpretation of these evaluation results is an issue that has been 
addressed only to a limited degree. 
Currently the alarms generated during the evaluation of IDSs are rated either as true or fal e po itive . 
Moreover, false negatives, i.e ., when an IDS fails to generate an alarm for an attack, are also recorded. 
Based on this information, one commonly defines metrics that measure the percentage of attacks detected 
or the rate at which false alarms are generated. In the Lincoln Lab evaluation, for instance, the fal e 
positive rate was measured in false alarms per day. 
Often the results obtained are represented using receiver operating characteristics (RO ) curve . RO 
curves have been already in use for many decades in the domain of signal proces ing. There they are used 
to judge the quality of a given receiver and to choose an operating point for it [peBiF054]. For a gi en 
receiver a ROC curve superimposes the probabilities for true and fal se positives for the value range of a 
selected receiver parameter. For a good receiver the curve will come very close to the point (0,1 ), i.e., the 
point where each signal is detected correctly and no false positives are generated (see curve a) in Figure 
34. A poor receiver will produce a curve that is close to the diagonal (see curve b) in Figure 34. 
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Figure 34--Example of ROC curves 
ROC curves have been used to illustrate the IDS assessment results by Lippmann [LFGHKMOO], Maxion 
and Tan [MaxTanOO] and others. However, their application to ID is not without difficulties 
[McHughOOb] as illustrated by the following examples : 
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The probability for a false alarm may be biased significantly by the environment in which the 
IDS has been tested-a fact that may influence the curve significantly. 
The number of available samples may be as low as one if there is no IDS parameter available 
that can be set to multiple values (this is a property inherent to our IDS description approach: see 
curve c) in Figure 34). As a consequence the resulting curves have to be interpreted with care. 
Moreover, note that measuring and plotting the percentage of true and false positives does not take into 
account the non-binary nature of IDS alarms. Besides being a true or a false positive alarms convey 
information (implicitly and explicitly) that is rarely measured by IDS evaluation efforts. Also. the metrics 
used do not measure how well true and false positives can be discriminated or how well causes of alarms 
can be identified (see also Section 8.1.1). 
8.1.2.2 Information retrieval 
In our search for more generic metrics to assess IDSs, we have also looked at the field of information 
retrieval (IR), where such concepts have been investigated over the past years. Here people have defined 
the concepts of precision and recall [BaCoBe94, Lager96, Weiss97]. In his glossary [Weiss97] Weiss 
defmes them as follows: 
• Recall: Recall is the percentage of total relevant documents retrieved from all documents. Recall 
refers to how much information is retrieved by the search. Total recall would locate every 
document that matched the search criteria in a database. 
• Precision: Precision is the percentage of documents retrieved that the searcher is actually 
interested in. Precision focuses on the relevant, most useful items retrieved in the search. 
Weiss [Weiss97] further states: 
Recall with high precision is the ultimate goal. The goal of information retrieval scientists 
is to provide the most precise or relevant documents in the midst of the recalled search 
results. 
Ifwe now assume the distribution of activities to be known, recall, when applied to ID, can be considered 
as being the percentage of the total number of attacks considered that are reported by means of true 
positives. In a similar way, precision can be defmed as the percentage of the total number of alarms 
generated that are true positives. 
However, also in the case of IR metrics, one ought to exercise care. As recognized in Sections 8.1.1 and 
8.1.2.1, a given attack may be reported by semantically diverse alarms depending on the IDS. Using the 
IR concepts one can only classify alarms into true and false positives and identify missed attacks as false 
negatives. Also one thereby does not take into account the utility of alarms for correctly distinguishing 
between true and false positives and identifying attacks. 
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8.1.3 Discussion 
Current IDS assessment approaches only distinguish between true positives, false positives. and false 
negatives. As indicated, these metrics can be defmed well using the notion of precision and recall. as 
described in Section 8.1.2.2. We will apply this concept in Section 8.2, where we define evaluation 
metrics for individual IDSs that do not assess the utility of the information provided by the alarms the 
IDSs generate. However, as with any metric that is based on the accounting of true and false positives. 
these metrics also have weaknesses. ID alarms are not of a binary nature, i.e .. one can distinguish far 
more than just between correct and incorrect alarms. ID alarms implicitly and explicitly contain additional 
diagnostic information that is not assessed by any such metric. The diagnostic information may be key to 
further analysis as performed by alarm correlators within an ID architecture that combines multiple IDSs 
or the analysis performed by a human. Especially when one aims at identifying or diagnosing the activity 
that caused several IDSs to generate a set of alarms, the fact whether every single alarm is a false or a true 
positives becomes less important. When one analyzes alarms at this level, it is far more important to take 
into account the meaning of alarms as it is defmed by alarm identifiers, etc., and as it is implicitly defmed 
by the type of the generating IDS. 
ROC curves are a popular means to represent IDS assessment results. However, we chose not to use them 
in this work because we would obtain curves defmed by only a single point (see curve c) in Figure 34). 
Such curves are too imprecise for meaningful interpretation. Instead we chose to use two-dimensional 
plots and histograms to represent the results of our experiments. 
8.2 Detection rate of IDSs 
In this section we develop simple metrics that allow us to judge IDSs in a manner similar to existing 
approaches. We have extended RIDAX to automatically calculate these measurements on a per-IDS basis 
as part of the IDS analysis process. We measure the total number of true positives, false positives, and 
false negatives in a matmer that we derived from the concepts of precision and recall, as used in the 
information retrieval field (see also Section 8.1.2.2). However, in doing so, there are some issues that we 
need to be aware of: 
1. The semantics of generalized alarms generated differs significantly from that generated by IDS 
implementations. First, generalized alarms denote the potential of an IDS to generate a given 
class of alarms. Second, our approach may report, i.e., describe, activities using multiple 
generalized alarms. This can be caused by the combination of multiple activity, i.e., attack, class 
description components, but also by single components. It is clear that IDS implementations may 
also generate multiple alarms when reporting a single attack. Therefore comparing absolute 
alarm numbers may result in misleading measurements. 
2. The number of false negatives determined by our approach cannot be compared with the number 
of false negatives determined while evaluating IDS implementations. This is due to the fact that 
we rate every generalized alarm that was expectable (see Section 6.4) but was not generated as a 
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false negative. However, as explained in Section 7.1.3, these false negatives only matter if no 
true positive reports the activity component in question. When judging coverage provided by an 
IDS, we focus on whether a malicious activity variant was rated "detected" or not (see Section 
7.1.3), i.e., we defme coverage as the percentage of all considered malicious acti,ity variants 
that are detected. 
3. The utility of the information carried by alarms generated is not measured 
4. The measurements are not made in a real environment, and encompass only one instance of 
every activity variant. However, as explained in the preceding section, other approaches suffer 
from this environment-related issue to an equal or greater extent. In spite of this. the results 'Aill 
provide a normalized assessment of the IDSs evaluated 
Most of these issues have already been mentioned in Section 2.4 (see Table I) and in part provide the 
motivation for the considerations made in the next section. There we propose an assessment method that 
enables us to include the utility of the information provided by IDS alarms. 
Being aware of above issues, we defme the following metrics derived from the concepts of precision and 
recall: 
• Recall r: the percentage of the total number of considered malicious activity class variants that 
was detected md • The total number of malicious activity class variants is determined by 
summarizing the number of detected malicious activity class variants md , the number of 
partially detected malicious activity class variants mpd and the number of nondetected malicious 
activity class variants mnd : 
md 
r=---~---
md +mpd +mnd 
This measurement is normalized, and thus recall is equivalent to coverage. Applied to ID, 
coverage reflects the percentage of all considered attack classes that an IDS is capable of 
detecting, without taking into account the frequency of the occurrence of individual attacks. 
• Precision p : the percentage of the total number of alarms generated that are true positives alp' 
The total number of alarms is composed of alp and the number of false positives a fp : 
alp p=---'--
alp +a.(p 
This metric enables us to assess the credibility of the alarms generated by an IDS. 
Note that in above definitions we used both rated alarms (alp and a fp) as well as rated activity class 
variants (m
d 
etc.). We chose to do so because the resulting defmitions of precision and recall reflect the 
relevant information well. Moreover, the resulting defmitions are to some extent comparable with the 
measurements determined in other approaches such as the Lincoln Lab experiment (see Section 2.3.3.1). 
143 
AITACK-CLASS-BASED ANALYSIS OF INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS 
It would have been misleading to use the number of false negatives for the definition of recall fi 
• or 
instance, because the semantics of the false negatives as used in the context of our approach differs 
considerably from that used in other works. 
In Section 8.6.2 we will provide concrete examples of precision and recall that were measured for a series 
ofIDSs using the extended RIDAX prototype. 
8.3 Fault diagnosis based on alarms generated by multiple IDSs 
In the preceding section we defmed metrics similar to the ones determined by other approaches. As 
explained, the resulting metrics neither take into account nor measure the utility of the infonnation 
provided by alarms; they are not suitable for assessing combinations of individual IDSs. The latter. 
however, is an important foundations for the design of ID architectures. Bottom-up approaches that apply 
voting mechanisms such as the N-modular redundancy (NMR) scheme [MatAvi70] are not suitable for 
developing and building such supposedly highly complex architectures (see also Section 8.1.1). The 
realization of such an approach would be difficult because the semantics of all these alarms differs 
significantly depending on the type, configuration, and location of the IDS used. In addition given the fact 
that IDSs tend to generate far more than 50% false positives, an NMR scheme is likely to make matters 
even worse instead of improving them. 
As a consequence we propose a method that attempts to take into account the semantics of alarms and, 
even more importantly, that of alarm sets. Later in this section this will enable us to develop metrics that 
reflect the usefulness of the information contained in alarms and alarm sets. For instance we consider 
alarms useful if they enable us to clearly rate an activity class variant as being malicious or to identify the 
activity class from which the activity class variant was derived. 
8.3.1 Information provided by alarms 
In Section 7.1.2.2 we introduced a 5-tuple of alarm properties to represent alarms. This representation 
enables us to distinguish between different generalized alarms semantically without having to describe 
their semantics explicitly. The latter would be difficult to do because the generating IDS determines much 
of the alarm's semantics, which in turn means that each of the influential IDS characteristics identified in 
Chapter 5 would have to taken into account accordingly. Finally the location of the IDS, also the 
environment, and possibly other factors influence the alarm semantics. 
Our 5-tuples of alarm properties is sufficient to address all the implicit infonnation conveyed by 
generalized alarms as they are used in the context of this work. They not only include sufficient 
infonnation to distinguish alarms caused by different activity classes, but also provide infonnation on the 
generating IDS. However, if we were to consider the IDS location and environment as well, the set of 
alarm properties might have to be extended. 
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In the following we wish to assess and exploit the complete information provided by generalized alarms. 
Hence, we searched for an analogy that would permit us to do so. We found that signals known from 
information and coding theory [CovTh091] provide a suitable analogy. Accordingly alarms can be 
viewed as being output signals that result from symbol transmissions over a channel. In this model an IDS 
corresponds to the channel which transforms symbols, i.e., activity variants, as they are transferred. 
Owing to the fact that in general information may be lost in transmission, it is not always possible to 
determine the initial symbol based on the output signal, i.e., the set of alarms an IDS generates. In the 
following we assess the completeness and utility of the alarms by measuring how well conclusions can be 
drawn on the respective activity class variants based on the set of alarms. This approach also enables the 
assessment of the potential gains one can achieve in terms of completeness and utility by combining 
individual IDSs, because such combinations can be viewed as the parallel use of multiple diverse 
channels. 
Example: Consider a network-based IDS such as Snort to represent a broad-band channel and a host-
based IDS such as WebIDS a comparably narrow-band channel. This would mean that many signals. 
which use carrier frequencies that can be transmitted over the Snort-channel. could not be transmitted 
over the WebIDS channel, because the latter is not capable of transmitting signals at all the frequencies 
the former can. On the other hand, one can expect the signals that were successfully transmitted over the 
WebIDS channel to be of better quality than if they had been transmitted over the Snort channel. 
Reverting to ID, Snort is capable of analyzing SMTP (mail) messages, whereas WebIDS cannot. On the 
other hand, WebIDS is capable of taking into account the http server's request retum code in order to 
determine the success state of a potential attack, whereas Snort cannot. Similar considerations can be 
made with respect to variations such as IP fragmentation. (See also Table 28). 
Note, in this model whether an alarm is rated a true or false positive is not relevant. An alarm, if the IDS 
actually generates one, is 'just" to be seen as a transformed symbol that needs to be interpreted. 
8.3.2 Fault diagnosis based on alarm sets 
In this subsection we develop a method that applies the considerations made in the preceding section to 
the results obtained by analyzing IDSs as described in Section 7.1. The assessment method described is as 
well implemented by means of an extension to RIDAX, and is automatically executed as a continuation of 
the IDS analysis process. It is not related to the method described in Section 8.2. 
Every alarm that an IDS generates indicates the observation of a possibly suspicious activity. With a 
probability specific to them, alarms thereby indicate an error that may lead to a security failure. However. 
the probabilistic aspects of the relation between activity variants and alarms are not explored in the 
following, because this would require an in-depth knowledge of the environment, which lies outside the 
scope of this thesis. 
Here we view alarms and alarm sets as signals indicating a set of possible generating activities. 
Remember, whether an alarm is a true or a false positive is irrelevant for these considerations. In some 
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cases false positives may even support the identification of activities or theLI· trn· be· mal · ra g as rng ICIOUS or 
benign. In the following we therefore consider IDSs to be performing a sunp· Ie .-dir"; naJ . uru ecuo proJe non 
/,;s that depends on the IDS being evaluated. Figure 35 illustrates this projection. ote that one of the 
alarm sets can denote the empty set. 
J,~s 
Activity variants  Alarm sets 
Figure 35--Projection of activity variants to alarm sets 
In this projection several activity variants may cause the same alarm set R, to be generated. B 
performing the IDS analysis described earlier, we obtain all these mapping between acti ity cla 
variants and generalized alarms. If we do so for each activity class variant, it become po ible to 
determine the sets of generalized alarms that uniquely identify a given activity class variant. Howe er, in 
many cases this mapping is not unique. 
In order to simplify the analysis we shall only identify the activity class but not the activity class variant 
derived from it. This simplification, which is illustrated in Figure 36, can be made wi thout 10 ing 
important information, because variations generally represent benign alterations of activity cla e , I. e., 
activities. 
Example: Considering an attack that is staged over the network and targets an application layer service 
such as the webserver. When it comes to identifying the activity or to judging whether the observed 
activity is malicious or benign. the fact that the activity involved fragmented IP PDUs or minimum- ized 
rcp segments is of limited importance. This is not to say that this info rmation might not be useful-
especially when it comes to assessing the intentions of the adversary. However. when identifying and 
rating the activity. this additional information merely adds conf usion. 
Figure 36c shows that it may not be possible to unambiguously identify the activity that caused a gj ven 
alarm set. In the figure this is illustrated by alarm set R
J
. However, knowing this relation may prove quite 
useful if, for instance, a
l 
and a
2 
are both benign, we can identify the alarm sets R1 , RJ and R4 as 
reports of benign activities that require no further attention. If both activities are considered malicious, 
R3 at least informs us of a malicious activity in progress. Knowing the above mappings, we can e en 
abridge the list of possible causes to a set of two activities. If, however one of the activities is benign and 
the other malicious any observation of R3 is unfortunate because it is impossible to judge whether the 
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detected activity is benign or malicious. This means that rating the cause. i.e .. rating the acti"lry. based 00 
R3 has become ambiguous. 
When performing this analysis one might find that too many malicious activlry ariants 
• are oot detected at all, 
• cannot be rated unambiguously, or 
• cannot be identified. 
Last but not least one might also frnd that too many benign activity variants cannot be rated 
unambiguously . These shortcomings can be addressed by increasing the information provided b the 
alarms sets used for analysis, which is exactly what was discussed in Section 8.3.1. 10 other words, using 
alarms generated by multiple diverse IDSs to compose the alarm sets will increase the information they 
provide. If we use the alarm representation as introduced in Section 7. 1.2.2, the combination of alarms 
geoerated by diverse IDSs becomes straightforward and does not require any changes to our analy i 
method. Note, however, that combining IDSs may improve some of the issues mentioned, but may make 
others worse. 
1;;s 1;DS r l IDl 
Activities 
---
Alarm sets Activities 
---
Alarm sets AcI!Vities Alarm sets 
a, 
D R, al R, 
R, R, 
R3 ~ ~ 
R, 
R, a, a, R, 
RJ R, R, 
R6 ".! ".! R. 
a) b) c) 
Figure 36--Projection of activities to alarm sets aod vice-versa 
10 summary, this method of alarm-set analysis enables us to combine the alarms generated by multiple 
IDSs by identifying the set of activities that may cause the generation of a given alarm set. Hence an 
activity may be identified if the alarm set considered cannot be associated with any other activity. 10 a 
similar, but even simpler fashion, we can also attempt to rate the possible cause of an alarm set as being 
benign or malicious. If no clear rating can be made, the alarm set is considered ambiguous . 10 the 
examples provided in Section 8.6 we will apply these considerations to activity classes and generalized 
alarms. 
8.4 Metrics for assessing individual IDSs and their combinations 
In Section 8.2 we have defined the metrics precision and recall that enable a relatively simple but limited 
IDS assessment. These metrics cannot be easily applied to IDS combinations and do not assess the utility 
of the information provlded . In this section we address this issue by proposing a set of metric that 
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assesses the completeness and utility of arbitrary IDS combinations based on results obtained by 
analyzing alarm sets as described in the preceding section. 
Before starting to define metrics, we need to clarify their goals. It is clear that in the most general case 
one seeks to measure and optimize coverage of the ID architecture envisaged (see Section 8.21. In this 
and the following context, it is important to ensure that each IDS is assessed for the same set of activity 
classes. When referring to the optimization of coverage, we should be aware that it often does not make 
sense to aim for total coverage. Often it suffices to optimize coverage in a given domain. i.e., just for a 
given set of IDS scopes, according to the security policy and the environment to be protected. 
Example: Consider a DMZJ9 of an e-business. There the majority of the activities encountered is most 
likely somehow related to web services. As a consequence one would concentrate on these services and 
pay less attention to others. The emphasis is naturally going to be different when envisaging the 
protection of an Intranet infrastructure. 
However, merely optimizing coverage will not result in a usable ID architecture. If the solution identified 
provides high coverage, but the alarms generated are too often false alarms and difficult to interpret, a 
solution may prove to be almost useless. To assess the utility ofIDSs and their combinations, we propose 
metrics that measure the quality of the information provided by the sum of all generated alarm sets 
according to selected criteria. The criteria we choose are the ones identified in the preceding section. The 
resulting metrics summarize the utility of alarm sets with regard to the identification of activities and the 
rating of their causes as benign or malicious. 
8.4.1 Attack recall 
The so-called attack recall metric is highly similar to recall as defined in Section 7.1.3. Instead of 
considering only individual IDSs, we expand our considerations to a set of IDSs. One notable difference, 
however, is the fact that we do not distinguish between alarms generated because of variations and alarms 
with other causes. This is due to the manner in which alarms are analyzed (see above). In this analysis we 
do not distinguish between false positives and false negatives, which means that a malicious activity 
variant is considered detected if the IDS evaluated reacts with the generation of an alann-independent of 
what the alarm is reporting. Note that it may not be possible to identify the activity based on the alarm set 
observed. 
Furthermore, it is clear that one cannot simply add the numbers of detected and not detected malicious 
activity variants of all the IDSs considered because the domains they cover may overlap. In other words. 
md denotes the number of malicious activity variants that at least one of the IDSs involved was able to 
detect. In order not to complicate things further, let us consider activity variants that were detected only 
partially as "not detected." This results in the definition of mnd as the number of malicious activity 
19 Demilitarized Zone: usually that part of the network that connects an organization's Intranet to the 
Internet. 
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variants that were either not detected or only partially detected by all of the IDSs. Finally we can deflDe 
attack recall ra as follows: 
Again, in our case where only a single instance of every activity variant is considered. r. pro\ides a 
measurement for the coverage achieved by the combination of IDSs considered. 
8.4.2 Attack identification recall 
Attack identification recall is similar to the definition of attack recall. The only difference is that we count 
the number of malicious activity variants mj for which it was possible to determine the activity that the 
activity variant was derived from. This results in the following definition of r, : 
mj Ii =--'---
md +mnd 
It is clear that because mj :::;; md , Ii will never be larger than ra' i.e., ri :::;; ro . 
Attack identification recall provides us with an absolute measure of the attacks that can be identified 
based on the information available. It thereby provides us with indication on the utility of the considered 
IDS or IDS combination with regard to diagnosis. 
8.4.3 Attack identification precision 
Attack identification recall provides a measurement in absolute terms. However, in most cases knowing 
the percentage of detected attacks that can be clearly identified is of higher interest. This is because it 
provides some measurement for the quality of the detection process. This relative metric Pi can be 
defined quite easily as follows: 
8.4.4 Rating ambiguity 
In measuring recall it is important to verify whether the IDS or set of IDSs considered provide the 
required coverage. However, when it comes to assessing the usability of the system an important 
parameter is what we call the rating ambiguity a r' This absolute metric measures the percentage of 
activity variants that cannot be rated unambiguously as benign or malicious. The number of ambiguously 
rated activity variants is composed of malicious (m a) and benign (b a ) activity variants. m denotes the 
total number of malicious and b the total number of benign activity variants considered. 
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ma+ b a = a 
r m+b 
The resulting measurement provides an indication of the operational effort that one has to spend because 
of false positives that cannot be clearly identified as being false positives. As explained earlier. we 
consider false positives as troublesome only if they cannot be recognized. If we observe a set of alarms 
that may only have benign causes we can simply discard them, i.e., they do not require any further 
treatment. Ambiguous alarm sets are troublesome because their generation may be caused by benign 
activity variants. This is especially annoying because in real-world environments benign activity variants 
may occur very frequently-far more frequently than the corresponding attacks. Thus one should focus 
on composing IDSs such that the overall rating ambiguity is as low as possible. 
8.4.5 Rating precision 
The metric rating precision P r is closely related to the rating ambiguity metric. The two differences are 
that it is measured in relative terms instead of absolute ones, and that it assesses the activity variants that 
can be rated unambiguously. md denotes the malicious and bd the benign activity variants that were 
detected or reported. m
na 
represents the malicious and bna the benign activity variants that were 
unambiguously rated as benign or malicious. 
mna +bna p = 
r md +bd 
When measuring the rating precision we obtain an idea of the usability of the IDS combination 
considered with respect to the coverage it provides. 
8.5 Extending RIDAX to include fault diagnosis and the calculation of 
metrics 
Once every IDS has been analyzed for every activity class variant, the analysis process comes to its end. 
What we have obtained by now is a set of rather large database tables reflecting how the IDSs have 
analyzed the activity variants and the alarms that the IDSs were found to have the potential of generating. 
Based on this data, we can calculate the statistical data required for calculating per-IDS precision and 
recall as defined in Section 8.2. 
In addition we further analyze the results obtained by identifying and analyzing alarm sets as described in 
Section 8.3. From this analysis we obtain, for every individual IDS but also for every possible 
combination ofIDSs, measurements compiled using the metrics defined in Section 8.4. 
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8.6 RIDAX experiments 
In above chapters and sections we developed methods for the analysis and assessment of IDSs. For 
illustration purposes we have extended RIDAX such that it is now able to calculate the IDS assessment 
metrics proposed. In the following we discuss experiments made using RIDAX. We do so by first 
providing brief descriptions of the IDSs analyzed in the course of these experiments. Then we discuss the 
attack detection rates, which are based on rated alarms, using the metrics described in Section 8.2. Next. 
we consider examples obtained while performing the far more advanced alarm-set-based fault diagnosis 
as developed in Section 8.3. We continue by considering measurements obtained by applying the metrics 
developed in Section 8.4 to the results of the alarm-set-based diagnosis. Whereas earlier attack detection 
rates are discussed primarily for the sake of comparison with other approaches. the measurements 
obtained using the alarm-set-based analysis enable us to assess the viability of IDS combinations in a 
manner not possible before. 
Our experiments incorporate most of the concepts developed in the course of this work. including the 
descriptions of the 48 activity classes identified in Section 4.3 and seven variations (see also Section 6.3). 
Up to two of these seven variations were applied concurrently to each of the 48 activity classes. This 
resulted in a total of 928 activity class variants considered in our experiments. Of these 498 are 
considered malicious, and 430 benign. As explained in Section 6.3, any given variation can only be 
applied to activity classes that involve the IDS scope addressed by the variation. Therefore not every 
activity class leads to the same number of activity class variants. 
Technically RIDAX is capable of applying any number of variations to any activity class concurrently. 
However, we limited this number to two because we felt it necessary to set an upper limit for practical 
reasons. This limit enables us to investigate the effects of multiple, concurrently applied variations, while 
providing us with a workable solution. The resulting number of 928 activity class variants is believed to 
represent a meaningful test set because they were generated in a systematic fashion. which assures 
consistent coverage of a significant portion of the most relevant attack classes. 
8.6.1 IDSs assessed 
For our experiments we have to select a small number of IDSs from a large list of candidates (see 
Sobirey's list [Sobire98]). This means that we need selection criteria that are well suited to our primary 
goal, which is the investigation of potentially achievable gains by combining diverse IDSs. As a result we 
selected three IDSs, of which we consider five different configurations, by following the following 
criteria: 
1. Diversity: We require at least one knowledge-based and one behavior-based IDS, as well as at 
least one host-based and one network-based system. 
2. Practicality: As these experiments are conducted for demonstration and validation purposes. it 
must be possible to describe the IDSs with only limited effort. This means that the internals of 
the IDSs need to be available, and, ideally, that they are already well known. 
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In our experiments we chose to focus on IDSs monitoring network services because various approaches to 
ID have been developed in this area (see also Section 4.3). Ibis enables us to control the effort spent for 
the RIDAX prototype implementation as well as to address both network-based and host-based IDSs. 
which may either use knowledge- or behavior-based methods. We are aware that we thereby exclude 
classes of attacks such as those that describe attacks staged by local users (see also Section 4.3). 
Nevertheless we believe this choice to be viable because the goal of our experiments is merely to prove 
and illustrate the validity and flexibility of the concept and not so much the assessment of IDSs at large. 
Based on these requirements and considerations, we selected the three IDSs listed in the table below (see 
also Section 1.6). The last column defmes the identifiers for the respective IDSs as used in the following 
discussion. 
Table 31-IDSs analyzed and assessed using the RIDAX prototype 
IDS Detection method Information source used Configuration 10 
(see Section 5.3.1) (see Section 5.2.1.1) 
DaemonWatcher Behavior-based System level log (audit log) http DWH 
[WeDaDeOO, WesDeb99] ftp DWF 
Snort [Roesch99] Knowledge-based External raw data (network PDUs) Simple SNS 
Full SNF 
WeblDS [Almgre99] Knowledge-based Application level log (httpd logs) Normal WI 
We used a total of five different configurations of these three IDSs for our experiments: Two 
configurations of DaemonWatcher--<>ne configured for the ftp and one for the http daemon; two 
configurations of Snort--<>ne configuration using basic capabilities only and one with all additional 
modules enabled, and one of Web IDS. 
8.6.1.1 DaemonWatcher for ftpd and httpd 
DaemonWatcher [WeDaDeOO, WesDeb99] by Wespi et al. is a behavior-based system that analyzes the 
audit records of processes as they are written by the OS. The system was developed at the IBM Zurich 
Research Laboratory, as was this work. For our experiments we consider two configurations of 
DaemonWatcher. A first configuration covers buffer overflow attacks against the ftp daemon, and the 
second covers the corresponding attacks against the http daemon. 
DaemonWatcher matches the per-process sequences of system calls to system-call sub-sequences stored 
in a database. The latter represent known benign sequences that were isolated in a training phase. During 
this training phase, ideally, all possible execution paths of the executable to be protected are exercised 
and recorded. From these system-call traces, sub-sequences are isolated using a pattern-extraction 
algorithm. The resulting sub-sequences describe the complete system-call trace and thereby provide a 
sufficient description of the normal behavior of the executable to be monitored. As a result 
DaemonWatcher does not require signature updates for new attacks. However, its disadvantage is that its 
alarms do not identify the attack staged against the monitored process. 
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8.6.1.2 Snort 
Snort [Roesch99] by Roesch is a network-based IDS that is freely available. Snort has become very 
popular, and is broadly supported by the open-source community. This support consists primarily of new 
signatures that are being made available on a daily basis and additional modules that extend Snort' s 
detection capabilities. For our experiments we used two configurations of Snort v1.7. One configmation 
uses none of the resource-intensive extension such as the TCP stream re-assembly module. For the second 
configuration we consider all these additional features enabled. 
Because Snort is a knowledge-based IDS, its signature database needs to be updated as new attacks 
become known. The signatures are primarily PDU or stream-oriented and support the verification of 
various protocol flags as well as string matching applied to the payload of the PDU. 
8.6.1.3 Web IDS 
WebIDS [Almgre99] by Almgren is a host-based, lightweight IDS tailored to the protectIOn of web server 
services (httpd) that was developed at mM Zurich Research Laboratory. The IDS was implemented in the 
scripting language Perl [Perl87] and relies on its powerful regular expressions to recognize attacks. ln 
addition the system builds up a list of suspicious hosts and is capable of statistical analysis towards the 
recognition of flooding attacks. It is clear that the signature database of WebIDS needs to be updated as 
new attacks become known. 
8.6.2 Detection rates of individual IDSs 
In Section 8.2 we defmed the metrics precision and recall by deriving them from the corresponding 
defmition in the information-retrieval field. The resulting measurements can only be compared in a 
limited fashion with the results produced by known benchmarking approaches such as the Lincoln Lab 
evaluation (see Section 2.3.3.1). A first important difference is the fact that we considered a "normalized" 
environment in which every activity variant occurs exactly once (see Chapter 7). A second difference is 
that the alarms and activity variants represent classes and therefore cannot be directly compared with their 
real-world counterparts. 
The measurements produced with using RIDAX are shown in Table 32 and illustrated in Figure 37. 
Table 32-Recall and precision of the IDSs assessed 
IDS Detected Not detected Recall True False Precision 
attack attack (coverage) positives positives 
variants variants 
DWF 42 456 8.4% 42 0 100.0% 
DWH 112 386 22.5% 112 0 100.0% 
SNF 72 426 14.5% 277 94 74.7% 
SNS 44 454 8.8% 242 92 72.5% 
WI 79 419 15.9% 164 15 91.6% 
The first fact one notes is that DaemonWatcher for http (DWH) not only provides the highest recall but 
also 100% precision. This raises two questions: How does this come about? And, why are the results of 
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Daemon Watcher for ftp different? The main answer to this lies in the environm nt . th .. . d e l.e., e actJ\lUes an 
activity variants used for this evaluation: 
• 
• 
• 
We have defmed nine malicious activities for http, but only four for ftp (see Section 4.3). 
We have defmed one variation (hexadecimal encoding of the URL) that can only be applied to 
http-related activities. Such an additional variation can significantly increase the number of 
activity variants that can be derived from an activity. 
Because of the detection method used, DaemonWatcher IS not susceptible to any of the 
variations considered, i.e., in the context of this work we were not able to identify a meaningful 
variation that could be used to elude DaemonWatcher. 
The items identified illustrate that even our approach suffers some bias caused by the selection of the 
input data used for the evaluation. However, this impact is limited and well understood. On the other hand 
it seems fair to give more weight to http activities owing to the popularity of http (see also Section 4.3) 
and its nature, which permits variations that are not possible in other protocols. For future work it seems 
advisable to investigate approaches that would permit the results to be weighted on a per-activity and 
variation basis. 
Moreover, DaemonWatcher has the inherent advantages that it does not have to repeat the error-prone 
network-stack processing and that it does not have to predict how the monitored application might 
interpret the observed activity. 
Example: A simple network layer variation thatfragments IP PDUs will not prevent Daemon Watcher or 
WebIDS from detecting the actual attack because the host's network stack will reassemble the fragments 
before the data is passed on to the daemon process. For the same reason it is impossible for these IDSs to 
detect the variation itself. 
Note that the obtained measurements do not reflect whether the IDSs were able to provide any further 
information besides the fact that a number of attack variants was detected. Moreover, they do not reflect 
whether the success state of the attack variants considered is reported by the IDSs. DaemonWatcher, for 
instance, will only report attacks that were successful, whereas Snort generally cannot provide this 
information. 
Considering Figure 37, we see that Snort has the lowest precision, followed by WebIDS and 
DaemonWatcher. These differences illustrate the increase in inherent difficulties the lower the level at 
which the IDS sensor operates is. IDSs that operate based on network PDUs have to make assumptions 
about how the PDUs will be treated by the target system. Based on these assumptions, they have to move 
up further levels of abstraction, trying to predict how the observed data PDUs or data sequences will be 
interpreted. This excessive crossing of abstraction levels typically results in relatively generic signatures 
that may not only be evaded, but may also cause false positives. Similar conclusions were drawn by Sekar 
et af. [SGVS99]. As a consequence their implementation of a network-based IDS only focuses on attacks 
up to the transport layer, and rarely considers application layer attacks. 
154 
ATTACK-CLASS-BASED ANALYSIS OF INTRUSIO DETECTIO 
100.0% 
80.0% 
60.0% 
40.0% 
20.0% 
0.0% 
... Q) ~ 
.c u. u~ 
coO 
~ ~ 
c o.. 
o f-
E U. 
Q) ... 
co 0 0 -
WI 
£~ 
..... 0 co~ ~o.. 
Cf-
Of-EI 
g; 0 
0 -
LL 
z 
~ 
"S 
-t 
0 
C 
(j) 
Q) 
a. 
E 
en 
t 
0 
C 
(j) 
if) 
Z 
(j) 
~ 
c Recall (cmerage) 
I · Prec isi~ 
Figure 37--Chart representing precision and recalJ 
8.6.3 Examples of alarm-set-based fault diagnosis 
Y TEf 
Especially for large-scale ID architectures, the meaningfuJ processing of aJarms i vi taJ . One important 
factor is certainly the handling of the vast number of faJse positives one can expect. Howe er, faJ e 
positives are only part of the problem. With increasing size of the ID architecture, at 0 the difficulty of 
interpreting the symptoms of a cause that may be malicious increases significantly. Worse, the e two 
issues are closely related and therefore shouJd not be separated. This resulted in the alann- et-ba ed 
approach to fauJt diagnosis developed in Section 8.3. 
Depending on the number of IDSs combined, we were able to identify up to 72 unique alarm ets. 
However, when considering individual IDSs such as DaemonWatcher this number may be as mall as 
one. Each of the identified aJarm sets may be caused by one or several activities. In the following, we 
discuss some examples of aJarm sets as they were generated in the context of the RIDAX experiments. 
We consider the http-argument buffer overflow attack we have already used several times as an example . 
This class of attacks was identified as activity I in Section 4.3 , Table 4. In our experiments RIDAX was 
capable of considering 28 attack class variants of this attack class. 
In DaemonWatcher (DWH) each of these 28 activity variants is being reported by an alann indicating that 
the execution path of the process implementing the http services is diverting. However, as one might 
imagine, other activities can have the same effect and are reported by the same alarms. Based on 
DaemonWatcher alarms only, it is therefore not possible to clearly identify the activity, i.e. the cause of 
the aJarm. Other IDSs, such as Snort or WebIDS, generate aJarms indicating the observation of a 
suspicious or overly long argument string. However, these alarms do not permit the clear identification of 
the attack class either because they may aJso report other, possibly benign, activity classes. Moreo er, in 
many cases, variations render the attack class invisible to these IDSs. In our experiments we found ID 
combinations that wouJd report activity variants of this activity with up to ele en diffe rent aJarm seLS. 
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However, it is not our goal to maximize this number. It should be the goal to find solutions that maximize 
the number of activity variants that, based on alarm sets can be associated urn' I t th . 
, que y 0 e generanng 
activity. In Table 33 we provide an overview of the relevant figures for a selection of IDSs and IDS 
combinations. 
Table 33-Fault diagnosis results for the class of http argument buffer overflow attacks 
IDS Number of alarm Number of alarm Number of alarm Number of Number of 
combination sets identified for sets that sets that identify activity variants undetected 
the http- uniquely identify only malicious that can be attack class 
argument buffer attack class 1 activity classes associated variants 
overflow attack uniquely to 
class variants attack class 1 
DWH 1 0 1 0 0 
SNF 6 0 0 0 18 
WI 3 2 2 21 6 
DWH, SNF 7 0 7 0 0 
DWH,WI 4 2 4 21 0 
SNF,WI 10 8 8 21 4 
DWH,SNF, WI 11 8 11 21 0 
In the above table we also included the number of undetected attack class variants and the number of 
alarm sets, i.e., sets of generalized alarms, caused only by attack classes. These numbers become 
important in the next section as we assess the utility and the coverage of IDS combinations. As explained 
in Section 8.3.2, an important factor is the number of alarm sets that may denote malicious as well as 
benign activity classes. Remember, we do not consider false positives to be problematic as long as they 
can be recognized as such. On the other hand, false positives are particularly annoying if the attack-
similar but benign activity causing them occurs. It is difficult to eliminate them in a generic manner, 
because they may not be distinguishable from alarm sets reporting classes of malicious activity. 
8.6.4 Measuring the results of alarm-set-based fault diagnosis 
In this section we discuss the measurements made while performing fault diagnosis based on IDS analysis 
results. The fault diagnosis and measurements are made as introduced in Section 8.3. As opposed to the 
measurements determined in Section 8.6.3, those determined here provide us with indications of the 
utility of the information provided by alarms. The following discussion is primarily concerned with the 
metrics defined in Section 8.4. It not only considers the results provided by the five individual IDS 
configurations, but also those provided by all possible combinations thereof. 
We start with a table that shows the measurements determined for all possible IDS combinations while 
performing fault diagnosis as described in Section 8.3. In contrast to the measurements discussed in 
Section 8.6.2, this analysis includes alarms reporting variations. In a next step we discuss bar charts and a 
Venn diagram illustrating the results. Then, in a third step, we discuss plots illustrating how different 
metrics may influence each other. Finally we discuss the impact and use of alarms reporting variations. 
and illustrate their impact by comparing fault-diagnosis results that include them with results where they 
are excluded. 
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The measurements shown in Table 34 are ordered by attack recall and by rating ambiguity. Intuitively one 
wishes to maximize attack recall, i.e., coverage, while minimizing ambiguity. As shown in Table 34 and 
illustrated in Figure 38, most IDS combinations result in a higher coverage than individual IDSs or 
smaller sets of combined IDSs do. However, in most cases the rating ambiguity seems to increase or at 
least to be relatively high. Considering Figure 38, we can identify Snort as having a negative impact on 
the rating ambiguity. On the other hand Snort generally increases attack recall quite significantly. 
Table 34-Measurements resulting from alarm-set-based fault diagnosis 
(including variation alarms) 
IDS combination Attack recall Rating Rating Attack Attack (coverage) ambiguity precision identification identification 
recall precision 
DWF, DWH, SNF, SNS, WI 55.6% 19.2% 57.6% 18.5% 33.2% 
DWF, DWH, SNF, WI 55.6% 19.4% 57.1% 18.5% 33.2% 
DWF, DWH, SNS, WI 50.0% 19.2% 54.4% 12.9% 25.7% 
DWH, SNF, SNS, WI 49.2% 20.3% 51.5% 18.5% 37.6% 
DWH, SNF, WI 49.2% 20.5% 51.0% 18.5% 37.6% 
DWF, DWH, SNF, SNS 47.8% 16.6% 57.7% 5.6% 11.8% 
DWF, DWH, SNF 47.8% 16.8% 57.1% 5.6% 11.8% 
DWF, SNF, SNS, WI 46.4% 24.0% 40.4% 15.5% 33.3% 
DWF, SNF, WI 46.4% 24.2% 39.8% 15.5% 33.3% 
DWH,SNS, WI 43.6% 20.3% 47.5% 12.9% 29.5% 
DWF, DWH, SNS 42.2% 16.6% 53.9% 0.0% 0.0% 
DWF,DWH, WI 41.4% 7.4% 72.5% 12.9% 31.1% 
DWH, SNF, SNS 41.4% 17.7% 50.6% 5.6% 13.6% 
DWH, SNF 41.4% 17.9% 50.0% 5.6% 13.6% 
DWF, SNS, WI 40.8% 24.0% 35.2% 9.8% 24.1% 
SNF, SNS, WI 40.0% 25.1% 31.9% 15.5% 38.7% 
SNF,WI 40.0% 25.3% 31.3% 15.5% 38.7% 
DWH,SNS 35.7% 17.7% 45.7% 0.0% 0.0% 
SNS,WI 34.3% 25.1% 25.3% 9.8% 28.7% 
DWF, SNF, SNS 33.3% 20.9% 33.6% 5.6% 16.9% 
DWF, SNF 33.3% 21.1% 32.9% 5.6% 16.9% 
DWH,WI 32.9% 7.4% 67.0% 12.9% 39.0% 
DWF, DWH 30.9% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
DWF,WI 29.5% 10.9% 47.4% 9.8% 33.3% 
DWF, SNS 27.7% 20.9% 26.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
SNF, SNS 26.9% 22.0% 21.5% 5.6% 20.9% 
SNF 26.9% 22.2% 20.8% 5.6% 20.9% 
DWH 22.5% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
SNS 21.3% 22.0% 11.3% 0.0% 0.0% 
WI 21.1% 10.9% 32.7% 9.8% 46.7% 
DWF 8.4% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Therefore the question arises whether one could combine Snort with other IDSs in such a way that the 
rating ambiguity decreases. Figure 38 clearly shows that this is possible. However, the improvement does 
not seem as significant as one might hope. Indeed, in many cases the situation becomes worse. This 
phenomenon is inherent in the combination of IDSs as illustrated by the following example. 
Example: Combining Snort (SNF) with WebIDS (WI) results in relatively high attack recall, but causes 
the rating ambiguity to increase above 25%. On the other hand combining Snort rS}'"F) with 
DaemonWatcher (DWF, DWH) improves the situation from 22.2% down to 16.8% rating ambiguity. 
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Wh ere do these differences come from ? Snort and WebIDS partially cover the same anac' and D.l 
combining them one can improve coverage. However, because both systems use similar techniqu for 
detecting an attack. both are susceptible to generating f alse alarms for similar activities. As a Junher 
consequence of using similar techniques. the semantics of their alarms are also simila; r'. Because ~ thi 
it becomes difficult fo r any f ault-diagnosis algorithm to compensate the increased amhiguity caused b.l 
the increased number of benign activity variants that may cause ala nils. The situation chang 
significantly when considering the combination of Snort and Daemon Watcher. These JDSs u e complet 1.1' 
different techniques and information sources for their analysis. and are therefore not su ceptible to tire 
same variations. Here it becomes not only possible to increase coverage. but also 10 compensat 
weaknesses of the respective IDSs by exploiting the semantic diversity of the alarolS they generat . 
Similar observations can be made when considering attack identifi cation recal l. However. here the 
strengths and weaknesses are distributed di fferently among the IDSs. An ID tha t di tingui he well 
between malicious and benign activity class variants is not necessarily as good hen it corne to 
identifying the activity class causing a given alarm set. An extreme example of this i Daemon at her. 
This IDS distinguishes well between malicious and benign activities. Howe er, as it alarms do not carry 
semantics beyond the fact that an unusual sequence of system caJIs was observed, it become impo ible 
to determine the cause of such an observation. On the other hand, we are able to demonstrate that uch 
systems may significantly increase the expressiveness, i.e., attack identification recal l, of 1D 
combinations. 
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Figure 38--Attack recall, rating ambiguity and attack iden tification recaJI 
10 Using dependability terms, thi s indicates a high probability for the existence of common failure-mode . 
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Example: Considering Figure 38, it is apparent that the combination of WebIDS (IT7) and 
Daemon Watcher for http (DWH) results in an significant increase of the anack identification recall 
compared with any of the respective stand-alone configurations. 
Considering attack recall, i.e., coverage, as shown in Figure 38, we already noted that combining ID in 
most cases results in increased coverage. In some cases coverage ' . 'n tl . illcreases SlgnJ can y. and ill others lhe 
increase is less important. The reason for this is quite simple' some IDS I " fi 
. s over ap SlgnJ lcantl in terms of 
coverage, and some do not overlap at all . Figure 39 illustrates how the fi e IDS configurations evaluated 
overlap. 
Attack class variants (498) 
Figure 39-Venn-diagram sbowing coverage overlaps of evaluated IDSs 
When seeking meaningful IDS combinations, it is important to know how the individual IDSs ove rlap in 
terms of coverage, in order to determine the coverage provided by a set of IDSs. However, it is even more 
important to be aware of coverage overlaps when seeking ways to reduce ambiguity andlor to increase 
attack identification recall . This was illustrated in the above example, where we considered the 
combination of WebIDS and DaemonWatcher for http . For this combination the gains in terms of 
coverage are not very important. However, the example clearly illustrates how the diverse semantics of 
the IDSs ' alarms lead to improved ambiguity and attack identification recall. This can be further 
illustrated in plots such as those shown in Figure 40 and Figure 4 1. These plots reemphasize the fact that 
not every combination of IDSs leads to improved usability in terms of rating ambiguity or attack 
identification recall . In Figure 40, for instance, we can identify three bands of IDS combinations. first 
band on the x-axis, a second around 10% rating ambiguity, and third around 20% rating arnbigui . 
Taking a closer look at the data provided in Table 34, we recognize the fiISt band to consi t of just lhe 
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two Daemon Watcher configurations and their combination. The band at the 10% level i defined b 
WebIDS, and represents the various combinations of WebIDS with Daemon atcher configurations. The 
band at 20% is dominated by Snort. Every IDS combination at this level contains at least one of the two 
Snort configurations. 
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In combination with Table 34 these plots may also be used to investigate the impact of ID crash failures . 
Assuming that one out of three combined IDSs fails, these results enable us to asses the degradation in 
terms of coverage to be expected etc. 
So far we considered the absolute "recall" measurements only To compl t this d' . 
. e e lSCUS IOn we compare 
attack recall with the relative "precision" measurements rating precision and attack identification 
precision. These measurements are illustrated in the bar chart shown' F' 4 AI th ill 19ure . so e e 
measurements reflect the inherent strengths and weaknesses of IDSs, such as the fact that 
DaemonWatcher is excellent at distinguishing between malicious and benign activity variants. but 
completely fails to identify the activities that cause a given alarm set. 
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Figure 42- Attack recaU, r ating precision and attack identification precision 
8.6.5 Use and impact of alarms reporting variations applied to 
activities 
While performing these experiments it became apparent that alarms reporting the observation of 
variations are of limited use. In fact we felt that they would create misleading measurements for attack 
recall. To further investigate their influence, we repeated our experiments--disregarding alarms reporting 
variations. 
Our analysis (see Figure 43) revealed that doing so caused both the attack recall and the rating ambiguity 
to decrease (measurements for rating and attack identification precision are affected even more 
significantly because they rely on relative metrics). The attack identification recall is not affected b tID 
measure . At first glance the fact that the attack recall decreases appears as a disadvantage. However. if an 
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attack is reported only by means of an alann indicating the presence of a " . n' . bl 
. ana on. a SUlta e reactIon to It 
is difficult. These alarms are highly ambiguous as in practice the maJ'oo'ty f th . 
, . 0 em report non-malicIous 
activities . Second, assuming the presence of malicious activity these aJarms h dl 'd , ar y pro\1 e any useful 
information about the attack observed. In Figure 43 the generally observable drop of the rating ambiguity 
nicely illustrates these facts . In most cases the drop in rating ambiguity is far more important than the 10 
of coverage in teons of attack recall . 
As a result we concluded that alarms reporting the presence of variations should be used for adjusting the 
severity one associates with the potential cause of a given alarm set. The fact that an adversary obfuscate 
its attacks might provide an indication of the tools used and/or the adversary 's skills. 
60.0% 
C Attack recall 0ncl. I.Elri ation alarms) 
• Att ack recall (excl. I.Elriat lon alarms) 
50.0% o Rating ambiguity 0ncl. I.EInalion alarms) -
o Rating ambiguity (excl. I.EInation alarms) 
40.0% 
-
-
-30.0% 
- -
- -
~ 
- -20.0% 
10.0% 
-I- i ~ ' (f) u. U) ' u.. ' (f) - (f) u. (f) (f) 0.0% ui u: ui ui z z z z (f) (f) (f) (f) ui ui u: z z z (f) (f) (f) 
u: ~ ~ u: z z (f) 0 0 (f) ~ u: u: :i ~ ~ ~ 0 0 0 0 
u: 
~ u: z 
0 (f) 
~ 
0 
Figure 43-Attack recall and rating ambiguity including vs. excluding alarms reporting ariations 
8.7 Discussion 
In this chapter we have used the results produced by our approach to IDS analysis for assessing IDS 
combinations at a conceptuaJ level. The approach to IDS assessment presented cannot be compared wi th 
existing approaches directly simply because it operates at a different level of abstraction and al so pursues 
different goaJs. Nevertheless we defmed metrics that enable us to assess IDSs in a manner similar to what 
is done by other approaches (see Section 8.2). It is clear that measurements resulting from the use of these 
metrics wil l therefore suffer from the same deficiencies as the ones determined using other approaches 
such as the Lincoln Lab experiment (see Section 2.3.3.\ ) or the more commercially oriented work 
pursued by the NSS Group [WaJderO\a, WaJderO\b] . These deficiencies are primarily due to the fact that 
the environment significantly biases the measurements and that the environment by nature i neither 
identical at any two places nor stable over time (see aJso Section 2.4). 
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Therefore we focused on assessing the potential of fault diagnosis to develop metrics that prmide 
indications on the utility of the information provided by individual IDSs and their combinations (see 
Section 8.3). One of the key differences to the metrics described in Section 8.2 is the fact that we consider 
false positives only as problematic if they cannot be eliminated based on known relations between activity 
classes and sets of generalized alarm they may cause IDSs to generate. As a result we developed metrics 
that enable us to assess factors such as the expectable coverage or utility of the information. The utility is 
assessed by measuring the extent to which malicious and benign activity class variants can be 
distinguished, and by measuring the share of attack classes that can be identified unambiguously. 
The ability to assess the completeness and utility of the information provided by IDS combinations 
supports the development of ID architectures as it permits the comparison of architecture proposals. 
However, if one extends the proposed methods to the real world, the analysis will become more involved. 
mainly because the identification of alarm sets becomes more complex. Also the fact that depending on 
its internal state and the environment, the IDS may not always generate the same alarm set for a given 
activity increases the complexity of this reasoning. In addition one needs to be aware of the semantic 
differences between the generalized alarms generated in the context of our IDS analysis approach and 
alanns generated by IDS implementations. The generalized alarms, similar to activity classes, represent 
classes of real alarms rather than alarms that report specific attacks as IDS implementations generate 
them. 
Having taken note of these differences, it is hoped that these results will support the further enhancement 
of existing systems such as the Tivoli Risk Manager [TRMOO] towards advanced fault diagnosis and root-
cause analysis [JuliscOl, KYYOS95, ParBus88]. A root-cause denotes the most basic cause that can 
reasonably be identified and that management has the control to fix [parBus88]. One of the key 
contributions is the relations between activity classes and sets of generalized alarms that we have been 
able to identify. This promises to be applicable in a generic manner because these relations are not made 
at the level of specific real-world attacks or alarms, but rather at the level of attack classes and alarm 
classes. 
8.7.1 ID architecture design process example 
The information our approach provides may be used in the context of the design process of an ID 
architecture. For a given portion of the infrastructure considered a conceivable procedure could look as 
follows: 
1. Attack classes: Based on the security policy one determines the attack classes that have to be 
covered (see Sections 2.2.2 and 3.6.1). 
2. Identification of IDS combinations: From a given set of IDSs one determines the IDS 
combinations that provide the coverage required (see Section 8.4.1) 
3. Selection of the IDS combination: Depending on the importance of the individual factors. one 
selects the most suitable combination ofIDSs. Relevant factors are, for example. the following: 
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The difficulty of discriminating true and false positives. A measure for this difficulty is the 
rating ambiguity defmed in Section 8.4.4. 
The ability to identify the attack based on the alarms generated by the IDSs. This ability is 
measured by the attack identification recall defmed in Section 8.4.2. 
System performance degradation due to failing IDSs. Whenever one component of a given 
combination of IDSs fails, the performance (see Section 8.4) of the IDS combination is 
degraded. The performance of the remaining IDSs corresponds to the performance of their 
combination. As the performance of both combinations is known (see Table 34). it is 
possible to investigate the impact of failing IDSs on the overall system. 
In addition to this analysis one might take into account additional factors such as costs, quality of the IDS 
implementation, services provided by the IDS vendor, e.g., updating of signature databases. etc. As the 
requirements of organizations may differ significantly, many diverse ID architecture designs become 
conceivable. 
8.7.2 Discussion of experiments 
Roughly speaking we were able to identify three classes of results. First, we were able to produce 
precision and recall measurements for individual IDSs. Second, we were able to identify inter-class 
relationships between activity classes and sets of generalized alarm, which may serve as the foundation 
for future work on alarm processing towards root-cause analysis. Finally, we were able to exercise the 
metrics of attack recall, rating ambiguity etc., which we defmed for our alarm set-based approach to fault 
diagnosis. These measurements enable an assessment of the potential viability of individual IDSs and, 
more importantly, of IDS combinations. All these results were obtained using RIDAX to analyze the 928 
activity variants derived in an automated fashion from the 48 activities identified in Section 4.3. We 
created these variants by selecting up to two variations out of a set of seven variations described. Of the 
928 resulting activity variants, 498 are to be considered malicious. 
An important result is the inter-class relationships between activity classes and sets of generalized alarms 
that we were able to identify. Depending on the number of IDSs combined, we were able to identify up to 
72 unique alarm sets. For individual IDSs, such as DaemonWatcher, this number is as small as one. Any 
given set of generalized alarms identifies one or several activity classes that may cause the generation of 
the alarm set considered. Recalling that generalized alarms represent classes of real-world alarms, our 
results describe relationships between the two classes. The knowledge of these inter-class relationships 
will support the development of future alarm-processing algorithms, such as will be required in large-
scale ID architectures consisting of many highly diverse IDSs. The importance of this knowledge is likely 
to increase because existing solutions such as ffiM's Tivoli Risk Manager [TRMOO] gradually improve 
their alarm processing towards root-cause analysis. What has been developed in this chapter represents a 
proposal for an approach to develop this knowledge. The manner in which this knowledge can be used 
has been demonstrated in the context of the MAFfIA project [AJessa03a], where the alarms generated by 
diverse IDSs are combined based on knowledge obtain in this way. 
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In addition. in Section 8.6.2, we briefly considered detection rates of individual IDSs that were 
detennined in ways similar to what is done in other approaches. We chose not to develop these 
measurements much further as they seem not well suited to our approach for three reasons: 
1. The underlying metrics cannot be extended to incorporate results from multiple IDSs in a 
meaningful manner. 
2. The measurements obtained do not permit judging the utility of the IDSs with respect to the 
semantics of the alarms they generate. This specifically includes the ability to distinguish false 
positives from true positives and the identification of the alarm cause, i.e., the activity. 
3. As a consequence the metrics used only seem to provide meaningful infonnation when applied 
to a real IDS implementation that is being evaluated in the environment for which it is 
envisaged. Because our approach operates at the more conceptual level of classes and does not 
include the modeling of an environment, the measurements obtained must be interpreted with 
care. 
Therefore we focused on alarm-set-based fault diagnosis instead. Again. one needs to keep in mind that 
we do not consider a real-world environment, but rather a nonnalized environment, in which every 
activity variant is considered exactly once. Identifying the inter-class relationships does not require a 
model of a real environment because the relevant attack characteristics are not influenced by the 
environment. Also, for assessing the viability of IDS combinations, a normalized environment proved 
sufficient. While perfonning the alarm-set-based fault diagnosis and measuring its results, we were able 
to validate and quantify a number of common assumptions and to learn numerous lessons: 
• Substantial gains in coverage, i.e., attack recall, result from the combination of IDSs with as 
distinct a coverage as possible (see also Figure 39). 
• Improving the rating ambiguity by combining IDSs requires a significant overlap in coverage. 
• The techniques used by the combined IDSs should be as diverse as possible. 
• It is possible to slightly improve the rating ambiguity while combining IDSs to improve 
coverage, but this proved to be a difficult task requiring special care. 
• Similar observations as made for rating ambiguity measurements apply to attack identification 
recall measurements. 
• Alarms indicating the use of variation techniques increase both coverage and rating ambiguity. 
One should not consider attacks as detected if they are only reported by an alarm indicating the 
use of variation techniques. In other words, such alarms should not be included in attack recall 
calculations because in practice this leads to misleading measurements of coverage. 
• It might be meaningful to use alarms that report the use of variation techniques to adjust the 
severity level associated with a finding presented to the human security officer on duty. Also 
such alarms may be used to facilitate the identification of the attack-tool used by the adversary. 
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We were able to validate the common perception [SGVS99] that IDSs should not operate across 
too many levels of abstraction, e.g., protocol layers, while performing their analysis. 
Specifically, although generally considered very convenient to implement. systems applying any 
of kind string-pattem-matching algorithm to (extemal) raw data sources (see Section 5.2.1.1) are 
prone to false positives and obfuscation. Furthermore the severity of this issue clearly increases 
the more abstraction levels an IDS attempts to monitor. An example is the class of network-
based systems, which in general are particularly susceptible to false positives due to string 
mismatches and obfuscation techniques. 
In our experiments we always considered the total number of attack class variants identified-assuming a 
normalized environment. In future work one might wish to expand this by weighting the acti\;ty classes 
and variations according to the coverage required by the security policy and according to their importance 
in the respective environments. For instance one might wish to maximize coverage for http-related 
activities. 
When taking into account the environment one should ideally use a model of the environment an 
individual IDS or the complete ID architecture is envisaged for. If this is not possible. one might consider 
the creation of multiple environment profiles, each describing a particular class of em;ronments. Such 
profiles might include descriptions of typical commercial DMZs, Microsoft Windows-dominated 
intranets, Unix-based environments, etc. At the stage where one weights the assessment results. one might 
even choose to combine multiple environment descriptions if appropriate and necessary. Although this is 
more complex to implement, we believe that IDS benchmarking approaches as described in Section 2.3.3 
should use multiple environment profiles rather than just a single one for their assessment. One might also 
want to assess the expressiveness of the alarms generated. In other words, one should not focus on the 
pure numbers of false and true positives but instead assess how well attacks can be identified and how 
well false and true positives can be distinguished. 
Lastly, we note that our experiments consider worst-case scenarios only. This means that when 
considering an attack, we always assumed the attack to be successful. In future work, one might extend 
RIDAX towards considering successful and unsuccessful instances of each attack. This extension should 
result in more finely grained results for IDSs such as DaemonWatcher that are only able to detect 
successful attacks. 
8.8 Conclusion 
The IDS assessment method described here represents an application and extension of the approach to 
IDS analysis developed in this work. It provides a systematic way to assess individual IDSs and the 
benefits attainable thanks to the combination of diverse IDSs. However, one should bear in mind that the 
results obtained from such an analysis are based on descriptions of IDSs, and not on experiments with 
real systems, i.e., IDS implementations. The assessment results are based on the analysis for classes of 
activities rather than for specific activities, e.g., particular attacks. Thus the results are of rather limited 
use when assessing IDSs for particular attacks. Instead, the results can be used for the design and 
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development of ID architectures that combine multiple IDSs to improve completeness and utility. 
Moreover they may be used to derive high-level alarm-correlation rules for fault diagnosis and root-cause 
analysis purposes. Last but not least, we have illustrated a way in which the results prO\ided by our 
approach to IDS analysis can be used for further investigations and analysis. 
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Chapter 9 Conclusions and future work 
In this work we have presented a novel approach to IDS analysis that supports and simplifies the difficult 
task of designing and analyzing IDSs. The approach operates at a conceptual level and thereby facilitates 
the identification and analysis of strengths and weaknesses of IDS designs--even before they are actually 
implemented. Thus, the approach can be used to provide guidance to IDS designers at an early stage of 
the design process by predicting the set of attack classes that an IDS design will be able to detect when 
implemented. In addition our approach enables IDS designers to create a detailed specification for the 
IDS envisaged by precisely specifying the classes of attacks that the IDS has to be able to detect. The 
specification may even detail the manner in which the IDS has to report its findings. 
In order to achieve the goal of improving the design process for IDSs, a number of well-structured 
concepts have been developed. These namely include highly generic and concise schemes for describing 
IDSs and classifying attacks. As illustrated by an example that assesses the information pro\;ded the 
combination of diverse IDSs, these schemes may serve as the basis for future conceptual work in the 
domain ofID. Similarly, this also applies to the analysis results produced by our IDS analysis approach. 
9.1 Contributions 
The main contribution of this work is a novel method of IDS analysis that provides guidance to IDS 
designers at early stage of the design process. It does so by predicting the attack classes that an 
implementation of the envisaged design will be able to detect and may even be used to express and verify 
an essential part of the IDS specification. 
While working towards this goal, we designed, built, and continuously enhanced a highly structured 
security database (VulDa) [DacAJe99]. We used the system to develop a scheme that categorizes attacks 
according to aspects of attack that are visible to IDSs. The categorization of over 350 attacks enabled us 
to identify categories of attacks that are relevant in practice. The VulDa system moreover evolved to a 
heavily used information system that provides access to security related information to hundreds of 
security professionals within IBM. 
This attack categorization served as the basis for some the following concepts, methods and tools that we 
have developed in the context of this work: 
• Description of IDSs: Based on the insights gained from creating the above attack categorization., 
we developed a highly flexible and generic but concise description framework for IDSs that uses 
multiple dimensions to describe IDS characteristics. The high generality and consistency are 
achieved thanks to the introduction of the so-called IDS scopes as one of the scheme's 
dimensions. It thereby enables a clear separation of ID techniques and the domain (IDS scope) to 
which these techniques can be applied. 
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Classification and description of attacks: We have developed an attack classification that yields 
concise descriptions of attack classes. The resulting descriptions are expressed in terms of 
characteristics that are required of an IDS to analyze attack classes, i.e., attack classes are 
described at the same level of abstraction as IDSs are described. The scheme moreover suppons 
the systematic identification and description of attack class variants. These variants reflect 
commonly used practices for obfuscating attacks in order to evade detection by IDSs. In addition 
to the analysis of IDSs, the set of identified attack classes and attack class variants can also be 
used for creating a part of the IDS specification. More specifically they can be used to set the 
requirements with regard to the attack classes an IDS has to be able to detect. Finally, it should 
be mentioned that the description scheme is of sufficient generality such that it can be used to 
describe not only attacks but also benign activities. 
• Novel IDS analysis method: In order to predict the attack classes that IDSs. i.e., implementations 
of IDS designs, are able to detect we have developed a method that performs a combined 
analysis of IDS descriptions and attack class descriptions. It thereby determines the set of attack 
classes that IDSs have the potential of detecting. The results obtained provide guidance to the 
designers of IDSs. This guidance may be highly valuable because it can be provided at an early 
stage of the design process, i.e., before the IDS design has been implemented. Similarly, the 
method may also be used to determine the suitability of existing IDSs to detect newly discovered 
classes of attacks. 
• RIDAX tool: We have created a prototype implementation of the entire approach to IDS 
analysis. The results of experimenting with RIDAX were used to outline a possible validation 
approach and thereby provide some evidence that the predictions made are actually accurate. 
Additionally, we have used the results to illustrate further potential applications for our approach 
by means of an example that shows how combinations of diverse IDSs can be assessed with 
respect to the usefulness of the information conveyed by the alarms that they may generate. 
9.2 Discussion 
In this thesis we have presented a novel approach for analyzing IDSs. It was the declared goal to support 
IDS designers early on in the design process by providing them with guidance in terms of the attack 
classes a given IDS design has the potential of detecting. The eminent advantage of this approach is that 
IDS designs can be analyzed before they have actually been implemented. This requires that the 
predictions made must be reliable. Although highly desirable, a rigorous validation of the results 
produced by our approach represents an undertaking that goes beyond what can be practically achieved. 
In order to provide some evidence of the accuracy of the predictions made by our approach, we have 
instead successfully illustrated and outlined a less involved validation approach that verifies the 
predictions made more selectively. 
It may, however, still happen that the predictions made for an IDS design are not met by the IDS 
. .. . t b investigated Our investigations ImplementatIon. In this case the reasons for the discrepancy mus e . 
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revealed that the predictions with regard to requirements for our description-based analysis approach were 
always consistent. The investigations, however, also revealed that in some cases the IDS implementation 
fails in meeting the requirements set by its specification and design owing to implementation flaws. i.e .. 
bugs. Moreover there exist techniques used by IDS implementers the description of which would require 
an IDS description framework that supports even more detail than the one we have presented. As we have 
illustrated by means of the IP fragmentation example in Section 7.3.1, such techniques are typically ad-
hoc and highly specific to a particular ID problem. Although the proposed IDS description framework 
could be extended to capture such IDS-specific peculiarities, we remained at the level of detail chosen. 
The attainable benefits from a systematic, i.e., uniform, extension of the description framework at such a 
level of detail would have been minor compared with the significant increase in complexity of the entire 
analysis process. Such an increase of complexity would have been undesirable as it was one of the goals 
to avoid unnecessary complexity, i.e., to find a balance between expressiveness and simplicity. 
Many of the concepts developed in this work may be used as the foundation for future work in the domain 
of ID. In Chapter 8, for instance, we have described an approach that uses RIDAX results for analyzing 
the utility of arbitrary combinations of diverse IDSs. Note that further refinements would be necessary 
before such an approach can be used in practice, but it represents an illustrative example that highlights 
the possibilities of analyzing IDSs at a conceptual level. 
9.3 Future directions 
As we illustrated in Chapter 8, this work may be extended in a number of different directions. In addition 
to the IDS assessment described in Chapter 8, additional avenues of further research could be the 
following: 
• Environment: Our description-based approach could be extended towards investigating the 
effects of environmental factors such as the traffic volume or the system load under which IDSs 
have to operate. If combinations of IDSs are to be analyzed it will most likely be necessary to 
take into account the network topology as well. 
• 
• 
False alarms: In the work as presented here we did not focus on the problem of IDSs generating 
excessive numbers of false alarms (except in the example presented in Chapter 8). We have. 
however, shown that the schemes presented can be used for analyzing the potential of IDSs to 
generate false alarms. This analysis could be extended further to provide even more information 
to IDS designers-supporting them in identifying potential causes for IDSs generating false 
alarms. To some limited degree, such analysis methods have been developed and explored in 
Chapter 8, but additional work will be necessary to develop these concepts further and to 
validate them. 
Analysis costs: Security always comes at a certain cost and so does ID. One aspect to be taken 
into account is the impact that IDSs may have on the systems they survey. This impact should 
remain below an "acceptable" limit. Another aspect is the possibility of the IDS being saturated 
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by the number of activities to analyze. As a consequence we suggest the introduction of per-IDS 
characteristic costs. These costs could be composed of cost items such as uCPU utilization.·· 
"memory utilization," and "storage utilization." Once RIDAX has completed the analysis of an 
activity class, one could then simply calculate the total costs caused by the IDS characteristics 
required for the analysis of activities that belong to that class. 
• Worst-case considerations: RIDAX could be extended so that it performs its analysis for more 
than just worst-case scenarios. Currently the system assumes each attack to be successful. This is 
not always the case, and should be reflected in future extensions to RIDAX (see also Section 
8.7.2). 
• Alarm correlation: The results obtained from our approach to IDS analysis may be used to 
investigate and develop novel approaches to ID alarm correlation, i.e., techniques that aggregate 
and interpret the alarms that are generated by multiple, possibly diverse. IDSs. An approach of 
how this could be realized and used has already been demonstrated in the context of the 
MAFTIA project [Alessa03a, DlOMaf02]. 
Last but not least, it is hoped that this work will help to promote efforts that go beyond the items just 
identified and thereby improve the utility ofID in general. 
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VulDa, a database of collected attacks and 
vulnerabilities 
VulDa is an actively maintained, searchable database of information relevant to computer security. Its 
particular focus is vulnerability information and contextual material. Being the only such senice 
available within ffiM, it represents one of the major contributions of this work. It has evolved to a highly 
regarded and used repository for security-related information within mM. Moreover VulDa, which 
started its operation in 1996, was among the fIrst to offer security-relevant information structured in a 
manner [DacAle99] as can be now found on public sites such as SecurityFocus [SecFoc) since 1999, or at 
NIST's ICAT metabase [ICAT] since 1998. 
In addition of being important to mM, VulDa signifIcantly supported numerous concepts developed in 
this work by providing the necessary profound knowledge of practical security issues. Moreover we were 
able to use it for categorizing a large number of attacks, which yielded results that were highly valuable to 
the IDS analysis approach developed in this work. 
Our VulDa effort, which lasted over a period offour years (1998-2001), included its design, population. 
and operation. In addition it included being the contact point for security- and operation-related issues of 
the entire VulDa user community of more than 500 registered IBM-internal users. It was this direct access 
to the internals of VulDa that enabled the iterative process that resulted in the categorization of more than 
350 attacks, and the concept of IDS scopes, all of which we describe in detail in the next chapter. It is 
worth mentioning that VulDa now offers continuously updated attack categorization statistics to its users. 
In the following we provide background information on the motivation for and the history of VulDa, 
followed by descriptions of its structure, operational processes, the concept of vulnerability descriptions, 
and user interfaces. Over time this database has evolved to a rather complex system whose detailed 
description lies beyond the scope of this document. We therefore focus on the core functionality of the 
database and on the data and functionality used in the context of the work described here. 
Note that the following sections are not a prerequisite for understanding the remainder of this work, but 
they add valuable background information and describe a signifIcant effort made in the context of this 
work. 
A.I Motivation and history 
Back in 1996, members of the ffiM Zurich Research Laboratory started, for internal purposes, to build up 
a structured repository of attacks. At that point it was sometimes still difficult to get hold of information 
about attacks because some of them were not disclosed to the public. Collecting information about newly 
discovered vulnerabilities and attacks was, however, a must for the ongoing research efforts in the ID 
research fIeld. The team felt that a systematic and uniform description of the vulnerabilities and attacks 
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found was required to structure the collected data. This led to the introduction of a first version of the so-
called vulnerability description files. 
From 1998 onwards, an increasing number of security professionals were interested in accessing the 
database. This trend resulted in more that 500 registered accounts by the end of 2000. This increased 
interest led to various improvements of the system, which finally enabled the transfer ofVulDa from ffiM 
Research to ffiM's Managed Security Services (MSS) organization. 
A.2 VulDa structure 
The structure of VulDa has evolved and has been improved significantly over time. However. the core of 
VulDa has remained the same [OacAle99]. The information available on VulDa is two-fold. First. VulDa 
contains a large repository of documents collected from sources known to provide security-relevant 
material, e.g., mailing lists such as Bugtraq [SecFoc], newsgroups, various web and ftp sites such as 
CERT/CC [CERT], SecurityFocus [SecFoc], SANS21 [SANS] and ~2 [NIAP97J. Second, so-called 
vulnerability descriptions provide highly structured information about vulnerabilities and their 
corresponding attacks. These vulnerability descriptions are tightly linked to the documents that are 
collected automatically by means of generic references. 
The population of the database is automated to a high degree and is mostly achieved by unattended batch 
processes that actively gather (e.g., newsgroups, world wide web, ftp sites etc.), archive, convert and 
index data. In addition data is also gathered passively. For instance, VulDa maintains archives of more 
than 100 mailing lists. 
Figure 44 shows the data flow within VulDa. For maintenance, control, state tracking, indexing, and 
searching numerous processes have been implemented that make use of freely available tools such as Perl 
[Perl87], GDBM (GNU database manager), or MySQL [MySql]. The database can be accessed from 
within ffiM by means of a secured webserver that offers various ways for searching the various document 
categories. 
As shown in Figure 44, much of the data is being collected from the Internet in an automated fashion. 
This data is then stored in a file system that in time has grown to over 1,500,000 documents. All newly 
collected data is then filtered according to rules, which we have defmed based on experience. The goal of 
this filtering is to isolate important information on new attacks and vulnerabilities, which can then be used 
to create vulnerability descriptions. 
We admit that it would have been preferable to store such a vast amount of information using a database 
server. However, the data was stored in filesystem for historical reasons, and the migration to a database 
21 SANS: "System Administration, Networking, and Security," an institute focusing on cooperative 
research and education; founded in 1989. 
22 NIAP: ''National Information Assurance Partnership," part of the National (US) Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST). 
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server was not done owing to the limited (human) resources avail bl Inst d th 
a e. ea e focus was the content 
of the database. 
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Figure 44-Data flow in VoIDa 
A.3 Vulnerability descriptions 
The vulnerability descriptions represent an important asset of VulDa. They are generally used as the 
primary entry point for searches in VulDa. The creation of vulnerability descriptions requires both a good 
knowledge of networking and computing systems in general and an in-depth understanding of computer 
security, including the peculiarities of the security community. The latter is necessary because. for 
instance, often only wrong or incomplete information is made available, which has to be identified as 
such. 
Vulnerability descriptions are stored in so-called vulnerability description files. These are composed of 
sections that contain attribute-value pairs, which are used to describe the properties of vulnerabilities and 
their corresponding attacks. Owing to these sections, VulDa's vulnerability descriptions are well 
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structured and thereby clearly separate vulnerabilities and atta ks Grall · . 
. . c . ene y speaking the \ulnerabilil) 
descnptlODS are capable of representing a super-set of the info n· ·d d b 
nna on proVl e yother more re ent 
efforts such as lCAT [ICAT] or the Bugtraq ID pursued by SecurityFocus [SecFoc]. 
Vulnerabilny 
Description File 
Main ~lStratove onfoonaoon 
abstraa 
keywords 
CVE 
Bugtraq ID 
external references 
Vulnerability nature of fautt 
CharacterizatJon :... cause 
Vulnerability 
Detection 
Vulnerability 
Removal 
Anack 
Characterization 
Attack 
Detection 
OS I Software 
Hardware I Protocol 
r;:::::::::===, .... 
Reference 
.... 
'--------' 
attacked obtec1 
attack orrterface 
attack charactenstlcs 
explortablhty 
Impact 
name 
version 
status 
patch level 
data category 
search critena 
Figure 4S--Overview of the vuJoerability description structure 
10 the following we briefly discuss the purpose of the various sections shown in Figure 45 . We only 
highlight details that are either believed to be of general interest or are used in the context of the work 
described here. 
The main section of vulnerability description files contains generic information about the document. 
Besides information used for administrative purposes, it also contains the document title, an abstract, 
keywords, external references, and last but not least, CVE identifiers and Bugtraq IDs (see also section 
2.2.5 .1). 
10 the section vulnerability characterization, the vulnerability is classified according to numerous criteria 
such as the cause of the fault (e.g. , design fault , implementation fault etc.). Furthermore, the vulnerabili ty 
is classified according to well-known fault characteristics such as insufficient input validation, privil ege 
abuse etc. (See also Section 2.2.5) . Among other criteria this section also indicates the system component 
in which the fault is located. 
The sections vulnerability detection and vulnerability removal will not be explained in detail here. 10 
summary the vulnerability detection section includes information on testing tools, e.g., a scanning tool. 
and how these tools would report the vulnerability. The vulnerability removal section de cribe the 
various ways to remove the vulnerability, e.g., disabling of a service reconfiguration, etc. ulnerabilil) 
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descriptions may include several of these sections because several different ways to detect a \ulnerability 
or to remove a vulnerability might exist. 
Each of the attack characterization sections characterizes one of the ways the pre\iously described 
vulnerability can be exploited, i.e., the way the fault can be activated. The attributes of these sections 
describe attack characteristics such as the immediate impact of the attack, the exploitability (remote or 
local), prerequisites, etc. In addition these sections support attributes required for the attack categorization 
developed in this work. 
The attack detection sections consist of properties that allow us specify how one can detect an attack 
using a given IDS. Several attack detection sections are supported because the vulnerability description 
may contain the description of several attacks, and because the various existing lDSs may detect attacks 
in various different ways. 
The sections OS, software, hardware and protocol have an almost identical structure. Each section 
describes a specific version and patch-level of an OS, software, hardware, or protocol. In addition these 
sections contain a status field that marks the described as being vulnerable or safe. Thus it becomes 
possible to describe the difference in terms of version and patches between vulnerable and safe versions 
of a product or protocol very precisely. This also means that it is possible to describe the fact that a given 
patch introduced the described vulnerability and that the installation of another patch will remove the 
vulnerability again. 
The reference sections are used to link the vulnerability description with additional information sources. 
It is possible to provide references to every document found in VulDa-including other vulnerability 
descriptions, exploits (attack scripts), advisories, RFCs etc. It is important to note, and completely natural. 
that in general information about a given vulnerability is discovered and published gradually. 
Furthermore it seems obvious that in practice the frequent updating of references in several hundred or 
thousand vulnerability descriptions is infeasible. This has led us to the introduction of so-called dynamic 
references, which proved to be very efficient both in terms of maintenance and usability. A dynamic 
reference consists ofa search pattern that is resolved at runtime. We thereby make use of the possibility to 
search VulDa on a per-category basis, which allows us to refer to an entire series of subsequent 
documents, e.g., mailing list threads or a series of advisories, very efficiently and in an always up-to-date 
manner. Experience has shown that if the search patterns, i.e., the dynamic references, were formulated 
with sufficient care in the first place, the number of non-relevant document references generated can 
subsequently be kept to a negligible minimum. To further extend the expressiveness of the references 
generated it is possible to rank them. 
A.4 User interfaces provided 
Over the years the VulDa database has grown to a large repository of security-relevant documents that are 
organized by categories. The underlying technology extracts the text from all documents (including 
PostScript, PDF etc.) and creates a searchable index per category of documents. Based on these indices 
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VuLDa offers a flexible keyword search facility that allows the use t h (' d . r 0 searc lor ocuments by categone 
or to browse vulnerability descriptions according to various criteria such as the operating stem affeeted. 
A.4.1 Attack categorization 
The attack categorization, which relies on dedicated attributes that we included in the anack 
characterization section of the vulnerability descriptions, is probably the most directly visible contribution 
that this work has made to VulDa. The statistical data derived from this categorization i used to eleet 
activity categories for the analysis of IDSs. The categorization scheme and the manner its re ults are used 
are explained at large in Chapter 4. Additional statistical data is provided in Appendix B. 
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Figure 46--Statistics derived from attack categorization superposing attacked object, attack 
interface and attack characteristics 
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Besides the statistics discussed in Section 4.3, numerous HTML tables as shown in Figure 46 and Figure 
47 are created, i.e. , updated, on a daily basis. The tables not only provide an overview of the most 
frequent categories of attacks, but also allow us to obtain the list of vulnerabilities belonging to a given 
category by clicking on the corresponding table field . This functionality simplifies the task of describing 
attack classes that belong to a given category by providing us with attack examples. 
Figure 46 shows a table that combines the static (rows of the table) and dynamic activity characteristic . 
Both are described in detail in Section 4.2. Note that every attack may quali fy for several tatic and 
dynamic activity characteristics. As a consequence vulnerability descriptions may qualify for e\ eral 
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category fields in the table, which is a completely valid situation. (See also 2.2.1 and the citanon 0 
Axelsson [AxelssOO] , p. 17) 
Figure 47 shows a different example of a table that is generated based on the categorized ana . . Here 
one can find the various ways the dynamic activity characteristics (labeled "attack characteri ti .. in the 
figure) are combined within one attack. Note that this table reflects only combinations of two 
characteristics per field . This means that attack categories that combine three or more attack 
characteristics cannot be identified using this table. It also means that attacks combining everal 
characteristics appear more than once in this table. 
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Attack Characteristics - Correlation Matrix 
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Figure 47-Statistics of concurrent occurrences of attack characteristics 
A.4.2 Vulnerability browser 
The vulnerability browser, also called "vulnerability overview," provides a browser-style interface that 
. . f vuln bili" d ttacks The interface is implemented enables a user to search eaSily for categones 0 era nes an a . 
.' 8 d F' 49 the user may choose a category of based on VulDa ' s search engine. As shown ill Figure 4 an 19ure , 
vulnerability descriptions in the left colurrm of the browser window and have them displayed in the main 
portion of the browser window. 
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Figure 48 shows an example listing of all vulnerabilities known to affect mM's AIX operating system. 
and Figure 49 shows an example listing of all vulnerabilities for which it is known that at least one of the 
corresponding attacks affects processes. The latter example exploits one of the attack categorization 
attributes included in the vulnerability description files. The vulnerability browser can be configured to 
operate on any of the attributes supported by the vulnerability descriptions. 
A.4.3 Integration with security software 
The flexibility of the vulnerability description mes and the search engine enables the efficient integration 
of VulDa with other systems such as mM's network security scanner. We have. for instance. created a 
package that integrates mM's security scanner with VulDa. The scanner generates an HTML report that 
contains links that indirectly refer to vulnerability descriptions on VulDa. A link may, for example, 
contain a reference to a tool-specific vulnerability identifier or to vulnerability identifier such as CVE 
numbers or Bugtraq IDs. By clicking on the link. VulDa returns the list of vulnerabilities matching the 
search criteria specified by any of the identifiers mentioned. Using this level of indirection it becomes 
possible to maintain any external system and VulDa in a highly independent, but still well integrated 
manner. 
A.5 Conclusion 
Over time VulDa has proved to be a highly useful and valuable system with respect to many aspects of 
this work and to the entire mM security community. Nevertheless, one has to mention that its 
development, maintenance, and population proved to be enormously time-consuming. However, 
concerning this work, VulDa represented the ideal facility to develop and implement the activity, i.e., 
attack, categorization scheme, and to educate us on security-related issues. Most importantly I enabled us 
to select a set of representative attack classes that was then used throughout this work. Note that also 
VulDa benefited from this work as the results have become an integral part of the system and are 
therefore readily available to its large number of more than 500 mM-internal users. It thereby represents 
an important and highly regarded contribution of this work. 
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Statistical results derived from the attack 
categorization 
In Chapter 4 we have developed a classification scheme for activities, which is geared at the 
characterization of activities that are either malicious, i.e., attacks, or that are sufficiently attack-similar to 
be confused by an IDS with an attack. In Section 4.3 we have then explained how this classification 
scheme was used to classify 358 attacks taken from IBM's security database VulDa, which is described in 
Appendix A. Also in Section 4.3 we provide some more detailed insights gained from this classification 
effort. 
As a general comment on the following figures, note that we provide histograms rather than pie charts for 
most of the data. This is done because the classification scheme permits attacks to be characterized by 
multiple activity interface and dynamic activity characteristics. Solely the affected objects are defined 
such that only one characteristics is permitted per attack classified. In this case the sum of all affected 
objects adds up to 100%, which is why we provide a pie chart in B.3. 
B.I Dynamic fault characteristics 
As mentioned in Section 4.2.3, the dynamic activity characteristics allow the combination of several 
dynamic activity characteristics to describe an attack, i.e., we use the potential set created based on all the 
dynamic activity characteristics defined. 
In Figure 50 we consider the communication model combined with the method invocation model only. 
By considering the communication characteristics (uni- and bi-directional) it is apparent that more than 
half of the attacks classified involve some means of communication. 
Note that the histograms shown in Figure 50 and Figure 51 are simplifications of the underlying data. We 
have been able to identify 42 different combinations of dynamic activity characteristics in the data used 
for Figure 50, and 86 combinations in the data used for Figure 51. Figure 50 shows only 14 combinations 
of dynamic activity characteristics, whereas the remaining combinations are collected in the group called 
other combinations. Figure 51 shows 21 different combinations. 
Figure 51 incorporates also the dynamic activity attributes (see Section 4.2.3.3). This enables us to 
identify some very frequent types of attacks such as buffer overflow or special-character attacks against 
server processes. These attacks typically involve bi-directional communication and execution within 
object context. In addition, the input provided is of high importance because it contains the buffer 
overflow data or the special characters. One can easily identify these attacks in the figure by considering 
the input relevant, exec. within object context portion of the second bar (49 attacks). In a similar way one 
can identify any kind of potential buffer overflow or special-character attack by considering the first bar 
(taking a look at the raw data one finds 99 attacks that combine the attack characteristics "exec. within 
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object context" and the attribute "input data relevant"). Additional combinations of charactensnc e 
that involve other characteristics in addition to those just mentioned. For instance. the pecial-charn ler 
attack against a webserver that reveals the password file invol es the object read characteristi ill 
addition. 
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B.2 Interface objects 
The histogram shown in Figure 52 shows the di stribution of interface objects used to stage an.acks. The 
total size of the bars shows that processes and application layer protocols are the most frequently u ed 
interface objects. Taking a closer look at the respective bars one can further deduce that protocol layer 
and processes are rarely combined to attack another object. This is not swprising as it highlights the fact 
that remote attacks generalJy involve the protocol stack, whereas local attacks typically involve processes 
as attack interface. This observation allows us to distinguish clearly between locall y and remotely 
executed attacks. 
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Figure 52-Histogram of interface objects 
Moreover, it is apparent that the jiJesystem objects and the environment are not used in combination with 
communication protocol layers to attack other objects (see bars labeled "environment " and "jiJesystem 
object " in Figure 52). This is a reasonable result, because for remote attacks jilesystem objects typically 
play the role of the affected objects, e.g. , reading of the password file . On the other hand they may serve 
as interface objects for local attacks that target processes for instance. For the environment, the findings 
are similar. Although the environment was involved in some remote attacks involving the telnet protocol, 
remote attacks involving the environment typically are very rare, as also revealed by Figure 52 . 
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B.3 Mfected objects 
The distribution of the affected objects shown in Figure 53 shows the clear d rrun' f Th 
o ance 0 proces . ey 
represent the most prominent target of attacks. As to be demonstrated tater in more detail , till 
corresponds to the observations made in B.2, which showed a large number of attacks involving various 
application layer protocols. These attacks typically affect network services that are commonl 
implemented by daemon processes. Attacks against jilesystem objects are typicall targeted to\\'3Ids 
sensitive files such as the password ftle . 
networking 
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Figure 53-Distribution of affected objects 
process 
76% 
Note that we are not classifying the impact of attacks here . The impact of an attack is de cribed by a 
system state corresponding to an error and/or failure state, which depends on the success of an attack. 
However, the success of an attack mostly depends on the presence of the corresponding vulnerability and 
its characteristics. For instance, an attack that is staged against a process or afilesystem object may result, 
in both cases, in a shell being provided to the attacker. Thus, the affected object can be a process or the 
filesystem respectively. However, the impact of the successful attack is merely determined by the 
vulnerability rather than by the attack. 
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B.4 Dynamic attack characteristics with affected objects 
When considering the eight most frequent combinations of dynamic fault characteristic . we obtain a 
simi lar picture as in Figure 50. However, it is apparent that the combination of the activit)' characteristi 
bi-directional communication and execution within object context (second bar from the left in Figure ':-0 ) 
are even more frequent than the sole execution within object context (third bar from the left in Figure ':-0). 
This has already been observed in Section B. I , and demonstrates the importance of the attacks against 
(server) processes. This can also be verified byt the fact that almost all the attacks falling into to thi 
category target processes (especially apparent for the fIrst three bars from the left in Figure 50). 
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Moreover we can identify the class of attacks that uses a communication mean to attack the networking 
stack of a system. Most of those attacks are denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, and attempt to crash the 
entire system by sending some malformed PDUs to the host. The malformed PDU may then force the 
networki.ng stack into an undefIned (error) state, a failure state. Finally we can identify an important class 
of attacks that affect the jilesystem by means of obj ect creation, modification or reading. Those attacks 
are typically staged on the local host. 
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B.S Interface objects with dynamic attack characteristics 
The distribution of the combinations of interface objects with dynamic activity characteristic (hO\Yll ill 
Figure 55) is less bursty than the one found when considering the combination of affected objects and 
dynamic activity characteristics (see Section BA). The resulting sub-classes are distributed more evenly. 
At a fust glance the most important class by far is that consisting of processes (see first column of Figure 
55). However, a detailed analysis shows that the classes involving application layer protocols urn up t 
an even more significant number. 
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Furthermore we can identify the class of remote buffer overflow and special -character attacks by 
considering the class of the combined dynamic activity characteristics bi-directional communication and 
execution within object context (appears in almost all columns). 
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B.6 Interface objects with affected objects 
When considering the relation between affected objects and interface objects \ve can identify the 
interfaces most frequently used to attack a given object. Considering Figure -6. we re ognize the 
dominance of processes as attack target objects and as attack interface objects. In addition we can identify 
filesystem objects to be attacked merely using a process as interface. This makes sense because proc ses 
are the primary objects making use of fi lesystem objects . However. even more frequently proce are 
attacked using some application layer protocol indicating attacks against daemon proce e . i.e .. ef\; e . 
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In addition, one can observe that the CPU is attacked by processes onl y, which can be explained by the 
fact that CPUs are generally attacked by exercising some malicious, possibly inva lid. command 
ul · d ' 1 f . b crashing the entire system. Another sequences. In most cases these attacks res t ill a eilla 0 sef\l1ce y 
observation one can make is the fact that the networking stack is general ly attacked by transport and 
. . " 1 h b 0' made above when identifying the processes network layer protocols. This IS slim ar to teo serva on we 
as a popular attack target, just at a lower level in terms of the protocol stack. 
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Appendix C Example IDS scopes and their use 
In this appendix we provide additional information on IDS scopes and their use in the context of this 
work and specifically the RIDAX implementation. In a first section we pro\ide definitions of the IDS 
scope tree elements introduced in Section 4.1.1. In the second section we provide the definitions for the 
IDS scope attributes used to describe functional properties of IDS scopes as introduced in Section 4.1.2. 
In the last section we provide examples on how the semantics of the various IDS description 
characteristics is defmed using IDS scopes. 
C.I IDS scopes 
The IDS scope tree shown in Figure 9, p. 31, contains all the relevant higher-level IDS scopes we were 
able to identify. In addition the figure also shows some examples of lower-level IDS scopes. In the 
following sections we provide definitions of all the IDS scopes as used in this work and shown Figure 9. 
It is clear that the tree shown in Figure 9 may be extended if needed, for example. by the addition of 
further protocols if necessary. 
Note that we do not discuss the user IDS scope in greater detail because we do not divide the user IDS 
scope into lower-level IDS sub-scopes, as there are no user components that would seem to be of special 
interest to an IDS. Nevertheless the user IDS scope is needed as it may be used to describe the ability of 
an IDS to relate observations to a user or possibly a group of users. 
C.l.I IDS scopes related to networking 
As a first step we consider the networking IDS scopes used to describe networking-related IDS 
capabilities. For further details we refer to Tanenbaum [Tanenb96]. Note that the protocols listed below 
are mostly examples illustrating the conceptual foundation of the IDS scope tree. 
Physical layer 
Table 35--Networking-related IDS scopes-physical layer 
The physical layer of communication systems is not of importance for current 
IDSs. However, as technology evolves, this aspect may become relevant some 
day. 
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Link layer 
LLC 
MAC 
Network layer 
IPv4 
IPv6 
X25 
ARP 
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Table 36-Networking-reIated IDS scopes-link layer 
The link layer is split into the less known LLC layer Oogical link control) and 
the MAC layer (medium access control). 
The logical link control layer used on today's mostly Ethernet-based networks 
is basically empty. In theory the LLC may offer the sen'ice of reliable 
communication, which is hardly used. The LLC has been defined in IEEE 
802.2. See also Tanenbaum {I'anenb96]. 
The medium access control layer provides the addressing of entities on the 
LAN, and defines the way the medium is accessed e.g.. Ethernet. which 
originally used a shared medium. This requires a special method to send data 
on the media such that possible collisions do not lead to the loss of data. The 
MAC has been defined in the IEEE 802.3 standard. See also Tanenbaum 
{I'anenb96]. 
Table 37-Networking-related IDS scopes-network layer 
The network layer generally provides a routable addressing of entities. and may 
also offer reliable communication, i.e., a connection-based service. However 
the most commonly used implementation of the network layer used today is 
IPv4, which offers a datagram service only. 
The internet protocol version 4 offers a routable datagram service that does 
not guarantee the delivery of a datagram nor the order of a"ival of datagrams. 
This new, not yet widely deployed, version of the internet protocol prOVides a 
much wider address space, and offers improved support for the encryption of 
data, quality of service, mobility, dynamic routing etc. 
The X25 is a connection-oriented neMork layer service that was used by 
telecom operators for data services before the internet became as popular as it 
is today. 
The address resolution protocol ARP resides at the lower neMork level. and 
provides the service of mapping MAC sub-layer addresses to neMork layer 
addresses. 
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Transport layer 
rcp 
UDP 
[CMP 
Middleware 
COREA 
DCOM 
Application layer 
DNS 
SMTP 
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Table 38--Networking-related IDS scoper-transport layer 
The transport layer is the layer where reliable communication is implemented 
in current networks. However, connectionless transport layer senices also play 
an important role in today's networks. The transport layer is generally used to 
address a specific service on a given host. 
The transmission control protocol is the most common~\" used connection-
oriented protocol. The handling of rcp streams is an imponant but nontrivial 
issue for network-based IDSs. 
The user datagram protocol is similar to rcp but does not prm'ide bi-
directional connection-based service. As this protocol is not connection-based 
it is far easier for [DSs to analyze. 
The internet control message protocol is also a connection less protocol that 
was conceived to control the routing at the network layer and to offer simple 
service such as ping. However. the functionality offered by [CMP may be 
misused in various ways. which makes it an important protocol to be monitored 
byIDSs. 
Table 39-Networking-related IDS scopes--middleware 
The monitoring of middleware protocols is-if done at all-mostly 
implemented at the application layer level. However, we list it here for future 
developments. 
COREA is a middleware standard defined by the OMG (object management 
group) and is widely used in distributed systems. 
DCOM is Microsoft's answer to CaRRA. DCOM includes technology such as 
Microsoft's Active-X controls etc. 
Table 40--Networking-related IDS scopes-application layer 
The monitoring of application layer protocols is a tedious task for lOSs 
because there are so many of them. In addition, several versions have been 
defmed over the years for many of them e.g., http vO.9, http vI.O. http vl.l, 
POP vI, POP v2, POP v3 etc. 
The domain name service is the most commonly used name-resolution service. 
This protocol is mostly connection less. 
The simple mail transfer protocol is the most commonly used protocol to 
transfer e-mail over the internet. 
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The file transfer protocol is used to transfer files over the internet. This 
protocol uses separate control and data connections which makes it Q 
challenge for IDSs to analyze FTP traffic. 
The hypertext transfer protocol is the protocol used by the world wide weh 
(WWW). Several versions of this protocol have been defined and are stifl in 
use. 
C.1.2 Host-related IDS scopes 
As already mentioned, it is not so straightforward to identify the IDS sub-scopes for the host IDS scope. 
The following IDS scopes have been defmed by identifying system components that can be found in 
computing systems. The list focuses on security-relevant IDS scopes by refining areas of special interest 
to IDSs. 
Devices 
CPU 
Storage 
I/O 
Memory 
Firmware 
OS core 
Table 41-Host-related IDS scopes-devices 
Devices are rarely covered by today's IDSs. However, one might foresee ID 
work to be done in this area in the future. This area currently does not seem 
very promising but this may change as new paradigms evolve. 
The central processing unit is the target of some attacks that attempt to exploit 
faults present in the CPU's microcode. 
Storage devices such as disks. tapes. CD-ROMs etc., are used for persistent 
storage of large volumes of data. 
Input/output devices allow a system to communicate with the outside world. 
Examples: Network inteiface cards, seriallparallel line interfaces. keyboards. 
mouse etc. 
The memory (RAM) is commonly used to store data and executable code. 
Table 42-Host-related IDS scopes-firmware 
The fmnware is a low-level piece of code that runs beneath the operating 
system and that is responsible for managing the hardware of a system It 
manages all the devices in a system e.g., power management and bootstrap, the 
operating system at power-up time. The firmware is not of importance to 
today's IDSs, but with the ongoing development of the technology 
[VMwareOO] that will enable the operation of several independent virtual 
machines on the same physical system this may change. 
Table 43-Host-reIated IDS scopes--OS core 
The operating system is used to control and to manage the system Moreover, it 
provides various services. 
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OS modules 
Network stack 
Calls 
System calls 
Function calls 
Filesystem objects 
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Table 44--Host-related IDS scopes-OS modules 
Operating system modules are commonly used to extend the OS core with 
device drivers etc. Because the network stack is an OS module of high 
importance for ID we list it separately. 
The network protocol stack is commonly implemented as an OS module for 
efficiency reasons. The reason why it is listed here separately is that it is a 
prominent target. If the network stack encounters a failure this often 
propagates to OS core and may therefore lead to the failure of the entire 
system. Also it is relatively easy to attack the network stack because it 
represents-by definition-one of the most important interfaces of the system to 
the outside world. 
Table 45--Host-related IDS scopes-calls 
Calls represent an important change in the execution path of a process. One can 
distinguish calls that do not require a context switch from user space to kernel 
space and calls, i.e., system calls, that require such a switch. 
System calls are used by a process to interfere with the under~ving OS. The 
sequence of system calls made by a process may be used by an IDS, such as the 
DaemonWatcher by Wespi et al. [WeDaDeOO, WesDeb99], to obtain an 
indication as to what a process actually does .. 
The tracing of function calls is generally not easy because they occur in the 
user space and do not require an interaction with a central component such as 
the OS kernel. However, it is conceivable that calls to library functions are 
logged by the library involved and then used for later analysis by an IDS. An 
example of such an approach is the work by Kerschbaum, Spafford and 
Zamboni [KeSpZaOO, SpaZamOO, SpaZamOOb, ZambonO 1]. 
Table 46-Host-related IDS scopes-filesystem objects 
The filesystem is a vital component of commonly used computing systems. It is 
used to store security-relevant data such as configuration fIles, passwords etc. 
The filesystem may also be used as a general address space. In Unix 
filesystems, for instance, one can fmd. in addition to ordinary fIles, directories 
and links, also the notion of special fIles such as named pipes, and sockets or 
device files. 
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Signal 
Socket 
FIFO 
Shared memory 
Messages 
Semaphore 
Middleware 
Environment 
Variable 
Registry 
Process 
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Table 47-Host-related IDS scopes--IPC 
Inter-process communication is a widely used method to interfere with running 
processes. It therefore represents a potential interface for an adwrsarv 10 
manipulate the behavior of a running process. 
Signals are a basic technique to inform processes about a gil en e\·ent. Signals 
may also force a process to terminate. 
Sockets enable local clients to communicate with a local sen'er process. 
FIFO stands for first in-jirst out. FIFOs are pipes that can be used to feed the 
output generated b· ... one process to an input stream of another process. 
Shared memory enables two processes to exchange data \'ery' effieientil' 
directly over the memory. 
Messages provide a mechanism that enables processes to exchange data in a 
well-structured H'G\'. 
Semaphores are used for synchronization purposes e.g., to pre\'ent the 
concurrent access to a resource. 
Table 48--Host-related IDS scopes--middleware 
As mentioned, certain components of commonly used middlewarc' technology 
can only be monitored on the host level. This is why it is also listed here. 
Table 49-Host-related IDS scopes---environment 
The behavior of a process may be influenced by its environment. making the 
environment an important attack interface for adversaries. 
At process creation time. environment l'Griables are copied from the parent 
process to the new~l' created child process. 
The registry is specific to the fami/.v of the Windows operating systems. The 
registry represents a central repository' of configuration information of the 
entire system. The modification of the registry can. sometimes. influence 
processes already running. 
Table 50-Host-related IDS scopes-process 
A process is the running instance of a program. Any application. tool. servIce 
etc., that is run on a system is generally reflected by one or se\eral processes. 
This makes process the prime target and interface for attacks. Typical server 
processes are the http (world wide web) and sendmail (mail service) daemons. 
Typical applications are web browsers or text processors. 
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C.2 IDS scope attributes 
IDS scope attributes are used to describe functional properties of IDS scopes. For the description we first 
list the high-level IDS scope to which the attributes described consecutively may be applied. The names 
of the IDS scope attributes are highlighted in italic font. We also provide examples wherever possible. 
Note that we again focus only on issues relevant to ID. 
C.2.1 Networking-related IDS scope attributes 
As before we start by discussing the networking scopes first: 
MAC 
Fragmentation 
Network layer 
Fragmentation 
Table 51-Networking-related IDS scope attributes-MAC layer 
Mediwn access control layer, see Table 36. 
Fragmentation at the MAC layer is generally not done in standard LAS 
environments. However, in other applications such as satellite communication. 
MAC layer PDUs may befragmented. 
Table 52-Networking-related IDS scope attributes-network layer 
See Table 37. 
Network layer protocols such as IP may offer the possibility to split PDUs into 
smaller pieces. This splitting is required whenever the underlying service has 
an MTU (maximum transmission unit) size that is smaller than the size of the 
network layer PDU to be transmitted. In order not to miss important data. 
network-based IDSs should recompose these fragments before they analyze the 
data. This is not very complicated, but costly in terms of CPU and memory 
required. Certain IDSs do not reassemble fragments for exactly those reasons. 
An adversary can fool those IDSs simply by fragmenting the data sent to the 
target. Examples: IPv4, IPv6 (see also [Thomas96}). 
Connection-oriented Connection-oriented network layer protocols are main(l' used in the telecom 
world (circuit switching etc.). Examples: X25, Frame Relay, ATM, DQDB. 
Connection less Network layer protocols used in LAN environments are generally not 
connection-oriented. Examples: IPv4, IPv6. 
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Table 53-Networking-reIated IDS scope attribntes-transport layer 
Transport layer See also the example shown in Section 4.1.2 and Table 38. 
Address Many transport layer protocols such as TCP or UDP provide the abilin· to 
address a service access point on the destination and source entity. In the case 
of TCP and UDP addressing is done by means of S (H:a lied port numbers. 
Connection-oriented The analysis of connection-oriented protocols imposes additional costs on the 
IDS monitoring the connection for suspicious traffic. Connecrion-oriented 
protocols may be tricked into splitting the data stream into arbitrary 
sequences. Such data-chopping can be used by an adversary to pre.·enr the 
detection of their attacks by IDSs that are not sufficient~v able to reconstruct 
data streams of connections. In general the IDS needs to keep track of the 
connection's state, data retransmissions etc. Example: TCP. 
Connection less 
Fragmentation 
Connection less protocols have the advantage that they do not impose the 
overhead of establishing a connection. This also reduces the burden for IDSs 
when monitoring such traffic. However, PDUs of connecrionless protocols can 
be easily spoofed. Examples: UDP, ICMP. 
We are not aware of a connecrionless transport layer protocol that would 
support fragmentation of data. However, as it is conceivable to be 
implemented, we mention it for the sake of completeness. 
Table 54-Networking-related IDS scope attributes-application layer 
Application layer 
Connection less 
Single connection 
Multi connection 
See Table 40. 
Application layer protocols may be defined on top of a connection-oriented or 
a connection less service. As mentioned, connectionless services may be subject 
to spoofing attacks. That attack naturally propagates to the overlaying 
application layer protocols. Examples: Domain (DNS). TFTP (trivial file 
transfer protocol), NTP (network time protocol). SNMP (simple network 
management protocol). 
Most application layer protocols that are based on a connection-oriented 
service only require a single connection. This means that an IDS has to 
monitor only one transport layer connection to analyze the application layer 
session. Examples: http, SMTP (simple mail transfer protocol). Telnet. SSH 
(secure shell). 
Very few application layer protocols require several transport layer 
connections for their operation. However, the few that do are quite complex to 
analyze for IDS because it needs to keep track of all the transport layer 
connections and in addition it has to correlate the observations made across 
the various connections. Example: FTP (file transfer protocol). 
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Particularly in the database area e.g .. Oracle. DB:! .. \hSQL etc.. a clear~\" 
defined transaction concept exists. However. most application layer protocols 
do not have a clearly defined notion of transactions (see also Section -1.1.2). 
Application protocols that do not suppon multiple transactions withi" Ll 
session are generally simpler to anazee for an IDS because it needs to keep 
limited protocol state information only. Examples: http version 0.9 a"d 1.0. 
C.2.2 Host-related IDS scope attributes 
Within the host IDS scopes we have identified far fewer IDS scope attributes than for the networking IDS 
scopes: 
Environment 
Process creation 
Running process 
IPC 
Synchronization 
Interropts 
Data exchange 
Filesystem object 
Static 
Dynamic 
Table 55--Host-related IDS scope attributes~nvironment 
See Table 49. 
Environment elements belonging to this functional scope influence a process at 
the time of its creation. Examples: Unix and Windows environment \·ariables. 
Windows registry. 
Environment elements may influence processes alread)' nmning. £wmpll'. 
Windows Registry. 
Table 56--Host-related IDS scope attributes-IPC 
Inter-process communication, see Table 47. 
The fPC object can be used for synchronizatio" purposes. Examples: 
semaphore. signals. messages. 
The fPC object causes interropts of the normal program execution. Examples: 
FIFO. Signals. Sockets. 
The fPC object is used to exchange data. Examples: FIFOs. sockets. shared 
memory. messages. 
Table 57-Host-related IDS scope attributes-fiJesystem object 
See Table 46. 
The filesystem object is static. Examples: files. links. directories. 
Filesystem objects are considered to be dynamic if they are used for 
communication purposes such as fPC or the interaction with devices. 
Examples: named pipes. sockets. device files. 
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C.3 Definition and use of IDS characteristics with respect to IDS scopes 
The examples provided in the following are given to illustrate the way the pairs of items and IDS scopes are interpreted. The following tables are therefore by no means meant to 
cover the entire IDS scope tree. 
In some cases several semantic interpretations seem possible. In such cases we generally choose and document the one that seems most suitable for the analysis of Jl)Ss and ID in 
general. 
IliS 
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C.3.1 IDS sensor characteristics 
Table 58-IDS sensor characteristics-Objects (see also Table 7) 
IDS scope I User Filesystem IPC Device Network Host Process OS module Calls Environment 
items object middleware middleware 
Name Denotes the Denotes the IPC objects may Denotes a unique The IDS sensor The IDS sensor Denotes the OS modules or System and An environment 
name of a user unique name of be identified by device name. is able to gather is able to gather name of the drivers can be function calls can object e.g., an 
e.g., login name, an object e.g., some unique the name of a the name of a executable used identified by a be identified by a environment 
real name etc. path and name23 e.g., middleware middleware to create the name e.g., Linux name. variable or a 
filename. signal name. object from the object on the process. modules or registry key 
network24• host. Windows DLLs maybe 
(dyn.loadable identified by a 
libraries). unique name. 
10 Denotes the user Denotes a file IPC objects may Denotes a unique Middleware Middleware The process 10 N/A System calls can N/A 
10. Example Unix identifier e.g., be identified by device 10 object 10 object 10 identifies the be identified by 
user 10. Unix inode. some unique 10 running instance an 10. However 
e.g., signal of a program. this generally 
number. does not apply to 
function calls. 
Table 59-IDS sensor characteristics-Object attributes (see also Table 8) 
IDS scope I User Filesystem object IPC Device 
items 
Type Indicates the role of a user, e.g., the fact that Differentiates files, links, directories etc. Distinguish IPC object types Differentiates the various types of 1/0 
user is an administrative user. May be used devices, storage devices etc. 
to denote a user's role in role-based access 
control. 
-' ~-
11 This is not be l:onfused with \PC objects linked to a filesystem object as done on Unix systems. 
24 From a l:onceptual point of view, network and host middleware objects often do not exist. One usually refers to a middleware objcl:t and docs not l:arc about whcrc it is located 
e.g .. ('ORBA. Ilowever. whcn considering implementations of middleware solutions from the perspective of an IDS sensor this difference matters because the sensor may be 
monitoring object operations on a host or only on the network. 
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Table 60--IDS sensor characteristics-Arguments (see also Table 9) 
IDS scope I Call Application layer 
items 
Basic The arguments provided to a call are available for analysis. The arguments directly associated with a request are available e.g., the URL of an http 
request. 
Options N/A Optional, possibly loosely associated request arguments are available for further analysis. A 
- -- -
typical examPle are the http head!l' fields that follow_the httpr~quest statement. .. ___ 
Table 61-IDS sensor characteristics-Request (see also Table 10) 
IDS scope I Call Application layer Transport layer 
items 
Name The name of the function or system call made. The name of the request made e.g., the name of an http N/A 
request. 
10 The identifier of the call made. The identifier of the type of request made. The identifier of the protocol request, e.g., ICMP echo request. 
Table 62-IDS sensor characteristics-Protocol control data (see also Table 11) 
liDS scope I MAC layer Network layer Transport layer 
items 
Source I There, the source I destination 10 denotes the MAC There, the source I destination 10 denotes the network There, the source I destination 10 generally denotes the 
destination 10 address of the POU sender I destination. address of the sender I destination, e.g., IP address. transport layer source I destination address, e.g., TCP port 
number. 
Source I N/A There, the source I destination 10 denotes the network name There, the source I destination name can often be associated 
destination of a system, e.g., hostname as stored in ONS. with a service such as listed by the lANA well-known port 
name numbers [IANAPN). 
Options N/A Protocols such as IP offer the possibility to extend the Protocols such as TCP use optional header fields to negotiate 
header information with fields for source routing etc. connection parameters. 
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Table 63-IDS sensor characteristics-Data (see also Table 12) 
IDS scope I Filesystem object Process Device rcp 
items 
Up-I down- N/A N/A N/A TCP provides a reliable bidirectional data stream 
stream service. If the IDS sensor collects TCP packets 
on the network, the IDS is generally not able to 
guarantee the data stream. If the IDS sensor 
obtains the TCP stream data from one of the 
connection end points, one can consider the IDS 
to be operating based on a TCP stream. 
PDU data N/A N/A N/A If the sensor collects its data from the network it 
provides TCP PDUs only-and not as one could 
believe the reassembled TCP stream. On the 
other hand if the sensor collects its information 
on the host. TCP PO Us are not available. 
Status data In the filesystem IDS scope the status data The status data of a process can be seen In the device context the contents of 
represents the contents of a filesystem as the memory image of the process. physical memory or a storage device can 
object e.g., the contents of a file. be seen status data. This includes the 
status of device registers. 
-
- '-- -- --- --------------
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C.3.2 Detector data pre-processing characteristics 
Table 64-Detector characteristics-data normalization (see also Table 14) 
- ------
IDS scope I http FTP SMTP Calls Filesystem object 
items 
Single-byte In http it is possible to encode N/A N/A N/A N/A 
character characters in the URL with their 
decoding hexadecimal representation. 
Multi-byte It is possible to use UNI standard N/A N/A N/A N/A 
character codes in URLs 
decoding 
String A typical escape sequence used in FTP and many other protocol E-mail addresses may be written in The arguments passed to a system Filenames may contain various 
resolution http URLs is 'I.' (without quotes). involving filenames are susceptible complicated obfuscated ways by or function call may be quoted in an types of escape sequences. 
Such an escape sequence does not to the obfuscation of attacks similar adding quotes etc. Unfortunately unusual way. 
change the document or script that to http. this can also be done with strings 
is being accessed, but it may be containing attack data (e.g., he 
able to obfuscate the attack from an infamous pipe attack, CVE-1999-
IDS. Also it is possible to represent 0203). 
the host portion of an URL in 
various different ways. 
--.----- .-------
Data decoding In http POST data is often encoded N/A Mail messages--especially the N/A The content of files Illily be 
in base64. attachments-are often base64 compressed. 
encoded. 
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C.3.3 Detector instance analysis characteristics 
Table 65-Single instance part analysis 
IDS scope f Call Process Transport f network flink layer Application layer 
items 
Basic analysis The detector is able to recognize calls. The detector is able to identify a thread of a Connection segments and PDU fragments The detector is able to identify a protocol 
process. If a process consists of a single are recognized, i.e., the type of the protocol sequence or protocol statement e.g., SMTP, 
thread only, this falls also into this category. is recognized. FTP etc. statements. 
Basic instance part analysis for processes is 
for example required in combination with 
system call sequence analysis, where the 
detector needs some degree of process 
analysis to relate system calls to each other. 
Logic The arguments of system and function calls NfA The structure of the instance part i.e., PDU The syntax of the protocol request Is verified 
verification are verified to be syntactically correct fragment or connection segment is verified. with respect to the protocol specification. 
(including data types). 
Semantic The arguments of system and function calls NfA Unacceptable values, value combinations, or The detector verifies the plausibility and the 
verification are verified to be valid, e.g., the arguments inconsistencies of header fields are policy compliance of the instance part. 
are verified to be within a meaningful value recognized. 
range. 
-- -- --- --
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Table 66--Single instance analysis 
IDS scope I Call Process Transport I network layer Application layer 
items 
Basic analysis N/A The detector is able to identify a process and The detector is able to continuously identify The detector is able to identify a group of 
its threads. the segments or fragments belonging to a protocol statements, i.e., a transaction. 
connection or a PDU. This can be seen as a 
very simplistic reconstruction of the instance 
without any logical verification, e.g., 
reordering of fragments or segments. 
Logic N/A N/A The detector is able to recompose the The detector is able to verify the correctness 
verification instance from its parts by following the of the protocol sequence. 
protocol specification. Further the detector is 
able to recognize suspicious protocol 
sequences e.g., stealth TCP scanning 
[CIN0498]. 
Semantic The detector is able to analyze the impact of N/A Inconsistent but logically correct parts are In the case of http one expects the detector 
verification a call, e.g., to verify whether its return values recognized. Overlapping fragments are to be able to identify the fact that a protected 
are acceptable with respect to the call recognized. Also connection segment document was revealed. In the case of 
arguments. retransmissions or overlapping fragments SMTP one would expect the detector to 
that no longer contain the same data are recognize the fact that a confidential 
recognized. document is sent to a receiver outside of the 
organization. 
Table 67-Instance group analysis 
liDS scope I Call Process Application layer 
items 
Basic analYSis The detector is able to associate calls to a process or to a The detector is able to identify a process group. The detector Is able to recognize an application layer 
user. This may additionally require some degree of process protocol session, e.g., http, SMTP, Oracle, D62, MySQL etc. 
analysis. This may be realized based on a well-known port number or 
any other simple check. 
Logic The detector is able to verify the logical correctness of a N/A The detector Is able to analyze the Instances, I.e., the 
verification sequence of calls made by a process or by a user. transactions executed within a session, independently. 
Semantic The detector is able to verify the acceptability of a task NlA If dependency among the Instances of a group exists, the 
verification represented by a sequence of calls made by a process or by detector is able to verify Its consistency and the acceptability 
a user. of sequences. I 
- -
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Table 68--Cross-instance (multi-instance) analysis 
IDS scope I Call Transport I network I link layer Application layer 
items 
Basic analysis N/A N/A N/A 
Logic N/A N/A N/A 
verification 
Semantic The detector is able to verify the semantic correctness and The detector is able to identify unacceptable sequences of If a dependency among instances exists, the detector is able 
verification acceptability of a sequence of calls (the calls may be made instances. to verify its consistency and the acceptability of sequen:j 
-- --
~y several indepe~dent processesl 
- - ---
Table 69-Bi-directional instance part group analysis 
IDS scope I Connection-oriented transport I network Ilink layer Application layer 
items 
Basic analysis The detector is able to associate PDUs flowing in both directions. The detector is able to identify the server response. 
Logic The detector is able to verify that the PDUs flowing in both directions are consistent with The detector is able to verify the logical, e.g., syntactical, correctness of the server response 
verification respect to the protocol definition. with respect to the request sent by the client. 
Semantic The detector is able to verify the acceptability of the bi-directional instance observed, e.g., it The detector is able to verify that the server's response is acceptable with respect to the j verification is able to detect the attempt of TCP connection hijacking. request sent by the client. 
-
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C.4 IDS description example 
In the preceding sections we provided example definitions and interpretations of vanous IDS 
characteristics identified in Chapter 5. In this section we illustrate the underlying IDS description scheme 
by providing an example description of WebIDS [Almgre99]. Because WebIDS is a highly specialized 
host-based IDS that focuses on the monitoring of just one specifIc service, i.e., the http service. its 
description is comparatively short. 
In the following we provide the description of WebIDS that was used for the experiments described in 
Section 8.6. The description is split into several tables describing the various characteristics identified in 
Chapter 5 (see for instance Figure 21 and Figure 26). The first two tables describe the sensor portion of 
WebIDS, the other four its detector portion: 
Table 7O-Generic sensor characteristics of Web IDS 
Sensor item Value / level 
Reporting time Post-execution 
Reporting delay Less than 3 
seconds 
Reporting 
timestamp 
Information 
source type 
End of activity 
Application 
level log 
Comment (see also Section 5.2.1) 
The information is read as the webserver writes it to the log file. 
See above. 
The sensor passes on the time information prm'ided by the 
webserver. 
The information is read from the webserver application log file. 
Table 71-IDS scope dependent sensor characteristics of WebIDS 
Sensor item Sensor item IDS scope Comment (see also Section 5.2.2) 
type' 
Argument Basic http The arguments of the http request line (URL. 
protocol version) 
Request Name http The http request type (GET. HEAD. PUT) 
Result Size http Number of bytes transferred 
Result Status http Status (success) code of the http request 
Object Name User The (http) user ID of the user (used by the 
authentication method provided by the http 
protocol) 
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data 
Detector item 
Alarm 
timestamp 
Alarm delay 
Knowledge-
based 
Behavior-based 
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Source ID Network 
layer 
Destination ID Transpon 
layer 
Typica/(v the IP address o/the c1ielll 
Typical/y the TCP pon the request was sent to: 
the default is pon 81) and is provided only 
implicitly 
Table 72-Generic detector characteristics of Web IDS 
Value / level 
End of activity 
Less than 3 
seconds 
True 
False 
Comment (see also Section 5.3.1 ) 
The detector gets the information from sensor on(l' once the 
request has completed. 
The (light-weight) detector processes the information almost in 
real-time. 
The detector verifies each request for a list of" signatures of 
known attacks. 
The detector does not use any behavior-based component. 
Table 73-Data pre-processing detector characteristics of WeblD~ 
Detector item Detector item(s) IDS scope Comment (see also Section 5.3.2) 
type 
Filter Arguments. http The detector may .filter information based all 
request information available in the log file. 
Filter Source ID Network See above. 
layer 
Filter Object User See above. 
Data Single character http The detector is capable of decoding hexadecimal 
normalization decoding encoded characters used in the CRL. 
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Table 74-Analysis-level detector characteristics of WebIDS 
Detector item 
type 
(analysis type) 
Detector item 
(level) 
Single instance, Semantic 
bi-directional 
instance, single 
instance part, 
bi-directional 
instance part 
group 
Cross-instance, Basic 
bi-directional 
cross-instance 
IDS scope 
http 
http 
Comment (see also Section 0) 
The detector is capable of alUl(l'zing the 
semantics of the request (e.g., theft of password 
file). It may even investigate the success or non-
success of an attack. According(l', these 
capabilities enable an appropriate ana(rsis of 
individual pans of http requests. 
The detector is able to identify simple relations 
between requests for statistical purposes (see 
also below). 
Table 75-Control item analysis detector characteristics of Web IDS 
Detector item 
type 
(analysis type) 
Detector item 
(level) 
Single instance, Size 
single instance 
part 
Single instance, Regular 
single instance 
part 
expressions 
IDS scope 
http 
http 
Comment (see also Section 5.3.3.2.2) 
The detector is capable of verifying the si::e of 
http requests. 
The detector uses regular expressions to detect 
suspicious activities. 
To avoid repetition we omit the description of the statistical analysis capabilities of WebIDS here. It has 
already been provided in Example 1 of Section 5.3.3.3.2. 
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Appendix D Formal specifications and description 
examples 
In this appendix we provide the semi-formal specification for the constructs that we use to describe attack 
classes. This includes brief descriptions of all constructs and their elements and some extensive examples. 
The description scheme used in this work employs Prolog rules to express attack classes, attack class 
description building blocks, attack class variations, and alarm conditions. These rules are composed of a 
predefined set of elements, i.e., Prolog predicates. For the semi-formal specification of these constructs 
we rely on the BNF grammar for the Prolog core. Based on this grammar we specify the subset of 
predicates that may be used to create attack descriptions etc. 
D.I BNF specification of Prolog 
In its core Prolog is relatively small programming language. However, it contains a large set of 
predefmed predicates and supports many notational variations such as infix symbols. In the following 
BNF specification, which we derived from the book on logical programming by Slonneger and Kurtz 
[SloBar95a], only the core of the language is specified. We extended their specification towards covering 
the predicates we use to describe input to the IDS analysis process. 
<program> ::= <clause list> <query> I <query> 
<clause list> ::= <clause> I <clause list> <clause> 
<clause> ::= <predicate> "." I <predicate> ":-" <predicate list> "." 
<predicate> ::= <atom> I <atom> "(" <term list> ")" . 
<predicate list> ::= <predicate> I "(" <predicate list> "I" I "I" 
<predicate list> "," <predicate list> I 
<predicate list> ";" <predicate list> . 
<term list> ::= <term> I <term list> "," <term> 
<list> ::= "[" <term list> "j" I "[" <term list> "I" <term> "j- I "[j" . 
<term> ::= <numeral> I <predicate> I <variable> I <list> . 
<query> ::= "?-" <predicate list> "." . 
<atom> ::= <small atom> I "'" <string> "'" . 
<small atom> ::= <lowercase letter> I <small atom> <character> 
<variable> ::= <uppercase letter> I <variable> <character> . 
<lowercase letter> ::= "a" I _ I HZ" • 
<uppercase letter> ::= "A" I _ I HZ" I "_" . 
<numeral> ::= <digit> I <numeral> <digit> 
<digit> ::= "0" I ... I "9" . 
<character> ::= <lowercase letter> I <uppercase letter> I <digit> 
<special> . 
<special> ::= "+" I "-" I "*" I "I" I "\" I "A_ 
"@11 I 11#11 I "$" I "&" . 
<string> ::= <character> I <string> <character> 
"-" I II • n " . 
.' d" f tta kiss description In the subsequent sections we provide the specificatIons for the escnptIon 0 a c c a 
building blocks etc. These specifications are relatively simple, as we simply restrict the set of predicates 
that may be used to formulate clauses. Note, however, that in addition to the predicates to be defmed in 
the following we always permit the use of built-in predicates such as not (XI or equal (X, YI ~ithin rig.ht-
. ., rall d" infix tation' X - Y Moreover note that hand predicates. The check for equahty IS gene y use m Its no . - . 
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in the following definitions terms starting with capital letters denote variables and terms starting \\ith 
lower-case letters denote atoms with a fixed value. In addition we denote lists by adding the suffix List 
and use the Prolog tenn "_" as a generic placeholder for empty or non-relevant fields. 
D.2 Attack class description building blocks 
Attack class description building blocks were introduced in Section 6.1. We therefore restrict the 
following descriptions to a semi-fonnal specification and a brief description of the permitted predicates. 
For right-hand predicates we permit the use of one particular predicate only: 
adbb(basic, ADBB, ADBBScp, IDS, Detector, EffScp, ScpList, DiaglnList, 
DiagOutList, VarslnList, VarsOUtList, BlkFlag) 
The adbb atom is used to fonnulate rules that describe attack class description building blocks. It takes 
several arguments: 
• basic: A variable used internally by RIDAX. For the description of attack class description 
building blocks this variable has to be substituted with the atom basic or basic2; however. the 
latter may only be used to defme helper rules that are included by other adbb (basic, _) 
clauses. The sole purpose of adbb (basic2, ... ) clauses is the simplification of the description 
task. 
• ADBB: Identifier of the attack class description building block. 
• ADBBScp: (High-level) IDS scope for which this attack class description building block IS 
defined. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
IDS: Identifier of the IDS analyzed. 
Detector: Identifier of the detector considered. 
EffScp: IDS scope for which the attack class description building block is to be evaluated (see 
Section 6.1.1); commonly referred to as "effective IDS scope." 
ScpList: List of IDS scopes that the attack class considered involves. 
DiaglnList, DiagOutList: Lists that keep track of the analysis process and record all IDS 
attributes that were required to evaluate the attack class considered. 
VarslnList, VarsOutList: Lists that keep track of the variations already considered and of 
those that remain to be considered. 
BlkFlag: Variable indicating whether the evaluation of the attack class description building 
block has been blocked. 
Most of these arguments are reused in the following. Moreover note that they have already been 
introduced in Section 6.2.1, where we provided a simplified example of an attack class description. 
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For the right-hand predicates we permit the use of a set of 13 predicates that can be used to describe 
attack class description building blocks (in the following we use .. (_)" as a place holder for argument 
lists defmed earlier): 
adbb(eval, ... ) , adbb(basic2, _) 
In Section 6.1.3 we explained why and how attack class description building blocks can depend upon 
each other. We therefore permit the description of an attack class description building block to include 
other attack class description building blocks in its evaluation. See also the second example in Section 
6.1.3. 
chkDetAttrib(Detector, RequestedScp, ItemType, Item, 
DiagInList, DiagOutList) 
This predicate verifies whether the detector description contains an attribute that enables the IDS to 
perform the analysis that is described by ItemType and Item at the IDS scope specified by 
RequestedScp. This rule, however, never fails. If the IDS is found capable of perfonning the analysis, 
this is recorded accordingly in DiagOutList, which serves as input to the alarm analysis process 
described in Section 7.1.2. 
• RequestedScp: IDS scope of the requested IDS characteristics. 
• ItemType, Item: Generic identifier of the requested IDS characteristics. 
All other arguments have already been defmed. 
chkSensorAttrib(Ids, Sensor, RequestedScp, ItemType. Item, 
DiagInList, DiagOutList) 
This predicate performs the same verification for sensors as chkDetAttrib does for detectors. 
reqDetAttrib ( ... ) , reqSensorAttrib I. .. ) 
These predicates are similar to chkDetAttrib and chkSensorAttrib. The difference is that they fail if 
the requested characteristic is not available. 
reqDetAttribAbsence ( ... ) , reqSensorAttribAbsence (-) 
These predicates are similar to reqDetAttrib and reqSensorAttrib. The difference is that they fail if 
the requested characteristic is available and succeed if no characteristics specified by ItemType, Item 
and RequestedScp is available. 
variation (exercise, , ,Detector, EffScp, ScpList, 
DiagInList, DiagoutList. VarsInList, VarsOutList, BlkFlag) 
This predicate exercises the variations listed in VarsInList that are applicable to the IDS scope specified 
by EffScp. The effects of the variation are recorded in DiagOutList. If the variation blocks any further 
analysis the BlkFlag variable is set accordingly. 
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relBlkFlag(BlkFlagIn, BlkFlagOut) 
This predicate is used to resolve a RillAX, i e Prolog specifilc l'ssue that req' th 
. '" wres e BlkFlag argument 
given to other predicates to be an uninstantiated variable. It is the first of a set of helper predicates 
described in the following. 
selectAnyScp(SuperScp, SubScp, ScpList), selectSubScp(_). selectSuperScp(_) 
These predicates traverse the IDS scope tree and return either a lower-level (SubScp) or a higher-level 
(superScp) IDS scope from the list of IDS scopes provided in ScpList. selectSubScp. for instance. 
searches ScpList for an IDS scope SubScp below SuperScp. 
statCombinations(Comparison, Time, History, Unit. Item) 
This helper predicate facilitates the specification of detector characteristics related to statistical analysis as 
described in Section 5.3.3.3.2. 
D.3 Attack descriptions 
The specification of the core attack classes, i.e., attack class descriptions, is similar to the one for attack 
class description building blocks, and is restricted to a single left-hand predicate as well: 
attack (basic. Attack, EffScp, IDS. Detector, ScpList, MaxVars, DiagInList. 
DiagOutList, VarsList, BlkFlag) 
However, there are some important differences in the purpose of attack class and attack class description 
building block descriptions, resulting in some differences in the argument list: 
• Attack: Identifier of the attack class. 
• MaxVars: Maximum number of variations that may be selected concurrently. 
• VarsList: The set of variations selected. 
Note that EffScp, ScpList, varsList and BlkFlag represent output variables. In fact, the combination 
of Attack, EffScp and varsList defines an variant, as introduced in Chapter 6. 
The set of right-hand predicates that may be used to describe an attack class is almost identical to the one 
permitted for attack class description building blocks. The only difference is that attack class descriptions 
support an additional predicate that performs the selection of variations to be considered: 
selectVars(MaxVars, VarsList, scpList. DiagInList. DiagOutList) 
Each attack class description should select the variations to be considered before describing the actual 
core of the attack class (see also the example description in Section 6.2.1). Moreover, note that creating 
complex attack class descriptions is discouraged. Instead, it is preferable to create attack class description 
building block descriptions that can then be used to compose multiple attack class descriptions. 
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D.4 Attack class variations 
The specification of attack class variations is similar to that of the attack class description building blocks 
as well. However, the complete description of a variation requires two clauses, i.e .. left-hand predicates. 
A first clause defmes the existence of the variation: 
variation (index, Var, VarScp, _, Varlndex, 
Its primary goal is the defmition of the variation index (varlndex) and the IDS scope (VarScp) at which 
the variations is defmed. See also Sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.3. Based on this clause the selectVars 
predicate selects the variations to be considered. Moreover, note that the two-tuple composed of the 
identifier Var and the IDS scope VarScp identifies variations. This clause does not support any right-hand 
predicates. 
The second clause describes the actual variation and is defined by the following left-hand predicate: 
variation (blkChk, Var, VarScp, IDS, Detector, EffScp, ScpList, 
DiaglnList, DiagOutList, _, _, BlkFlag) 
The set of right-hand predicates that may be used to express these clauses is again almost identical to that 
permitted for the description of attack class description building blocks. The only difference is that the 
description of a variation may in addition suppress IDS characteristics: 
supDetAttrib C .. ), supSensorAttrib ( ... ) 
These predicates take the same arguments as chkDetAttrib and chkSensorAttrib defmed in Appendix 
D.2. Once such a predicate has succeeded all IDS characteristics described by ItemType and Item are 
unavailable for further analysis at all IDS scopes ofRequestedScp and below. 
D.S Alarm condition specification 
The specification of alarm conditions introduced in Section 7.1.2.1 is also similar to that of attack class 
description building blocks. The clauses describing alarm conditions start with the following left-hand 
predicate: 
alarmChk(basic, Alarm, Al armS cp, EffScp, SuccessState, IDS, Detector, 
_, _, DiaglnList, DiagOutList) 
In accordance to the clauses introduced, alarm conditions are identified by the arguments Alarm and 
AlarmScp. The (output) variable EffScp reflects the IDS scope for which the analysis IDS has the 
potential of generating alarms that belong to the alarm class identified by Alarm and AlarmScp. In 
addition, the variable SuccessState reflects whether the IDS analyzed is capable of analyzing the attack 
reported in terms of its success. 
For the description of alarm conditions all except one of right-hand predicates used for describing attack 
class description building blocks are permitted. The only restriction is that we do not permit variations 
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(variation) to be included in alann conditions. In addition, we include two predicates that permit the 
examination of the IDS characteristics that were required for the analysis of attack class variant 
considered: 
reqDetAttribUsed (Detector, RequestedScp, EffScp, ItempType, Item, 
DiagInList, DiagOutList), reqSensorAttribUsed (_) 
The predicates reqDetAttribUsed and reqSensorAttribUsed only succeed if the analysis of the attack 
class variant required that the IDS analyzed employs the IDS characteristics described by It emType , 
Item and RequestedScp. If the predicate succeeds, EffScp reports the precise IDS scope at which the 
IDS made use of the IDS characteristics required. 
D.6 Example descriptions 
In this section we provide Prolog code examples to illustrate how the above specifications were used to 
describe attack classes etc. The examples are taken from the RIDAX prototype implementation. 
To facilitate the reading of the examples we provide the definitions of the most basic abbreviations, i.e .. 
atoms. All IDS characteristics used in the following examples have been defmed in Chapter 5; example 
interpretations are provided in Appendix C. 
Basic detector 
item types 
si i 
cr i 
method 
data norm 
filter 
alarm timestamp 
Table 76-Abbreviations of detector item types 
The detector item types (see Section 5.3) define item categories as illustrated 
for example in Figure 26. All item types related to instance analysis may be 
extended further by appending the extensions bidir (hi-directional analysis), 
data (analysis of data), info (analysis of control information), seq (analysis of 
sequences), stat (statistical analysis), and time (timing related analysis). 
Single instance analysis 
Single instance part analysis 
Cross-instance analysis 
Cross-instance part analysis 
Instance group analysis 
Instance part group analysis 
Detection method 
Data normalization 
Filtering 
Delay of alarms 
Alarm timestamp 
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Table 77-Abbreviations of sensor item types 
Sensor item types The sensor item types (see Section 5.2) define item categories as illustrated for 
example in Figure 21. 
args Arguments 
data Data 
obj Object 
Object attributes 
prot ctl Protocol control information 
Delay of report provided to detector 
Reporting time 
report_timestmp Reporting timestamp provided 
req Request 
res Results 
Sensor type; information source monitored 
D.6.1 Alarm class description building blocks examples 
1* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
* adbb/17req - definition of the requirements to handle most 
* basic layer 7 activity. We start with description for a network-based 
* IDS. 
*1 
adbb(basic, AB, ABSCP, IDS, DET, EFFSCP, SCPLIST, 
DIAGIN, DIAGOUT, VARSIN, VARSOUT, BLKFLAG) 
(AB=reqDataUp; AB=reqDataDown; AB=reqDataBiDir), ABSCP=app_l, 
1* This only applies for external data sources *j 
reqSensorAttrib(IDS, _, generic, sensor_type, data_external, 
DIAGIN, DIAGl), 
1* verify and get the scope *1 
selectSubScp(ABSCP, EFFSCP, SCPLIST), 
1* blocking ... *1 
relBlkFlag(BLKFLAG, BLKl) , 
1* check the lower layers *1 
adbb(eval, AB, trsp 1, IDS, DET, ,SCPLIST, 
DIAGl, DIAG2, VARSIN, VARSl, BLKl) , 
1* blocking ... *1 
relBlkFlag(BLKl, BLK2) , 
1* check the required service access point of the 
* underlaying layer *1 
adbb(basic2, AB, ABSCP, IDS, DET, EFFSCP, SCPLIST, 
DIAG2, DIAG3, VARSl, VARS2, BLK2) , 
1* blocking ... *1 
relBlkFlag(BLK2, BLK3) , 
/* now check the variations for this layer *1 
selectAnyScp(ABSCP, VSCP, SCPLIST), 
variation (exercise, _, _, IDS, DET, VSCP, SCPLIST, 
DIAG3, DIAGOUT, VARS2, VARSOUT, BLK3) , 
relBlkFlag(BLK3, BLKFLAG). 
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adbb(basic2, AB, ABSCP, IDS, _, EFFSCP, SCPLIST, 
DIAGIN, DIAGOUT, VARS, VARS, notBlk) :-
1* here we verify the basic requirements for ABSCP scope awareness */ 
(AB=reqDataUp; AB=reqDataDown; AB=reqDataBiDir) ABSCP=app_l, 
1* verify and get the scope *1 ' 
selectSubScp(ABSCP, EFFSCP, SCPLIST), 
1* require the layer 4 data to be available *1 
reqSensorAttrib(IDS, _, EFFSCP, data, pdu, DIAGIN, DIAGOUT). 
1* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
* adbb/17req - alternatively we consider an IDS that is host based 
* and is providing access to tcp or udp data streams i.e., to the data 
* exchanged over sockets. 
*1 
adbb(basic, AB, ABSCP, IDS, _, EFFSCP, SCPLIST, 
DIAGIN, DIAGOUT, VARS, VARS, notBlk) :-
AB=reqDataUp, ABSCP=app 1, 
1* This only applies-for internal data sources *1 
reqSensorAttrib(IDS, SENSOR, generic, sensor_type, data_internal, 
DIAGIN, DIAGl), 
1* verify and get the scope *1 
selectSubScp(ABSCP, EFFSCP, SCPLIST), 
1* check the required service access point of the 
* underlaying layer *1 
reqSensorAttrib(IDS, SENSOR, EFFSCP, data, up_stream, DIAGl. DIAGOUT). 
adbb(basic, AB. ABSCP, IDS. • EFFSCP, SCPLIST. 
DIAGIN, DIAGOUT, VARS, VARS, notBlk) :-
AB=reqDataDown, ABSCP=app_l, 
1* This only applies for internal data sources *1 
reqSensorAttrib(IDS, SENSOR. generic, sensor_type. data internal. 
DIAGIN, DIAGl), 
1* verify and get the scope *1 
selectSubScp(ABSCP, EFFSCP, SCPLIST), 
1* check the required service access point of the 
* underlaying layer *1 
reqSensorAttrib(IDS, SENSOR. EFFSCP, data, down_stream. DIAGl. DIAGOUT). 
adbb(basic. AB, ABSCP, IDS, _, EFFSCP, SCPLIST. 
DIAGIN, DIAGOUT, VARS, VARS, notBlk) :-
AB=reqDataBiDir, ABSCP=app_l, 
1* This only applies for internal data sources *1 
reqSensorAttrib(IDS, SENSOR. generic, sensor_type, data internal. 
DIAGIN, DIAGl), 
1* verify and get the scope *1 
selectSubScp(ABSCP, EFFSCP, SCPLIST), 
1* check the required service access point of the 
* underlaying layer *1 
reqSensorAttrib(IDS, SENSOR. EFFSCP. data. up_stream. DIAGl, DIAG2). 
reqSensorAttrib(IDS, SENSOR, EFFSCP, data, down_stream. DIAG2, DIAGOUT). 
1* we do not exercise any transport layer variations here because 
* they should have been removed by the networking stack already *1 
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/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
: ~dbb/argBOF/optBOF ~ a buffer overflow attack using arguments 
1.e., the request 11ne of protocol session or the arguments 
* of a function call etc. 
*/ 
adbb(basic, AB, .ABSCP, IDS, DET, , SCPLIST, 
DIAGIN, DIAGOUT, VARS, VARS, notBlk) :_ 
(AB=argBOF; AB=optBOF), 
(ABSCP=app 1; ABSCP=call), 
/* verify and get the scope */ 
selectSubScp(call, EFFSCP, SCPLIST), 
/* information required */ 
reqSensorAttrib(IDS, SENSOR, EFFSCP, req, , DIAGIN, DIAG2), 
reqSensorAttrib(IDS, SENSOR, proc, obj, id~ DIAG2, DIAG4\, 
/* awareness level */ 
reqDetAttrib(DET, proc, si_i, basic, DIAG4, DIAG6), 
reqDetAttrib(DET, EFFSCP, si i, basic, DIAG6, DIAGS), 
reqDetAttrib(DET, EFFSCP, i_grp, logic, DIAGS, DIAGIO), 
/* the techniques */ 
reqDetAttrib(DET, EFFSCP, i_grp_seq, fixed, DIAGIO, DIAGOUT). 
D.6.2 Attack description example 
See also the example of the http argument buffer overflow attack provided in Section 6.2.1. 
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
* attack/suspArg - suspicious but benign argument string. 
* we verify the possibility of weak string signatures. 
* ActNbr: lS-20, 3S, 39 
*/ 
attack(basic, ACT, EFFSCP, IDS, DET, SCPLIST, MaxVars, 
DIAGIN, DIAGOUT, VARS, BLKFLAG) :-
ACT=suspArg, 
(((EFFSCP=http; EFFSCP=smtp; EFFSCP=ftp) ,LSCP=tcp); 
((EFFSCP=domain; EFFSCP=syslog),LSCP=udp», 
SCPLIST=[EFFSCP,LSCP,ipv4,ieee_S02_3] , 
/* select the variations to consider */ 
selectVars(MaxVars, VARS, SCPLIST, DIAGIN, DIAG2), 
/* This activity is in fact a layer 7 request */ 
adbb(eval, reqCtlUp, app_l, IDS, DET, EFFSCP, SCPLIST, 
DIAG2, DIAG4, VARS, VARS2, BLK1), 
relBlkFlag(BLK1, BLKFLAG), 
/* now check for the attack specific things i.e., the BOF */ 
adbb(eval, suspArg, app_l, IDS, DET, EFFSCP, SCPLIST, 
DIAG4, DIAGOUT, VARS2, _, BLKFLAG). 
D.6.3 Attack variation examples 
* -------------------------------------------------/ --------------------
* variation/13frgFirst - fragmentation on layer 3 . 
* This variation allows IDSs that are able to analyze only the f1rst 
* fragment only to recognize an attack correctly - assuming that the 
* attack can be identified by looking at the first fragment. 
*/ 
variation (index, 13frgFirst, net_l_frg, _, 3500, '_' _, _, -' ) . 
variation (blkChk, VAR, , ,DET, EFFSCP, 
DIAGIN, DIAGOUT,-_,-_, notBlk) :-
VAR=13frgFirst, 
/* simply check for fragment awareness 
* we assume that the interesting data is in the first 
* fragement. */ 
chkDetAttrib(DET, EFFSCP, si_ip, basic, DIAGIN, DIAGOUTI, .. 
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1* ------------------------ ________ _ 
: va:iatio~/l~frgNotFirst - fragmentation-~~-~~~~~-~-------------------
* T~~s ~ar~at~on makes the assumption that the suspicious data lS 
d~str~buted over multiple fragments, and that the IDS needs to be 
:/able recompose these fragments in order to recognize the attack. 
var~at~on(index, 13frgNotFirst, net_l_frg, ,3500, _, _). 
var~at~on(blkChk, VAR, _, IDS, DET, EFFSCP, 
DIAGIN, DIAGOUT, , ,notBlk):-
VAR=13frgNotFirst~ -
1* We require the IDS to be able to recompose fragments • 
reqDetAttrib(DET, EFFSCP, si_i, basic, DIAGIN, DIAGl) , 
reqDetAttrib(DET, EFFSCP, si_ip, basic, DIAGl, DIAG2) , 
reqDetAttrib(DET, EFFSCP, ip grp, logic, DIAG2, DIAG4) , 
1* Layer 3 data and header *1 
reqSensorAttrib(IDS, DET, EFFSCP, data, pdu, DIAG4, DIAG6), 
reqSensorAttrib(IDS, DET, EFFSCP, prot_ctl, frag_ctl, DIAG6, 
DIAGOUT), !. 
D.6.4 Alarm condition examples 
1* --------------------------------------------------------------- _____ _ 
* alarmChk/argStr - a suspicious argument string has been observed. 
* The IDS is capable of reporting the success-state of the suspected 
* attack. 
*1 
alarmChk(basic, ALR, ALRSCP, EFFSCP, true, IDS, DET, SCPLIST, ,DIAGIN, 
DIAGOUT) 
ALR=argStr, ALRSCP=app I, 
1* simplification of rule: reuse the rule for detecting suspicious 
1* data without reporting of success-state *1 
alarmChk(basic, ALR, ALRSCP, EFFSCP, false, IDS, DET, SCPLIST, 
, DIAGIN, DIAG2), 
1* now verify whether the IDS is capable to verify the success *1 
reqSensorAttrib(IDS, _, EFFSCP, res, status, DIAG2, DIAG4), 
(reqDetAttrib(DET, EFFSCP, si_i_bidir, semantic, DIAG4, DIAG6); 
reqDetAttrib(DET, EFFSCP, ip_grp_bidir, semantic, DIAG4, DIAG6», 
1* require the data *1 
adbb(eval, reqCtlDown, app_l, IDS, DET, EFFSCP, SCPLIST, 
DIAG6, DIAGOUT, [], ,notBlk). 
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
* alarmChk/argStr - a suspicious string has been observed. 
*1 
alarmChk(basic, ALR, ALRSCP, EFFSCPl, false, IDS, DET, SCPLIST, ,DIAGIN, 
DIAGOUT) :-
(ALR=argStr; 
ALR=optStr) , 
ALRSCP=app_l, 
selectSubScp(ALRSCP, EFFSCPl, SCPLIST), 
TSCP=trsp I, 
1* Check the IDS capabilities that were required *1 
(reqDetAttribUsed(DET, TSCP, EFFSCP, si_ip_data, string, DIAGIN, DIAG4); 
reqDetAttribUsed(DET, TSCP, EFFSCP, si_i_data, string, DIAGIN, DIAG4», 
1* check the required the data *1 
(reqSensorAttribUsed(IDS, ,TSCP,EFFSCP, data, pdu, DIAG4, DIAGOUT); 
reqSensorAttribUsed(IDS, ,TSCP,EFFSCP, data, up_stream, DIAG4, 
DIAGOUT» . 
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Appendix E Glossary 
In the following we summarize the terms that were defined within the MAFfIA framework [021 MalO3) 
and that are relevant to this work and to ID. Note that we provide only the definition of terms relevant to 
this work and that many of these defInitions are based on the concept of security policy as defined in 
MAFTIA D21 [D21MalO3], Section 3.1. 
• 
• 
Activity: event or a sequence of events within a given context. 
Alarm (intrusion detection -): a report of an error that may lead to or has led to a security failure. 
optionally including diagnostic infonnation about the cause of the error. 
• Alarm (false -): see false positive. 
• Attack (general sense): a malicious interaction fault, through which an attacker aims to 
deliberately violate one or more security properties; an intrusion attempt; (human sense) a 
malicious human interaction fault whereby an attacker aims to deliberately violate one or more 
security properties; (technical sense) a malicious technical interaction fault aiming to exploit a 
vulnerability as a step towards achieving the final aim of the attacker. 
• Error: part of the state ofa system liable to lead tofailure [LaAvK092]; manifestation of a fault 
in a system [LaAvK092]. 
• Event: a thing that happens or takes place [OMED92]; a change in state. 
• Failure: event occurring when the delivered service deviates from fulfIlling the system function. 
i.e., from what the system is intended for [Laprie98]; transition from co"ect service to incorrect 
service [LaAvK092]; see also security failure. 
• Failure (security -): violation of a security property of the intended security policy. 
• False positive: the event corresponding to the incorrect decision to rate an activity as being 
erroneous; also called a "false alarm" or "type II error." 
• False negative: the event corresponding to the incorrect decision not to rate an activity as being 
erroneous; also called a "miss" or "type I error." 
• Fault: the adjudged or hypothesized cause of an e"or [LaAvK092]; error cause intended to be 
avoided or tolerated [LaAvK092]; consequence for a system of the failure of another system that 
has interacted or is interacting with the system considered [LaAvK092]. 
• 
• 
• 
Intrusion: a malicious, externally-induced fault resulting from an attack that has succeeded in 
exploiting a vulnerability. 
Malicious: intending or intended to do harm [OMED92]. 
Security policy: description of 1) the security properties to be fulfIlled by a computing system: 2) 
the rules according to which the system security state can evolve. 
• Service: system behavior as perceived by a system user [LaA vK092]. 
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• Service (correct -): service that fulfills the system function [Laprie98]. 
• Service (incorrect -): service that does not fulfill the system function [Laprie98J. 
• State (system -): a condition of being, with respect to a set of circumstances [LaAvK092J. 
• System: entity having intemcted, intemcting or able to intemct with other entities [laAvK092J; 
set of components bound together in order to intemct [LaAvK092J. 
• System function: that for which the system is intended [Laprie98J. 
• True positive: the event corresponding to the correct decision to mte an activity as being 
erroneous; also called a "hit." 
• True negative: the event corresponding to the correct decision not to mte an activity as being 
erroneous. 
• User (system -): another system (physical, human) intemcting with the system considered 
[LaAvK092]. 
• Vulnerability: a fault created during development of the system, or during operation, that could 
be exploited to create an intrusion. 
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